CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): STATUS OF U.S.

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 001348 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) NSC FOR LEDDY WINPAC FOR WALTER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL CWC SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): STATUS OF U.S. PRIORITIES FOR 2007 This is CWC-65-07. -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (U) At mid-year, a number of U.S. priorities at the OPCW for 2007 have been achieved. An Executive Council chairman very supportive of the U.S. was selected. The Director General proposed a 2008 budget with zero nominal growth and increased funding for inspector training. The Technical Secretariat is quietly continuing to work on its ability to SIPDIS investigate allegations of CW use. Preparations for the Second Review Conference have advanced at a steady pace, and without problems. ¶2. (U) Some priorities will require extensive work if they are to be achieved by the end of the year. The proposed 2008 budget has no increase in OCPF inspections, and China will strongly oppose any substantial increase. Article VII implementation is moving ahead smartly, but specific progress toward achievement of "20 in 10" has been disappointing. Due to objections from South Africa, New Zealand and Iran, an agreement on nil declarations is just not in the cards. Finally, the issue of whether Russia has completed destruction of 20 per cent of its stockpile is still unresolved (which may not be the worst outcome for either the U.S. or Russia),although it is difficult to predict whether this may change in the autumn, based on a number of factors, including whether or not the second stage at Maradykovsky is operational before the November Conference of States Parties. End Summary. -------------- EC CHAIR -------------- ¶3. (U) Iranian interest in becoming the EC Chair was firmly but quietly deflected. Philippine Ambassador Arguelles, who has worked well and closely with the U.S. delegation, was the Asian Group candidate who was elected EC Chairman. -------------- 2008 BUDGET -------------- ¶4. (U) The recently released proposed 2008 budget from the Director General has a number of elements which are critical to the U.S. Most important, it proposes a third straight ZNG budget. In addition, it provides an increase in funding for inspector training. Budget co-facilitators Diana Gosens (Netherlands) and Donggy Lee (South Korea) held an initial consultation on July 4, and will resume meetings on August ¶29. In the intervening weeks, they and the TS fully expect a series of detailed questions from the U.S. (and other delegations) for which the TS can prepare answers so that the autumn consultations can start up quickly and efficiently. ¶5. (U) The co-facilitators have publicly stated that their goal is to reach agreement on the budget by EC-50 in September. While commendable, there is reason for skepticism that this can be achieved. While most of the budget does not appear contentious, there always seems to be some topic which provides last-minute complications. And at this time, there already appears to be a dispute on the number of proposed OCPF inspections. The proposed budget keeps the same overall ceiling on industry inspections (200) as well as specific numbers for Schedule 1, 2 and 3 and OCPF inspections. The DG's rationale is that with the recently announced modification of the OCPF site selection methodology, it would be best to have a "pause" and see how the TS change will affect these inspections. ¶6. (U) Del rep has already expressed in budget consultations the U.S. desire for a continuation of the increase in OCPF inspections, which was seconded by a number of WEOG delegations and Japan. China has strongly opposed any increase, with support from Iran and some NAM delegations. Iran in particular has argued that there should be no increase in OCPF inspections until the discussions on "risk assessment" led by CSP Chairman Dastis (Spain) have concluded. Many delegations and the Deputy DG have made clear they do not accept such a linkage, and have firmly asserted that the inspection numbers are decided in the budget negotiations. While Dastis intends to have more meetings in the autumn, there is no chance they will generate consensus on the OCPF issue. And at this time, China seems very firm in its opposition to any increase in OCPF inspections. In short, at this point, agreement on the budget on the margins of the November CSP would seem the most likely outcome. -------------- SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE -------------- ¶7. (U) The Chairman of the working group for the Second RevCon (Amb. Lyn Parker, UK) has pursued an appropriately measured pace of work. An excessive number of meetings and drafting would only have resulted in documents to be re-hashed and re-written this autumn or next year. However, we share Parker's view that work in general will need to intensify in the fall, and need to resume in mid-January ¶2008. The Chair certainly would welcome U.S. views on the most efficient pace and program of work for the remainder of ¶2007. -------------- ALLEGED USE OF CW -------------- ¶8. (U) The TS has continued to steadily pursue an increased capability to investigate instances of alleged use of CW. As the TS is already open to developing these capabilities, the delegation strongly recommends a continuation of this approach, rather than a more "political" effort, such as an EC decision or high-profile item in the proposed budget, which would generate questions and resistance from some delegations. -------------- ARTICLE VII -------------- ¶9. (U) The TS has also continued to maintain a steady, efficient pace in promoting full national implementation of Article VII obligations. Much work remains to be done, and the delegation will continue to work with the TS and interested delegations to do more. With regard to the specific benchmark of "20 in 10" put forth by Commerce A/S Padilla at the 2006 CSP, Japan and Australia have taken steps in pursuit of this goal. However, there really has been little work from others on this specific initiative. Substantial achievement of this goal will require a major effort in the second half of the year, and will require a strong leadership effort by the U.S. and our allies. Absent that kind of energetic activity, there will be minimal progress to report on "20 in 10" at the November CSP. -------------- NIL DECLARATIONS -------------- ¶10. (U) South Africa, New Zealand and Iran have made clear they will not accept a decision to adopt nil declarations. Del rep will continue to meet with key delegations to see if there is any way forward. However, there is little reason to expect that a decision implementing "nil declarations" can be achieved. It is still the goal of the facilitator, however, to achieve some manner of CSP decision on "late declarations" to serve as a sign of life within the Industry Cluster, and to show some progress on the long list of outstanding industry issues from the First RevCon. The unresolved aspects (like "nil declarations") would be referred to the Second RevCon for consideration. -------------- RUSSIAN DESTRUCTION -------------- ¶11. (SBU) It appears there is a stand-off on the specific issue of whether Russia has completed destruction of 20 per cent of its stockpile, and the larger issue of end-point of destruction. The U.S. has made clear it is not ready to approve the Maradykovsky facility agreement and verification plan, particularly when the incinerator for second stage destruction is not yet operational. (Note: Dominique Anelli of the chem demil branch at the TS recently said that he agreed the incinerator would not be operational before the September EC, so he personally expects another deferral of those documents. However, he thought it would be operational before the November CSP.) In return, the Russians made clear at EC-49 that they intend to hold all U.S. documents hostage. ¶12. (U) This is not a particularly pleasant situation, but probably better than any alternative. The DG's statement at EC-49 will remain the OPCW public line on Russian destruction, and in view of the extensive caveats and explanations, is not wholly unsatisfactory. U.S. objections to giving Russia credit at this point have been made clear to all, and most other delegations seem disinclined to take a stand on the issue. Of the small group that ordinarily takes a strong interest in CW destruction, France and Germany seem to most closely share U.S. concerns. Bilateral discussions with Russia during EC-49 made it quite clear that, despite the DG's "understanding" with Russia, Russia itself does not view second stage destruction as a treaty obligation, a fact the U.S. has shared with WEOG. ¶13. (U) While the Russians will continue to try to get "credit," it is not apparent they will make a big push on this issue before EC-50 and again, it is doubtful that delegations are ready to take definitive positions on this question. However, should the incinerator become operational before the CSP, del anticipates that this will again become a key topic for discussion. It was also noteworthy during EC-49 that Iran chose not to press the issue of whether or not Russia had met its 20 per cent deadline; it is still possible that even in the absence of an operational incinerator, a simple legal question from one or more delegations could easily spark further discussion. Based on the fact that the second stage will be under TS verification, the TS and most delegations are supportive of giving Russia credit for destruction after first stage processing. Any U.S. effort to deny that outcome would have to be backed up by very cogent argumentation. -------------- OCPF SITE SELECTION -------------- ¶14. (U) The DG's issuance of a TS note modifying certain technical aspects of the OCPF site selection methodology could have been handled more smoothly. While it provide an improvement over the existing system, the way in which it was announced generated questions from delegations and a substantial amount of ill-will. And the way in which the note was presented makes it very unlikely that someone will step forward to serve as facilitator, to address the outstanding issue of political nominations. ¶15. (U) In this case, such a "pause" would be the best option, and the delegation strongly recommends not returning to this issue until early 2008. This would allow memories to fade somewhat regarding the manner in which the DG announced this change, and humiliated the previous facilitator. In addition, it would provide more time for the delegation to get the views of other SPs and also have more extensive discussions with the TS about the change, which will only become operational in January. The U.S. urged the DG to take this step, and while neither the timing of the announcement nor the substance were what was anticipated, it would be best for the U.S. to request a reconsideration of the change only when it can argue that it is necessary to address the concerns of a number of key delegations. -------------- CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS -------------- ¶16. (U) The TS continues to make steady progress on increasing its capabilities to conduct a CI. As with alleged use, the more attention given to CI increases the likelihood that certain delegations will try to slow or derail the process, so it is probably advantageous that there remains no CI facilitator. Instead, the TS is working the specific technical issues, and individual States Parties are hosting CI exercises. Indeed, the Dutch-hosted event in September is an example of what happens when a CI-related issue shows up on the radar screen of delegations. While the U.S. supported what should have been the non-contentious idea of exercising the EC role in a CI, concerns and objections raised by some delegations killed this part of the exercise. -------------- TENURE POLICY -------------- ¶17. (U) It will be important to continue monitoring the number of departures (especially more experienced officials) from the TS for the second-half of the year. The adoption in 2006 of the DG's modification of the tenure policy has not had a major impact on the TS departures. Indeed, the 2008 budget requests additional funding for HR due to the unexpectedly high personnel turnover. While it is not politically feasible for the DG to propose another modification of tenure this year, it may become a key priority early in 2008 if the loss of personnel and expertise is not staunched. -------------- ARTICLE XI -------------- ¶18. (U) Newly-appointed facilitator Li Hong (PRC) held his first set of consultations on July 12, and they were rather predictable. The expected calls from Iran and some other NAM delegations for an Article XI action plan were more rote than heart-felt, and del rep merely needed to reiterate U.S. objections to end the discussion. The bulk of Li's facilitation focused on TS activity in the Article XI area, which was not contentious. Should the consultations continue in this manner, they may produce constructive results. And if the NAM is satisfied with merely going through the motions on pushing for an action plan, this will be a low-profile issue that will heat up again in the run-up to the RevCon. ¶19. (U) Ito sends. GALLAGHER