LEADING NATIONAL SECURITY EXPERTS DEBATE IRAN,

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 000733

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2017
TAGS: PREL PINS KPAL KWBG LE SY IR IZ IS
SUBJECT: LEADING NATIONAL SECURITY EXPERTS DEBATE IRAN,
IRAQ, HAMAS, SYRIA


CLASSIFIED BY: CDA GENE CRETZ FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: DURING A MARCH 1 ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION WITH
VISITING S/P DEPUTY DIRECTOR MATT WAXMAN, POLCOUNS AND
POLOFF, SENIOR RESEARCHERS AT TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY,S
INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES (INSS) SURVEYED A
VARIETY OF REGIONAL THREATS FACING ISRAEL AND OFFERED VARIOUS
POLICY ALTERNATIVES FOR DEALING WITH THEM. ON IRAN, THEY
GENERALLY AGREED THAT STRONGER AND MORE INTELLIGENT SANCTIONS
REPRESENTED THE BEST PATH FORWARD, WHILE ALSO ADVOCATING
PREPARATIONS FOR THE USE OF FORCE SHOULD INTERNATIONAL
DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS FAIL. ON IRAQ, INSS DIRECTOR ZVI SHTAUBER
SUGGESTED THAT CONTRARY TO POPULAR OPINION, A U.S. WITHDRAWAL
FROM IRAQ, EVEN IF FOLLOWED BY THE BALKANIZATION OF THE
COUNTRY, WOULD NOT THREATEN ISRAEL. REGARDING THE
PALESTINIANS, FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR GIORA EILAND
ARGUED THAT THE ROADMAP WAS UNREALISTIC AND DOOMED TO
FAILURE, WHILE DR. SHLOMO BRAUM ARGUED THAT WE SHOULD ENGAGE
HAMAS IN THE PEACE PROCESS. ALL AGREED THAT RELATIONS WITH
THE PALESTINIANS REMAINED ISRAEL,S HIGHEST PRIORITY. EILAND
ALSO OFFERED A CONTRARIAN VIEW OF SYRIA, ARGUING THAT
WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GOLAN WAS NOT IN ISRAEL,S INTERESTS
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER OR NOT BASHAR AL-ASAD,S OVERTURES WERE
SINCERE. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) THE INSS, FORMERLY KNOWN AS THE JAFFEE CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC STUDIES, IS AN INDEPENDENT THINK TANK AFFILIATED
WITH TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY AND COMPRISED OF RESEARCHERS
FORMERLY ACTIVE IN THE UPPER ECHELONS OF ISRAEL,S NATIONAL
SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT. MOST REMAIN ACTIVE IN GOVERNMENT
STRATEGIC PLANNING CIRCLES AND ENJOY WIDE CREDIBILITY AMONG
THE ISRAELI PUBLIC.

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IRAQ: NOTHING TO GAIN BY CONTINUING U.S. PRESENCE
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3. (C) INSS DIRECTOR AND FORMER AMBASSADOR TO THE UK BG
(RET.) ZVI SHTAUBER SAID THE U.S. WAS REPEATING THE SAME
MISTAKES IN ITS OCCUPATION OF IRAQ AS THE BRITISH MADE A
CENTURY AGO, WHICH MEANT THAT "NOTHING HAS CHANGED IN IRAQ IN
THE PAST 100 YEARS." CITING THE DEEPENING SECTARIAN VIOLENCE
IN IRAQ AND THE INCREASING PUBLIC APPETITE FOR WITHDRAWAL IN
THE U.S., SHTAUBER SAID HE EXPECTED IRAQ TO SOON EMERGE AS A
COUNTRY OF STRONG REGIONS HELD TOGETHER ONLY LOOSELY, IF AT
ALL, BY A WEAK CENTER. BREAKING WITH CONVENTIONAL WISDOM,
HOWEVER, HE DID NOT SEE THIS AS A "DOOMSDAY SCENARIO" FOR
ISRAEL. SHTAUBER ARGUED THAT THE ISRAELI FEAR OF A NEAR-TERM
U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ WAS UNFOUNDED, AND THAT ON THE LIST
OF REGIONAL THREATS FACING ISRAEL, A WEAK OR EVEN BALKANIZED
IRAQ WOULD RANK LOW. ON THE CONTRARY, "ISRAEL HAS NOTHING TO
GAIN" FROM THE ONGOING U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN IRAQ, HE SAID,
SINCE IT WAS DISTRACTING THE U.S. FROM FOCUSING ON IRAN.

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IRAN: WORK HARDER ON THE RUSSIANS
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4. (C) SHTAUBER ARGUED THAT WHILE UNSCR 1737 HAD SUCCEEDED IN
GETTING THE IRANIANS, ATTENTION, IT WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO
FORCE A CHANGE IN TEHRAN,S BEHAVIOR. THE SANCTIONS WERE NOT
BEING IMPLEMENTED, HE SAID, AND IF THE EXISTING SANCTIONS
WERE NOT EFFECTIVE, THERE WAS LITTLE CHANCE NEW SANCTIONS
WOULD WORK. "AT THE END OF THE DAY," HE SAID, "NO ONE WILL
BE ABLE TO AVOID THE TERRIBLE DECISION OF USING FORCE IN
IRAN." WITHOUT ELABORATING, SHTAUBER ALSO SAID HE WAS NOT
WORRIED ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ATTACK ON IRAN.


5. (C) INSS DEPUTY DIRECTOR AND IRAN EXPERT DR. EFRAIM KAM
LAUDED THE "WIDE FRONT" THAT HAS EMERGED AGAINST IRAN OVER
RECENT YEARS, BUT WAS DISCOURAGED THAT THE NEW INTERNATIONAL
CONSENSUS DID NOT SEEM TO BE HAVING AN IMPACT. HE AGREED
THAT STRONGER SANCTIONS WOULD BE NEEDED FOR A PROLONGED
PERIOD OF TIME IN ORDER TO PERSUADE IRAN TO RECONSIDER ITS
ACTIONS. HOWEVER, HE DOUBTED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
COULD ACHIEVE THE REQUISITE UNITY, LET ALONE SUSTAIN IT.
HONING-IN ON DISUNITY AMONG THE P-5, KAM SUGGESTED THAT WE
WORK HARDER AT BRINGING RUSSIA ON BOARD WITH REGARD TO THE
SEVERITY OF THE THREAT AND THE NEED FOR STRONGER SANCTIONS --
"AND THEN MAYBE THE CHINESE WILL COME ALONG ALSO." KAM SAID
HE SAW A FEW HOPEFUL SIGNS THAT MOSCOW MIGHT BE MOVING CLOSER
TO THE U.S. AND EUROPE. FOR EXAMPLE, MOSCOW HAD SUPPORTED
THE UNSC PROCESS AND HAD RECENTLY DEMONSTRATED A NEW
WILLINGNESS TO CRITICIZE IRAN PUBLICLY. YET EVEN IF THE P-5
UNITED AROUND A TOUGH NEW SANCTIONS RESOLUTION, HE STILL
QUESTIONED WHETHER THE IRANIANS WOULD BACK DOWN. "ISRAEL
SEES IRAN HAVING A BOMB IN ABOUT THREE YEARS," HE SAID, AND
THE "CRITICAL MOMENT" OF TECHNOLOGICAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY WILL
COME WELL BEFORE THAT. "WE HOPE THAT A COMBINATION OF
PAINFUL SANCTIONS AND FEAR OF ATTACK WILL SUCCEED, BUT WE

WORRY THAT IT WON,T."


6. (C) FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR MG (RET.) GIORA
EILAND AGREED THERE WAS LITTLE CHANCE OF STOPPING IRAN
WITHOUT MORE RUSSIAN COOPERATION. BUT WHILE MOSCOW WAS
CONCERNED ABOUT TEHRAN, IT WAS EVEN MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE
U.S., HE SAID. THE RUSSIANS FELT THREATENED AND HUMILIATED
BY GROWING U.S. INFLUENCE AND "ACTIVISM" IN THEIR BACKYARD,
AND BY U.S. CRITICISM OF RUSSIA,S HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, WHICH
THE RUSSIANS SEE AS BLUNT INTERFERENCE. MOREOVER, U.S.
POLICIES ON OIL AND GAS WERE "HURTING RUSSIA,S WALLET." IF
THE U.S. WANTS MEANINGFUL RUSSIAN ASSISTANCE ON IRAN, IT
SHOULD OFFER SOME CONCESSIONS ON THESE ISSUES, HE SAID.


7. (C) ASKED ABOUT RECENT SIGNS OF DEBATE WITHIN THE IRANIAN
RULING CLASS ABOUT THE WISDOM OF AHMADINEJAD,S PROVOCATIVE
APPROACH TO THE WEST, KAM SAID THAT WHILE THE DEBATE WAS
ENCOURAGING, IT WAS LIMITED TO TACTICS AND STRATEGY, NOT
GOALS. NO ONE IN THE REGIME WAS DEBATING WHETHER IRAN SHOULD
HAVE A NUCLEAR WEAPON TO BEGIN WITH, HE SAID, ONLY WHETHER
AHMADINEJAD,S STRATEGY WAS THE BEST APPROACH.

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NO AGREEMENT ON THE PEACE PROCESS
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8. (C) WHILE THE INSS RESEARCHERS ALL AGREED THE PALESTINIAN
CONFLICT WAS ISRAEL,S HIGHEST PRIORITY, THEY VARIED WIDELY
ON WHAT COULD OR SHOULD BE DONE TO MOVE FORWARD. EILAND, WHO
IS WELL KNOWN TO THE EMBASSY, OFFERED AN UNCHARACTERISTICALLY
BLEAK ASSESSMENT, STATING BLUNTLY, "THE ROADMAP IS AN
ILLUSION AND WILL NEVER HAPPEN." EILAND CITED FOUR REASONS
FOR HIS PESSIMISM: FIRST WAS HAMAS, WHICH HE SAID WAS NOT
INTERESTED IN A TWO-STATE SOLUTION AND WAS ROOTED TOO DEEPLY
IN PALESTINIAN SOCIETY TO BE EFFECTIVELY MARGINALIZED OR
DEFEATED. SECOND, THE PROCESS WAS WRONG, AS IT RELIED ON
EACH SIDE SATISFYING UNREALISTIC PRECONDITIONS (HALTING
TERRORISM ON THE PALESTINIAN SIDE; REMOVING SETTLEMENTS ON
THE ISRAELI SIDE) BEFORE SERIOUS TALKS COULD BEGIN. THIRD,
THE GAP BETWEEN THE SIDES WAS TOO LARGE AND WAS GROWING, WITH
EACH MAINTAINING IRRECONCILABLE EXPECTATIONS AND REDLINES.
FINALLY, THE CONCEPT OF A TWO-STATE SOLUTION ITSELF WAS WRONG
AND UNSUSTAINABLE. 2.5 MILLION PEOPLE WILL LIVE IN GAZA IN
14 YEARS, HE SAID, BUT WILL NOT BE SATISFIED LIVING IN THEIR
TINY IMPOVERISHED ENCLAVE. THE PRESSURES WILL BE TOO GREAT
FOR ISRAEL AND AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINE TO BEAR, HE SAID.
ASKED WHAT HE WOULD SUGGEST AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO A TWO-STATE
SOLUTION AS CURRENTLY CONCEIVED IN THE ROADMAP, EILAND SAID
HE HAD SHARED HIS VIEWS IN THE PAST WITH RICHARD HAAS.


9. (C) FORMER HEAD OF THE IDF STRATEGIC PLANNING BRANCH BG
(RET.) SHLOMO BRAUM DISAGREED WITH EILAND,S PESSIMISTIC
ANALYSIS. CONTRARY TO EILAND,S CLAIM THAT THE SIDES WERE
TOO FAR APART FOR MEANINGFUL COMPROMISE, BRAUM ARGUED THAT
SOMETHING APPROXIMATING THE CLINTON PROPOSALS (AT TABA IN
2000) HAD ALREADY BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE MAJORITY ON BOTH
SIDES. THE ISRAELIS HAD COME A LONG WAY SINCE THE BEGINNING
OF THE OSLO PROCESS, WHEN THEY DID NOT YET KNOW WHAT THEY
WANTED, HE SAID. ISRAELIS NOW AGREED THAT THEY WANT
"DEMOGRAPHY MORE THAN GEOGRAPHY" -- I.E. THAT MAINTAINING THE
DEMOGRAPHIC BALANCE THAT ENSURES ISRAEL,S JEWISH MAJORITY IS
MORE IMPORTANT THAN RETAINING CONTROL OVER THE BIBLICAL
HOMELANDS ON THE WEST BANK. FORMER DEPUTY FM (IN THE BEGIN
AND SHAMIR GOVERNMENTS) DR. YEHUDA BEN MEIR AGREED THAT
ISRAELIS NOW PREFERRED DEMOGRAPHY OVER GEOGRAPHY. HE CITED
THE 2006 INSS NATIONAL SECURITY SURVEY, WHICH FOUND THAT 70
PERCENT OF ISRAELIS SUPPORT A TWO-STATE SOLUTION ACHIEVED BY
NEGOTIATION. BRAUM ADDED THAT IF THE GOAL OF THE PEACE
PROCESS WAS TO NEGOTIATE A TWO-STATE SOLUTION, AND IF
EVERYONE KNEW MORE OR LESS WHAT SUCH A SOLUTION WOULD LOOK
LIKE, THEN THE CURRENT STRATEGY OF TRYING TO ROLL-BACK
HAMAS, POLITICAL-MILITARY GAINS OVER THE PAST YEAR WAS
WRONGHEADED. INSTEAD, WE SHOULD BE FOCUSING OUR EFFORTS ON
"ENLARGING PALESTINIAN PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF THE END GAME."
INVOLVING HAMAS IN THE PROCESS WOULD DO THAT, HE SAID, AND
MIGHT BE POSSIBLE SINCE "HAMAS IS SHOWING INDICATIONS THAT IT
IS OPEN TO BEING MODERATED."


10. (C) BRAUM ALSO SAID IT WAS NECESSARY TO OFFER THE
PALESTINIANS A CLEARER WAY OUT OF THE CURRENT SANCTIONS IN
ORDER TO AVOID A HARDENING OF POSITIONS. HE ARGUED THAT THE
SANCTIONS WERE WEAKENING BOTH HAMAS AND FATAH, WHICH WAS
WORRYING BECAUSE BEFORE LONG, "WE MIGHT NOT HAVE ANYONE LEFT
TO TALK TO." DR. RONI BART ADDED THAT IN ANY CASE, HAMAS
MIGHT SIMPLY WAIT OUT THE SANCTIONS, SINCE THEY KNOW THAT
UNLIKE THE EAST, THE WEST HAS NO PATIENCE AND WILL EVENTUALLY
CAVE IN.

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SYRIA: NOTHING TO GAIN BY MAKING PEACE

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11. (C) ON SYRIA, EILAND SAID THE DEBATE WITHIN ISRAEL OVER
THE SINCERITY OF SYRIAN PRESIDENT BASHAR AL-ASAD,S RECENT
PEACE OVERTURES MISSED THE POINT, WHICH WAS RATHER THAT UNDER
CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES, PEACE WITH SYRIA WOULD NOT BE GOOD FOR
ISRAEL IN ANY CASE. EILAND ARGUED THAT A PEACE AGREEMENT
WOULD NOT HELP ISRAEL,S PROBLEMS WITH HIZBALLAH AND WOULD
RESULT IN THE PALESTINIANS, WHO WERE MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE
SYRIANS, FEELING NEGLECTED. MORE IMPORTANTLY, PEACE WITH
SYRIA WOULD REQUIRE GIVING UP THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, WHICH EILAND
VIEWED AS AN IRREPLACEABLE STRATEGIC ASSET. NOTWITHSTANDING
THE ADVANTAGES OF THE NEW GENERATION OF HIGH-TECH, LONG-RANGE
WEAPONRY, IN A COUNTRY AS SMALL AS ISRAEL, GEOGRAPHICAL
ADVANTAGES STILL MATTERED. IN THE EVENT OF A CRISIS, IDF
FORCES DEPLOYED ON THE GOLAN COULD BE IN DAMASCUS IN A MATTER
OF MINUTES, HE SAID, AND "NOTHING CAN MAKE UP FOR LOSING SUCH
AN ADVANTAGE."

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