Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TELAVIV741
2007-03-08 15:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tel Aviv
Cable title:  

IRAN: CODEL KYL AND HARMAN'S DINNER WITH SHARANSKY

Tags:  PREL PTER MNUC KNNP KPAL KWBG IR IS 
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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9886
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 6184
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000741 

SIPDIS

CODEL
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER MNUC KNNP KPAL KWBG IR IS
SUBJECT: IRAN: CODEL KYL AND HARMAN'S DINNER WITH SHARANSKY
AND AUMANN CONSIDERS INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREATS TO ISRAEL

REF: A. TEL AVIV 542

B. TEL AVIV 549

C. TEL AVIV 739

D. TEL AVIV 740

Classified By: Marc J. Sievers, Political Counselor.
Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d).

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SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000741 SIPDIS CODEL SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2017 TAGS: PREL PTER MNUC KNNP KPAL KWBG IR IS SUBJECT: IRAN: CODEL KYL AND HARMAN'S DINNER WITH SHARANSKY AND AUMANN CONSIDERS INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREATS TO ISRAEL REF: A. TEL AVIV 542 ¶B. TEL AVIV 549 ¶C. TEL AVIV 739 ¶D. TEL AVIV 740 Classified By: Marc J. Sievers, Political Counselor. Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) During the visit of CODELs Kyl and Harman to Israel, February 18-20, the two CODELs -- led by Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) and Representative Jane Harman (D-CA) -- held a series of meetings with GOI officials and Knesset members according to a program drawn up by Knesset Member Yuval Steinitz, the Israeli Co-Chair of the U.S.-Israel Interparliamentary Commission (IPC). Reftels report on their meetings with Prime Minister Olmert, Foreign Minister Livni, opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu, and members of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. This cable reports on their February 19 dinner with Knesset Members Yuval Steinitz and Avigdor Itzchaky, Natan Sharansky and Nobel Prize Laureate Professor Aumann. In the dinner, Senator Kyl and Representative Harman were accompanied by Representatives Gabrielle Giffords (D-AZ) and Steve Pearce (R-NM),Ambassador Jones, POLCOUNS and poloff. ¶2. (C) Dinner discussion focused mainly on Iran, with Sharansky calling for greater U.S. engagement with Iranian dissidents in Iran, and Professor Aumann taking the contrarian view that a nuclear Iran could be contained and dealt with. Aumann based his views on his extensive work with game theory and its application to negotiations and the relationships between states. Aumann's Israel and American interlocutors expressed skepticism with his views, questioning whether the Iranian leadership can be counted upon to behave rationally. Aumann posited that the greater danger to Israel is societal fatigue and the resultant eagerness to achieve peace at all costs. Sharansky shared this concern about Israel, observing that the Iranian leadership may be more willing to die for its so-called Islamist principles, than Israelis would be willing to die to defend their freedom. Ambassador Jones warned that a nuclear Iran could start a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. All agreed that a nuclear Iran poses the danger that nuclear know-how and materials could find their way into the arms of non-state acto
rs operating in Iran that might have no fear about using them for terrorist purposes. END SUMMARY. ¶3. (C) On the evening of February 19, CODELs Kyl and Harman attended a dinner hosted by Knesset Members Yuval Steinitz and Avigdor Itzchaky at the King David Hotel. Other Israeli participants included former Knesset Member and Soviet dissident Natan Sharansky, and Israeli Nobel Prize Laureate Robert Aumann, a professor of mathematics. Steinitz opened discussion by reviewing the various topics the CODELs had discussed with their Israeli counterparts, including the urgency of the Iranian nuclear threat, the situation in Iraq, and the Palestinians after the summit in Mecca. -------------- -------------- SHARANSKY: U.S. SHOULD DO MORE WITH IRANIAN DISSIDENTS -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) On Iran, Sharansky said that he had met with President Bush six days earlier, and had heard that all options remain on the table concerning Iran, and that the U.S. hopes that sanctions will work. He said that he told President Bush that the U.S. needs to be more actively involved with the democratic opposition in Iran. He noted that Israel broadcasts a one-hour Farsi radio program daily into Iran, and that it has an estimated one million listeners. He said that similar U.S. programs modeled on Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe are very important. He advised that they focus on Iranian dissidents speaking about freedom, and avoid discussion about the commercial, material benefits of freedom like access to Coca Cola or blue jeans. Sharansky said that he will send to Senator Kyl a list of 10-15 names of prominent Iranian dissidents. Some, he said, are more pro-Western than others. He noted that the last Israeli ambassador to Iran still maintains contacts with dissidents in Iran. Sharansky acknowledged that there are some Israelis who believe that Israel should maintain contact with the TEL AVIV 00000741 002 OF 003 Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) operating in Iran. Sharansky said that there are enough dissidents in Iran that want regime change that nobody should feel compelled to deal with groups like the MEK, which practices violence. ¶5. (C) On Iraq, Sharansky said he understands that the war is a polarizing issue in America. Nevertheless, he felt strongly that if the U.S. leaves Iraq, it will be a huge victory for Al Qaeda and cause terrorism to increase around the world. He warned that pressing the Bush Administration to leave Iraq would be "very irresponsible." ¶6. (C) Steinitz agreed that democratic groups in Iran should be supported, and that more could be done in that area. He claimed that when he spoke on the Israeli Farsi-language radio broadcast about the Iranian nuclear program, he had six million listeners. He said he was asked many questions about what would happen if Iran acquired a nuclear capability. -------------- -------------- AUMANN: A NUCLEAR IRAN COULD BE CONTAINED AND CONTROLLED -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Professor Aumann commented on Iran, basing his remarks on game theory and the U.S.-Soviet relationship during the Cold War. Acknowledging that his views on Iran are contrary to those of most Israelis, he posited that it would not be so terrible if Iran acquired a nuclear capability. Admitting to his skeptical listeners that his thinking is based on the assumption that Iran's leaders are rational, he suggested that all that would be needed would be to make it clear to the Iranians that if they attacked any target with a nuclear weapon, they would be attacked themselves with nuclear weapons. Under such a scenario, Aumann suggested that the Iranians would not use a nuclear weapon, because they would not want their cities to be destroyed. As a downside, he admitted that Iran's possessing a nuclear weapon would probably increase support for the regime and provide Iran more leverage in the Middle East, but he felt nonetheless that such a development did not necessarily equate to an existential threat against Israel. ¶8. (C) Aumann said that what worries him more than Iran achieving a nuclear capability, is that someone in Iran could transfer nuclear technology to terrorist groups that cannot be targeted for reprisal. In this sense, he said he is less concerned about Iran passing materials or knowledge on a policy basis, but is worried that an individual lower in the overall nuclear chain of command might -- on an ad hoc basis -- commit such an act. Aumann suggested that the U.S. and its partners could guard against such a scenario by making it clear to the Iranian government that it would be held responsible for any nuclear attack traceable to Iran. -------------- -------------- ...ISRAEL'S FATIGUE, DESIRE FOR PEACE ARE WORSE THREATS -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Aumann said that, in his view, the biggest danger to Israel right now comes from within its own socity because it is "tired" and "too eager for peace." Likening the decision facing Israeli society as the same decision before a tired mountain climber caught on a cliff face at night, Aumann said that Israel cannot afford to give into this way of thinking, or it will damage itself and the Arabs. Instead, he said that Israel needs to prepare for war psychologically and with the necessary equipment, and then indicate that it is ready for peace on acceptable terms. He observed that -- based on his decades of study in game theory and its application to Cold War diplomacy -- cooperation among antagonists is much more possible with long-term interaction based on the antagonists' appreciation for each others strengths. In contrast, focusing on the "here and now" makes it likely that prospects for cooperation will fall apart. In this sense, Aumann expressed the view that Israel's disengagement from Gaza was a "tremendous disservice to peace." He said that disengagement told the Palestinians, "Keep the pressure up, and we will capitulate," and said that on the contrary, Israel needed to convince the Palestinians that Israel is here to stay. ¶10. (C) Steinitz replied skeptically by contrasting the examples of Hitler and Stalin -- two tyrants with absolute power. He posited that if Hitler had acquired the atomic bomb, he probably would have used it. Aumann suggested TEL AVIV 00000741 003 OF 003 otherwise, claiming that Hitler might have been evil, but was not irrational. This generated animated discussion at the table about whether Iranian President Ahmadinejad was rational or not, with a number of the participants pointing out his public statements that Israel should be "wiped off the map," and others noting Ahmadinejad's alleged belief that by starting a third world war, he could effect the return of the Hidden Imam. Senator Kyl (R-AZ) asked Aumann for his advice on how to deal with the nuclear transfer threat. Aumann said he would be willing to discuss how to deal with that possibility, but only in a smaller setting, expressing his confidence nevertheless that deterrence could work in the Iranian case. ¶11. (C) Sharansky expressed skepticism with Aumann's thinking, and noted that even so-called moderate Iranians like Rafsanjani have declared that it is better for Iranians to suffer for Islamic principals, than to live in co-existence with Israel and the U.S. Aumann replied that, in his view, sanctions will not work in Iran because they ultimately punish the people, not the leaders. He reiterated his view that Israel's greatest threat is its own fatigue. Sharansky agreed that fatigue is a problem, and said that in his view, the peace process since 1993 has been built on the wrong premises, those being: (a) Israel needs a dictator for the Palestinians; and (b) a strong Israeli desire for peace will encourage the Palestinians to choose peace. Sharansky lamented that because Israel is so impatient, it is encouraging its enemies. ¶12. (C) Aumann contrasted the notion of Iranians willing to die for something better in the afterlife, with modern Israelis, whom he characterized as mainly consumed with their own personal interests and private gains. He wondered aloud how Israel -- in this post-modern state -- could confront Iran. Steinitz replied that he was encouraged by the Israeli public's performance during the July-August conflict with Hizballah. In his view, Israeli civilians were ready to sacrifice, and the average soldier and reservist was ready and eager to fight, if necessary. ¶13. (C) Representative Pearce (R-NM) observed that the two big lies of Nazism and Communism infected people over the course of decades during the 20th century, and expressed concern that the "big lie of Islam" may be infecting people too rapidly at the present time. Ambassador Jones noted his concern that a nuclear Iran would likely touch off a nuclear arms race in the region -- something the U.S. and its partners are trying to prevent. ¶14. (U) Neither Senator Kyl nor Representative Harman had the opportunity to review this cable. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** CRETZ

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