CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): U.S.-CHINA

S E C R E T THE HAGUE 001413 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, EAP/CM, L/ACV, IO/S SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) NSC FOR LEDDY WINPAC FOR WALTER E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2017 TAGS: PARM PREL CH CWC SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): U.S.-CHINA BILATERAL DISCUSSION ON COMPLIANCE ON THE MARGINS OF THE 49TH SESSION OF THE OPCW EXECUTIVE COUNCIL REF: STATE 88012 Classified By: Pete Ito, Deputy Permanent Representative to the Organiz ation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Reasons: 1.4 (B, D). This is CWC-67-07. -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) On June 25 and 28, chemical weapons (CW) experts from the United States and China held bilateral discussions on Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) compliance issues on the margins of the 49th Session of the Organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Executive Council in The Hague. The U.S. delegation was led by Ambassador Eric Javits, U.S. Permanent Representative to the OPCW. The Chinese team was led by Chen Kai, Director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The meetings are part of an ongoing exchange in which the U.S. has sought additional information to assess China's compliance with, and understand China's implementation of, the CWC. This exchange, which began in 1998, resulted in a productive bilateral meeting in October 2002 and was re-energized last December following China's request to engage with the U.S. on a wider range of CWC issues. The overall atmosphere was constructive and positive, although the Chinese team was clearly uncomfortable with the level of detail sought by the U.S. side on some questions. The Chinese engaged in dialogue to clarify their April 2007 responses to USG questions (provided in November 2006). In answering some of the USG's specific declaration and compliance questions, the Chinese delegation stressed that the level of detail and transparency it has provided to the U.S. relating to the CWC is unprecedented. ¶2. (S) The discussions on June 25 began with Ambassador Javits drawing from the general talking points contained in reftel and following up with reftel questions to clarify China's previous responses to USG questions. As part of the ongoing compliance dialogue, the U.S. envisions visiting one or more Chinese CW-related sites in the future and used this opportunity to lay the groundwork before submitting a more 
formal request. Accordingly, del proposed continuing the overall CWC dialogue in Beijing this Fall, and expressed interest in visiting one or more Chinese sites. The Chinese side did not respond to these proposals. On June 28, a smaller group of CW experts from both side met to discuss several follow-up questions that resulted from the earlier meeting, which were subsequently handed over in written form. The discussions answered some, though not all, remaining U.S. questions. It is not clear that Beijing is able or willing to provide the level of detail we have requested in all cases. Overall, however, the USG met the three objectives laid out in reftel to further the U.S. - China compliance dialogue. Delegation lists are contained in paragraphs 15-16. End Summary -------------- JUNE 25 MEETING -------------- ¶3. (S) On June 25 the U.S. asked a number of follow-up questions drawing on reftel. Below are the Chinese responses. -------------- Declarations of Past Transfers -------------- ¶4. (S) The Chinese team reaffirmed that China did not use Form CW 1.0 to report transfers of agent to Albania (and does not plan to do so) due to a lack of sufficient documentation to support completion of the form. Instead, China provided a narrative description of the mustard (HD) transfer based on "the memories of concerned persons". (Note: The narrative description was not included in the redacted version of China's 1997 CWC declaration that the OPCW Technical Secretariat provided to States Parties including the U.S. SIPDIS The Technical Secretariat made a unilateral decision to not include the information since the narrative stated that the amount of HD transferred was very small.) Chen Kai explained that for the same reason, China did not use Form CWT 1.0 - CWT 2.7, and currently has no intention to do so. ¶5. (S) China was not clear on whether it will amend its 1997 declaration to reflect the 0.97 MT of Lewisite declared by Albania. Although China has oral reports by former workers suggesting the Lewisite came from China, it was not able to find sufficient documentation to show that a transfer occurred, according to Chen. He acknowledged that the quantity of Lewisite (L) transferred may be above the Convention's limit for a declaration of a transfer based on the information provided by former CW workers. He also said that China should make a declaration of the amount and that China did transfer a small amount of Lewisite; however, this statement seemed to indicate Chen Kai's personal reflection rather that China's intent to declare the transfer. ¶6. (S) Chen Kai stated that Chinese experts conducted one bilateral visit to Albania and were given access to the Albanian CWSF but did not find documentation to support the transfer. He stated that he was not a part of the visit and could not provide additional details. Chen Kai stated that the CW agents were transferred between governments and did not involve a third party. He further stated that the Albanian government initiated the request for CW agents from China. Chen Kai also said that the Lewisite information is not sufficient to support a declaration of a transfer and noted that the information China has collected is too sketchy. ¶7. (S) Chen Kai noted that he had no information on the transfer of mustard/Lewisite mixture but agreed to confer with the Chinese experts that visited Albania on several follow-up questions that were later provided to the Chinese on June 28. The U.S. also learned that China was trying to find logbooks of the runs made at its chemical weapons production facility, which China considers as experimental records; At the same time, Chen Kai has stated that China's production records did not show records of transfer and confirmed that all of the mustard was made at a single facility. Chen Kai opined that at this late date it is difficult to find records of such transfer of agents to Albania within China. -------------- -------------- Chemical Plant Accident Involving Nitrogen Mustard -------------- -------------- ¶8. (S) The U.S. sought clarification of China's answers about an accident that occurred at a chemical plant in 2000 involving nitrogen mustard (HN2). Chen Kai stated that that the plant only produces an intermediate for a pneumonia drug in which nitrogen mustard salt is made in a captive use scenario. He stated that following the accident in 2000 the Chinese National Authority immediately sent a team of experts to investigate. The team learned that the accident occurred due to operator error. The plant is still in operation. He explained the process is two steps: in step one three chemicals are reacted to form the nitrogen mustard salt (methylbenzene, N-methyl diethanolamine and thionyl chloride); in step two, the nitrogen mustard salt is reacted with hydrochloric acid (HCl) in the presence of a catalyst, followed by an addition of sodium hydroxide (NaOH) to make the intermediate. Chen Kai said that the accident occurred between steps 1 and 2. He claimed that one operator did not add the HCl following step 1 and a plant shift change occurred. A second operator, incorrectly assuming the first operator had completed the first stage, added the sodium hydroxide to the nitrogen mustard salt, resulting in the formation of HN2. (NOTE: This track with the process chemistry reported in the Chinese Journal of Industrial Hygiene and Occupational Diseases, but clarifies that ordinarily, the mustard salt reacts with HCL prior to the introduction of the sodium hydroxide, thus avoiding wholesale conversion into HN2). He noted that there is no CWC declaration requirement for the salt of a CW agent, and that China therefore does not consider this facility declarable. The U.S. was gently rebuffed when it requested additional information on the chemistry. Chen Kai explained that based on Chinese investigations, no other similar incident has occurred in China where HN2 was accidentally produced, nor are there any other similar facilities in China. ¶9. (S) After conferring with U.S. chemists, additional questions were provided to Chen Kai on June 28 about chemistry of the operations, including details of process conditions. The central issue raised by U.S. experts was that, granting that the facility aims to produce nitrogen mustard salt, rather than the base, as an intermediate product, it is nevertheless the case that the process described would lead to the formation of HN2 as well as the salt after the first stage; they are "equilibrium products" and a mixture of both is always created. How much is in each form (hydrochloric salt and free HN2) will depend on the conditions used in the production process. It is quite possible that they sometimes exceed the 100 gram limit in a reactor of hundreds, or a few thousand, liters - depending on the pH and other operating conditions. Baed on this explanation, he agreed to inquire furher with Chinese experts. -------------- Chemical Weapons Precursor nd Schedule 1 Chemical for Protective Purposes -------------- -------------- ¶10. () The U.S. informed Chen Kai that it is generally satisfied with China's answers relating to CW precrsors and schedule 1 chemical for protective puroses and thanked China for providing further claity in these areas. To wrap-up our discussion he U.S. asked a clarification question in each aea. In response to the U.S. question as to when hina's single small scale facility (SSSF) began oprations, we were told in 1997 and that the chemial weapons precursor methylphosphonyl dichloride(DC) was transferred to the SSSF before entry ino force of the Convention. The U.S. also asked f China would consider declassifying the structure of Vs, since the inforation is already in the public domain. Chen Kai informed us that China does not plan to declassifythe Vs chemical structure and it considers the infrmation highly classified. -------------- Historical CW Program -------------- ¶11. (S) China continues to hedge in its responses on its CW recordkeeping. Chen Kai stated that ecordkeeping is somewhat limited, China was alsoto ascertain that its laboratory records made nomention of transfers of CW agents to Albania. I response to U.S. questions about the 6th Institute of the Chemical Defense Academy of the Chinese PA, he stated that production at the facility wassporadic and not continuous and also stated that it is his understanding that production facility meant a continuously operating facility. Chen Kai further explained that China's facility was not even pilot scale; all work was done in the laboratory and not with industrial equipment. The CW agents were produced using glass equipment at its research site. He explained that China did not have a chemical weapons storage facility and once CW agents were produced they were sent to the testing site. Chen Kai did acknowledge, however, that China did have a temporary storage site (at the testing area?). When the del subsequently asked for information on the capacity of the glassware and other details of production, Chen Kai referred back to Chinese responses from 2002, which he said were adequate, and complained about the intrusiveness and detail of U.S. questioning. -------------- Riot Control Agents -------------- ¶12. (S) Chen Kai stated that China did not produce the riot control agent dibenz-(b,f)-1,4-oxazepine (CR),CAS registry number 257-07-8) that was identified on a Chinese website. He said that the website was inaccurate and stated that China has many such websites containing inaccurate information. Chen Kai said the China has no plans for amending its riot control agent declaration. The U.S. delegation also asked the Chinese delegation if Chinese National Authority officials monitored companies' advertised production of scheduled chemicals to insure consistency with their declaration. Chen Kai responded that the number of companies is much too vast to do this, and in any case, many times the advertisements are overestimates and are inaccurate. He specifically mentioned that in one instance, the government officials noticed advertisements for production by a company, and when the officials investigated the company, they found that it had not been built. -------------- JUNE 28 MEETING -------------- ¶13. (S) The meeting was led by USDel member Astrid Lewis and supported by members of the U.S. Delegation. Chen Kai was supported by Mr. Xu Li, and Mr. Yu Bianjiang. This meeting was less formal than the June 25 meeting and it allowed the participants to freely ask questions and express themselves in a more open manner. The U.S. shared with Chen Kai a list of additional questions which resulted from the June 25 meeting. Several of the questions, which were technical in nature, were discussed and while the U.S. did not receive answers, the participants were able to explain the context of the questions and the underlying reasons for pursuing a response. Chen Kai explained that from his "personal perspective" the level of detail went beyond the CWC requirement. The U.S. side explained the reasons for pursuing compliance and the role of the VCI bureau and the Congressional mandate to report to the President and Congress. When the Chinese side explained that they were concerned about sharing national information with another country and that China has already provided detailed information to the OPCW Technical Secretariat, the U.S. countered that not all information a State Party provides to the TS is shared when a request is made to obtain any State Party's declaration. The U.S. side explained that the information received from declaration helps, but engaging in dialogues between States Parties further helps each other build a better picture of what has happen in the past. At the end of the hour long discussion both sides agreed that having face-to-face dialogues such as this helps us to better understand each other. Chen Kai agreed to take the questions back to Beijing so that Chinese experts can provide the U.S. with additional details. The U.S. presented the final list of questions on June 29 to Mr. Li Hong, Counselor, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the OPCW. ¶14. (S/Rel China) U.S. Follow-up Questions of China's Declaration and Compliance Issues resulting from the June 25 Meeting: Begin text ¶I. DECLARATION OF PAST TRANSFERS During our dialogue on Monday, June 25 China agreed to further ask Chinese experts that visited Albania's CW storage facilities the following questions: ¶1. Could China's CW experts that visited Albania ascertain whether Lewisite bulk agent containers at the Albania storage facility were of Chinese origins, by using distinguishing features such as configuration, size and markings? ¶2. Could China's CW experts that visited Albania ascertain whether mustard/Lewisite agent containers at the Albania storage facility were of Chinese origins by using distinguishing features such as configuration, size and markings? ¶3. Did Chinese CW experts take photographs of the bulk containers during their visit to the Albanian storage facility? Did China show the photographs to the former CW workers at its laboratory facilities to verify from the distinguishing features such as size, configuration and markings on the containers whether they were of Chinese origins? II. CHEMICAL PLANT ACCIDENT INVOLVING NITROGEN MUSTARD HN2 Based on our June 25 discussion, we understand that, in the two stage production process used at the plant was making an intermediate for the pneumonia drug that the formation of nitrogen mustard gas (free base) occurred when an operator failed to add hydrochloric acid (HCl) and during the shift change another operator instead added sodium hydroxide (NaOH). We have checked with our chemists and have some follow up questions. ¶1. Was there a spill of nitrogen mustard from the reactor as a result of adding NaOH without the HCl or was the nitrogen mustard contained in the reactor? ¶2. What were the circumstances at the factory that led to the workers exposure? ¶3. How did China determine whether (a) the workers were exposed to nitrogen mustard or, (b) were workers exposed to sulfur dioxide, which is another product that would form upon addition of NaOH? ¶4. Based on discussions with our chemists, our understanding of the two stage reaction as described on Monday is that the results after the first stage is the formation of the nitrogen mustard salt but also there is the formation of some nitrogen mustard present whenever there is salt. There is always a chemical equilibrium between the two. How much is in each form (hydrochloric salt and free HN-2) will depend on the conditions used in the production process. It is quite possible that they sometimes exceed the 100 gram limit in a reactor of hundreds, or a few thousand, liters - depending on the pH and other operating conditions. Can China provide additional details about the operating conditions at the facility to include pH, content in the reactor, amounts of chemicals added, temperature, pressure, sequence of processing steps, and etc. ¶5. It is possible that the small amounts of nitrogen mustard (free base) formed in the reactor over the course of a year could exceed the Convention requirement triggering a declaration. Does the amount of nitrogen mustard produced each year at the facility, even for captive use, require a declaration? ¶6. The accident was due to the quantity of HN-2 formed during the process, which we would expect based on the information we have seen, likely exceeded the Schedule 1A limit although it was on an accidental basis. Can the Chinese National Authority explain why, after it investigated the accident, it did not report the incident to the OPCW? ¶7. What is the name of the facility and where is it located? ¶8. What steps were implemented at the company to prevent this accident from occurring again in the future? III. HISTORICAL CW PROGRAM China stated that they did not have a 'full-up production facility', but, based on China's declaration was able to produce a significant quantity of agent using laboratory size equipment. In order to better understand more about the laboratory size equipment that was used to produce China's CW agents, we seek clarification to the following: ¶1. What was the capacity of the glass equipment used to make China's CW agents? ¶2. How many production batches were necessary to produce China's declared quantity of mustard? ¶3. How many production batches did it take to make the amount of the 13.7 metric tones (MT) of mustard and how many batches would have been necessary to make 0.97 MT of Lewisite and possibly .4 MT of mustard/Lewisite agents -- using the laboratory size equipment as was declared by Albania? End text. ¶15. (U) Chinese participants: Mr. Chen Kai and Mr. Xu Li of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Fang Chuanhan and Mr. Yan Li of the Ministry of Defense and Mr. Li Hong, Mr. Yu Bianjiang and Mr. Gao Huijun of the Chinese Delegation to the OPCW, The Hague. ¶16. (U) U.S. participants: Ambassador Eric Javits; Pete Ito, Elizabeth Sanders, and Larry Denyer (USDEL/OPCW); Astrid Lewis, Robert Mikulak, Christopher Park (July 28 only),Mary Reeves, and Louis Alvarado (State); and Sarah Nett and Thomas Cataldo (OSD). ¶17. (U) Ito sends. GALLAGHER