ROTTERDAM PORT RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING SYSTEM IN PLACE

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 001386 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/UBI HOMELAND SECURITY FOR OIA - DGORDNER DOE FOR MEGAPORTS PROGRAM - WKILMARTIN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EWWT KHLS KRAD PTER NL SUBJECT: ROTTERDAM PORT RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING SYSTEM IN PLACE ¶1. Summary: The port of Rotterdam recently completed the installation of 40 new radiation portal monitors (RPMs) at all container terminals. Dutch Customs, which operates the monitoring program, demonstrated the new system July 10 for officials from the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Megaports Initiative. DOE officials noted that Rotterdam officials have been actively sharing information with the U.S. to improve the capability for detecting illicit nuclear material. End Summary. ¶2. With the completed installation of all 40 RPMs, Rotterdam now scans 100% of the containers that enter and exit the port by train or truck for nuclear and radiological materials. The 40 RPM gates are manufactured by SAIC and are similar units to those installed at US borders and ports. As container trucks enter or exit the port (trains are only scanned upon entry into the port) they pass through inconspicuous booms on both sides of the road that passively scan and record the containers identification number and the radiation level of the container. A central command post monitors the RPM gates and sends trucks to a secondary inspection station if the scan indicates higher than normal radiation levels. For the vast majority of container trucks and trains, there is no noticeable delay as a result of the scan. Dutch Customs indicted that the secondary alarm rate was less than 2% of scanned containers. ¶3. On June 10, 2007, DOE Representatives William Kilmartin, Megaports Program Manager, National Nuclear Security Administration and David Kostorowski, Program Manager, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and Embassy Global Officer met with Sylvia Niesing, Dutch Customs, Team Leader, Nuclear Detection, Port of Rotterdam. Ms. Niesing was accompanied by a group of technicians and customs inspectors that shared technical information with DOE representatives. ¶4. Rotterdam has been a leader in implementing strong security measures. Rotterdam is Europe's largest container processing port. It was the first foreign port to sign onto the U.S. Container Security Initiative (CSI) Program, in September 2002, and was an early partner for DOE's Megaports/Second Line of Defense Initiative. DOE first installed 5 RPMs in Rotterdam as a pilot project in 2004. The Dutch subsequently decided to expand the monitoring program to cover additional container terminals. Instead of having DOE pay for the expanded program, the Dutch government purchased 40 RPMs, at a cost of 30 million euros, by contracting with Siemans AG in 2005. It is the first port of its size to have completed implementation of a program for radiation monitoring that covers the whole container port. DOE officials noted that the Dutch installation has enhanced features that they would like to consider incorporating into future U.S. international deployments. For example, there is a large monitoring screen in the command post that relays real time video and data from all 40 RPMs. Redundancy is built into the system so that any one command post can assume control of all 40 RPMs in case of a malfunction. ¶5. DOE officials stated that Rotterdam's early adoption of the Megaports Initiative and CSI has helped persuade other ports to work with the U.S. on cargo security measures. As Europe's largest port, and one of the largest in the world, Rotterdam's decisions influence other ports. In the last 3 years, Dutch Customs officials, at the request of DOE, have hosted visits from over 15 different countries to review the operation of their radiation portal monitors. DOE officials stated that these visits convinced many more ports to adopt radiological monitoring programs. ¶6. Rotterdam scans all containers that enter or exit the port by truck and scan all containers that enter by train; it does not scan containers that are transferred from one ship to another, or from inland barges to ships within the port. These transhipments account for 10% of the total container traffic in Rotterdam. Due to operational impacts there is no plan to scan transhipments at Rotterdam. DOE officials noted that scanning transshipped containers continue to be a challenge at international ports. ¶7. Dutch Customs officials indicated they are "cautiously" discussing an ambitious plan to x-ray all containers, in addition to scanning them for radiation. Ms. Niesing noted that Shanghai's port already x-rays all of its container traffic, but no decision has been made yet on whether to adopt such a program in Rotterdam. Dutch Customs and DOE officials agreed to continue their on-going cooperation on data sharing and training, which each side agreed has been beneficial.