CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): LIBYAN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 001360 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) NSC FOR LEDDY WINPAC FOR WALTER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL CWC SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): LIBYAN RESPONSES ON CW DESTRUCTION PROGRAM REF: A. STATE 94204 ¶B. DTG 061445Z JULY 07 (NOTAL) This is CWC-66-07. -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Dr. Hesnawy of the Libyan National Committee provided a copy of the Detailed Facility Information (DFI) for the facility the Libyan government is contracting S.I.P.S.A., an Italian engineering firm, to construct. In discussions on Libya's decision to terminate its cooperation with the U.S. on chemical weapons destruction, Hesnawy cited the indemnification clause and the significant delay in response from the U.S. contractor earlier this year as overriding factors. Hesnawy also indicated Libya will likely be unable to meet its deadline for conversion of the former production facility at Rabta, and expressed his hope that the U.S. would provide political support as necessary for Libya. End Summary. -------------- -------------- NEW LIBYAN PLANS FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On July 11, in response to reftel, del rep met with Libyan National Committee representative Dr. Hesnawy and Libyan Embassy Counselor Mohadeb Gheton, the only member of the Libyan Embassy (closed earlier this summer) to remain in The Hague. Hesnawy had traveled to The Hague for a series of meetings with the OPCW Technical Secretariat (TS) on Libya's emerging plans for CW destruction. Hesnawy expressed Libya's desire to continue cooperation with the U.S. and the UK, as well as his appreciation for U.S. support. He explained that Libya was simply unable to accept the legal terms of the U.S. commercial contract, citing the indemnification clause, specifically the fact that the contractor apparently wanted to apply New York state law on the destruction site. He also noted Libyan concerns with the withdrawal clause were based on a worst-case scenario in which the U.S. pulled out of the contract at the last minute, leaving Libya to deal with its ultimate responsibility to destroy its chemical weapons stockpile by 2012. ¶3. (SBU) Hesnawy explained that Libya has now chosen to work with an Italian firm, S.I.P.S.A. Engineering, and later provided a copy of the Detailed Facility Information and amendments to del rep (which has been forwarded to Washington). He seemed quite confident in the reputation and capabilities of this company and its design, which comprises an incinerator for the mustard agent and two hydrolysis units for the precursors. He anticipates destruction beginning as early as April 2009, and was optimistic that the destruction program should not run more than fifty days, a projection based on design capacity and the assumption that no significant technical difficulties will be encountered. Construction has not started yet, as the contract still needs to be finalized and signed. ¶4. (SBU) Of note was the fact that Libya now intends to build its destruction facility close to the former production facility at Rabta, as opposed to collocating it with the current storage location. Hesnawy explained that the challenges posed by the lack of nearby water sources, reliable power supply, and adequate medical facilities for the treatment of chemical casualties, had all influenced this decision, but also that the final factor had been that permits would likely have been denied because the storage site apparently lies on a major fault line. None of these factors should be a concern at the new location (coordinates specified in the DFI). THE HAGUE 00001360 002 OF 002 ¶5. (SBU) As part of the plan to transport the chemical agent and precursors to the destruction site, Hesnawy explained that the mustard agent will be transferred at the storage facility from its current storage containers to larger, leak-proof containers. Because of questions about the purity of the agent, and how this might affect incineration, Hesnawy said they plan to combine the agent with gas oil in the new containers. As agent is transferred via a glove box from one container to another, it will also be quantified by weight and volume before being mixed with the gas oil, after which the new containers will be sealed for shipment. -------------- REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Hesnawy noted that Libya might still require U.S. assistance, as it plans to use 8-10 Minicams for monitoring in the toxic area of the destruction facility. Del rep noted that such a request would need to be made through appropriate, official channels. Hesnawy also expressed concern that Libya will be unable to meet its conversion deadline for the former production facility at Rabta, citing continuing efforts to remove the sand bag wall outside the facility perimeter and additional commercial buildings the TS apparently recently requested Libya declare. Hesnawy told del rep he hoped the U.S. would provide political support for Libya as necessary. ¶7. (U) Ito sends. GALLAGHER