Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TELAVIV733
2007-03-08 12:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tel Aviv
Cable title:  

LEADING NATIONAL SECURITY EXPERTS DEBATE IRAN,

Tags:  PREL PINS KPAL KWBG LE SY IR IZ IS 
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VZCZCXYZ0019
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTVA #0733 0671220
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZUI RUEWMCF5710 0671251
P 081220Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0000
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 000733 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2017
TAGS: PREL PINS KPAL KWBG LE SY IR IZ IS
SUBJECT: LEADING NATIONAL SECURITY EXPERTS DEBATE IRAN,
IRAQ, HAMAS, SYRIA


CLASSIFIED BY: CDA GENE CRETZ FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 000733 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2017 TAGS: PREL PINS KPAL KWBG LE SY IR IZ IS SUBJECT: LEADING NATIONAL SECURITY EXPERTS DEBATE IRAN, IRAQ, HAMAS, SYRIA CLASSIFIED BY: CDA GENE CRETZ FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: DURING A MARCH 1 ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION WITH VISITING S/P DEPUTY DIRECTOR MATT WAXMAN, POLCOUNS AND POLOFF, SENIOR RESEARCHERS AT TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY,S INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES (INSS) SURVEYED A VARIETY OF REGIONAL THREATS FACING ISRAEL AND OFFERED VARIOUS POLICY ALTERNATIVES FOR DEALING WITH THEM. ON IRAN, THEY GENERALLY AGREED THAT STRONGER AND MORE INTELLIGENT SANCTIONS REPRESENTED THE BEST PATH FORWARD, WHILE ALSO ADVOCATING PREPARATIONS FOR THE USE OF FORCE SHOULD INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS FAIL. ON IRAQ, INSS DIRECTOR ZVI SHTAUBER SUGGESTED THAT CONTRARY TO POPULAR OPINION, A U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ, EVEN IF FOLLOWED BY THE BALKANIZATION OF THE COUNTRY, WOULD NOT THREATEN ISRAEL. REGARDING THE PALESTINIANS, FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR GIORA EILAND ARGUED THAT THE ROADMAP WAS UNREALISTIC AND DOOMED TO FAILURE, WHILE DR. SHLOMO BRAUM ARGUED THAT WE SHOULD ENGAGE HAMAS IN THE PEACE PROCESS. ALL AGREED THAT RELATIONS WITH THE PALESTINIANS REMAINED ISRAEL,S HIGHEST PRIORITY. EILAND ALSO OFFERED A CONTRARIAN VIEW OF SYRIA, ARGUING THAT WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GOLAN WAS NOT IN ISRAEL,S INTERESTS REGARDLESS OF WHETHER OR NOT BASHAR AL-ASAD,S OVERTURES WERE SINCERE. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) THE INSS, FORMERLY KNOWN AS THE JAFFEE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, IS AN INDEPENDENT THINK TANK AFFILIATED WITH TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY AND COMPRISED OF RESEARCHERS FORMERLY ACTIVE IN THE UPPER ECHELONS OF ISRAEL,S NATIONAL SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT. MOST REMAIN ACTIVE IN GOVERNMENT STRATEGIC PLANNING CIRCLES AND ENJOY WIDE CREDIBILITY AMONG THE ISRAELI PUBLIC. -------------- -------------- IRAQ: NOTHING TO GAIN BY CONTINUING U.S. PRESENCE -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) INSS DIRECTOR AND FORMER AMBASSADOR TO THE UK BG (RET.) ZVI SHTAUBER SAID THE U.S. WAS REPEATING THE SAME MISTAKES IN ITS OCCUPATION OF IRAQ AS THE BRITISH MADE A CENTURY AGO, WHICH MEANT THAT "NOTHING HAS CHANGED IN IRAQ IN THE PAST 100 YEARS." CITING THE DEEPENING SECTARIAN VIOLENCE IN IRAQ AND THE INCREASING PUBLIC APPETITE FOR WITHDRAWAL IN THE U.S., SHTAUBER SAID HE EXPECTED IRAQ TO SOON EMERGE AS A COUNTRY OF STRONG REGIONS HELD TOGETHER ONLY LOOSELY, IF AT ALL, BY A WEAK CENTER. BREAKING WITH CONVENTIONAL WISDOM,
HOWEVER, HE DID NOT SEE THIS AS A "DOOMSDAY SCENARIO" FOR ISRAEL. SHTAUBER ARGUED THAT THE ISRAELI FEAR OF A NEAR-TERM U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ WAS UNFOUNDED, AND THAT ON THE LIST OF REGIONAL THREATS FACING ISRAEL, A WEAK OR EVEN BALKANIZED IRAQ WOULD RANK LOW. ON THE CONTRARY, "ISRAEL HAS NOTHING TO GAIN" FROM THE ONGOING U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN IRAQ, HE SAID, SINCE IT WAS DISTRACTING THE U.S. FROM FOCUSING ON IRAN. -------------- IRAN: WORK HARDER ON THE RUSSIANS -------------- ¶4. (C) SHTAUBER ARGUED THAT WHILE UNSCR 1737 HAD SUCCEEDED IN GETTING THE IRANIANS, ATTENTION, IT WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO FORCE A CHANGE IN TEHRAN,S BEHAVIOR. THE SANCTIONS WERE NOT BEING IMPLEMENTED, HE SAID, AND IF THE EXISTING SANCTIONS WERE NOT EFFECTIVE, THERE WAS LITTLE CHANCE NEW SANCTIONS WOULD WORK. "AT THE END OF THE DAY," HE SAID, "NO ONE WILL BE ABLE TO AVOID THE TERRIBLE DECISION OF USING FORCE IN IRAN." WITHOUT ELABORATING, SHTAUBER ALSO SAID HE WAS NOT WORRIED ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ATTACK ON IRAN. ¶5. (C) INSS DEPUTY DIRECTOR AND IRAN EXPERT DR. EFRAIM KAM LAUDED THE "WIDE FRONT" THAT HAS EMERGED AGAINST IRAN OVER RECENT YEARS, BUT WAS DISCOURAGED THAT THE NEW INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS DID NOT SEEM TO BE HAVING AN IMPACT. HE AGREED THAT STRONGER SANCTIONS WOULD BE NEEDED FOR A PROLONGED PERIOD OF TIME IN ORDER TO PERSUADE IRAN TO RECONSIDER ITS ACTIONS. HOWEVER, HE DOUBTED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY COULD ACHIEVE THE REQUISITE UNITY, LET ALONE SUSTAIN IT. HONING-IN ON DISUNITY AMONG THE P-5, KAM SUGGESTED THAT WE WORK HARDER AT BRINGING RUSSIA ON BOARD WITH REGARD TO THE SEVERITY OF THE THREAT AND THE NEED FOR STRONGER SANCTIONS -- "AND THEN MAYBE THE CHINESE WILL COME ALONG ALSO." KAM SAID HE SAW A FEW HOPEFUL SIGNS THAT MOSCOW MIGHT BE MOVING CLOSER TO THE U.S. AND EUROPE. FOR EXAMPLE, MOSCOW HAD SUPPORTED THE UNSC PROCESS AND HAD RECENTLY DEMONSTRATED A NEW WILLINGNESS TO CRITICIZE IRAN PUBLICLY. YET EVEN IF THE P-5 UNITED AROUND A TOUGH NEW SANCTIONS RESOLUTION, HE STILL QUESTIONED WHETHER THE IRANIANS WOULD BACK DOWN. "ISRAEL SEES IRAN HAVING A BOMB IN ABOUT THREE YEARS," HE SAID, AND THE "CRITICAL MOMENT" OF TECHNOLOGICAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY WILL COME WELL BEFORE THAT. "WE HOPE THAT A COMBINATION OF PAINFUL SANCTIONS AND FEAR OF ATTACK WILL SUCCEED, BUT WE WORRY THAT IT WON,T." ¶6. (C) FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR MG (RET.) GIORA EILAND AGREED THERE WAS LITTLE CHANCE OF STOPPING IRAN WITHOUT MORE RUSSIAN COOPERATION. BUT WHILE MOSCOW WAS CONCERNED ABOUT TEHRAN, IT WAS EVEN MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE U.S., HE SAID. THE RUSSIANS FELT THREATENED AND HUMILIATED BY GROWING U.S. INFLUENCE AND "ACTIVISM" IN THEIR BACKYARD, AND BY U.S. CRITICISM OF RUSSIA,S HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, WHICH THE RUSSIANS SEE AS BLUNT INTERFERENCE. MOREOVER, U.S. POLICIES ON OIL AND GAS WERE "HURTING RUSSIA,S WALLET." IF THE U.S. WANTS MEANINGFUL RUSSIAN ASSISTANCE ON IRAN, IT SHOULD OFFER SOME CONCESSIONS ON THESE ISSUES, HE SAID. ¶7. (C) ASKED ABOUT RECENT SIGNS OF DEBATE WITHIN THE IRANIAN RULING CLASS ABOUT THE WISDOM OF AHMADINEJAD,S PROVOCATIVE APPROACH TO THE WEST, KAM SAID THAT WHILE THE DEBATE WAS ENCOURAGING, IT WAS LIMITED TO TACTICS AND STRATEGY, NOT GOALS. NO ONE IN THE REGIME WAS DEBATING WHETHER IRAN SHOULD HAVE A NUCLEAR WEAPON TO BEGIN WITH, HE SAID, ONLY WHETHER AHMADINEJAD,S STRATEGY WAS THE BEST APPROACH. -------------- NO AGREEMENT ON THE PEACE PROCESS -------------- ¶8. (C) WHILE THE INSS RESEARCHERS ALL AGREED THE PALESTINIAN CONFLICT WAS ISRAEL,S HIGHEST PRIORITY, THEY VARIED WIDELY ON WHAT COULD OR SHOULD BE DONE TO MOVE FORWARD. EILAND, WHO IS WELL KNOWN TO THE EMBASSY, OFFERED AN UNCHARACTERISTICALLY BLEAK ASSESSMENT, STATING BLUNTLY, "THE ROADMAP IS AN ILLUSION AND WILL NEVER HAPPEN." EILAND CITED FOUR REASONS FOR HIS PESSIMISM: FIRST WAS HAMAS, WHICH HE SAID WAS NOT INTERESTED IN A TWO-STATE SOLUTION AND WAS ROOTED TOO DEEPLY IN PALESTINIAN SOCIETY TO BE EFFECTIVELY MARGINALIZED OR DEFEATED. SECOND, THE PROCESS WAS WRONG, AS IT RELIED ON EACH SIDE SATISFYING UNREALISTIC PRECONDITIONS (HALTING TERRORISM ON THE PALESTINIAN SIDE; REMOVING SETTLEMENTS ON THE ISRAELI SIDE) BEFORE SERIOUS TALKS COULD BEGIN. THIRD, THE GAP BETWEEN THE SIDES WAS TOO LARGE AND WAS GROWING, WITH EACH MAINTAINING IRRECONCILABLE EXPECTATIONS AND REDLINES. FINALLY, THE CONCEPT OF A TWO-STATE SOLUTION ITSELF WAS WRONG AND UNSUSTAINABLE. 2.5 MILLION PEOPLE WILL LIVE IN GAZA IN 14 YEARS, HE SAID, BUT WILL NOT BE SATISFIED LIVING IN THEIR TINY IMPOVERISHED ENCLAVE. THE PRESSURES WILL BE TOO GREAT FOR ISRAEL AND AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINE TO BEAR, HE SAID. ASKED WHAT HE WOULD SUGGEST AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO A TWO-STATE SOLUTION AS CURRENTLY CONCEIVED IN THE ROADMAP, EILAND SAID HE HAD SHARED HIS VIEWS IN THE PAST WITH RICHARD HAAS. ¶9. (C) FORMER HEAD OF THE IDF STRATEGIC PLANNING BRANCH BG (RET.) SHLOMO BRAUM DISAGREED WITH EILAND,S PESSIMISTIC ANALYSIS. CONTRARY TO EILAND,S CLAIM THAT THE SIDES WERE TOO FAR APART FOR MEANINGFUL COMPROMISE, BRAUM ARGUED THAT SOMETHING APPROXIMATING THE CLINTON PROPOSALS (AT TABA IN 2000) HAD ALREADY BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE MAJORITY ON BOTH SIDES. THE ISRAELIS HAD COME A LONG WAY SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE OSLO PROCESS, WHEN THEY DID NOT YET KNOW WHAT THEY WANTED, HE SAID. ISRAELIS NOW AGREED THAT THEY WANT "DEMOGRAPHY MORE THAN GEOGRAPHY" -- I.E. THAT MAINTAINING THE DEMOGRAPHIC BALANCE THAT ENSURES ISRAEL,S JEWISH MAJORITY IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN RETAINING CONTROL OVER THE BIBLICAL HOMELANDS ON THE WEST BANK. FORMER DEPUTY FM (IN THE BEGIN AND SHAMIR GOVERNMENTS) DR. YEHUDA BEN MEIR AGREED THAT ISRAELIS NOW PREFERRED DEMOGRAPHY OVER GEOGRAPHY. HE CITED THE 2006 INSS NATIONAL SECURITY SURVEY, WHICH FOUND THAT 70 PERCENT OF ISRAELIS SUPPORT A TWO-STATE SOLUTION ACHIEVED BY NEGOTIATION. BRAUM ADDED THAT IF THE GOAL OF THE PEACE PROCESS WAS TO NEGOTIATE A TWO-STATE SOLUTION, AND IF EVERYONE KNEW MORE OR LESS WHAT SUCH A SOLUTION WOULD LOOK LIKE, THEN THE CURRENT STRATEGY OF TRYING TO ROLL-BACK HAMAS, POLITICAL-MILITARY GAINS OVER THE PAST YEAR WAS WRONGHEADED. INSTEAD, WE SHOULD BE FOCUSING OUR EFFORTS ON "ENLARGING PALESTINIAN PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF THE END GAME." INVOLVING HAMAS IN THE PROCESS WOULD DO THAT, HE SAID, AND MIGHT BE POSSIBLE SINCE "HAMAS IS SHOWING INDICATIONS THAT IT IS OPEN TO BEING MODERATED." ¶10. (C) BRAUM ALSO SAID IT WAS NECESSARY TO OFFER THE PALESTINIANS A CLEARER WAY OUT OF THE CURRENT SANCTIONS IN ORDER TO AVOID A HARDENING OF POSITIONS. HE ARGUED THAT THE SANCTIONS WERE WEAKENING BOTH HAMAS AND FATAH, WHICH WAS WORRYING BECAUSE BEFORE LONG, "WE MIGHT NOT HAVE ANYONE LEFT TO TALK TO." DR. RONI BART ADDED THAT IN ANY CASE, HAMAS MIGHT SIMPLY WAIT OUT THE SANCTIONS, SINCE THEY KNOW THAT UNLIKE THE EAST, THE WEST HAS NO PATIENCE AND WILL EVENTUALLY CAVE IN. -------------- SYRIA: NOTHING TO GAIN BY MAKING PEACE -------------- ¶11. (C) ON SYRIA, EILAND SAID THE DEBATE WITHIN ISRAEL OVER THE SINCERITY OF SYRIAN PRESIDENT BASHAR AL-ASAD,S RECENT PEACE OVERTURES MISSED THE POINT, WHICH WAS RATHER THAT UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES, PEACE WITH SYRIA WOULD NOT BE GOOD FOR ISRAEL IN ANY CASE. EILAND ARGUED THAT A PEACE AGREEMENT WOULD NOT HELP ISRAEL,S PROBLEMS WITH HIZBALLAH AND WOULD RESULT IN THE PALESTINIANS, WHO WERE MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE SYRIANS, FEELING NEGLECTED. MORE IMPORTANTLY, PEACE WITH SYRIA WOULD REQUIRE GIVING UP THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, WHICH EILAND VIEWED AS AN IRREPLACEABLE STRATEGIC ASSET. NOTWITHSTANDING THE ADVANTAGES OF THE NEW GENERATION OF HIGH-TECH, LONG-RANGE WEAPONRY, IN A COUNTRY AS SMALL AS ISRAEL, GEOGRAPHICAL ADVANTAGES STILL MATTERED. IN THE EVENT OF A CRISIS, IDF FORCES DEPLOYED ON THE GOLAN COULD BE IN DAMASCUS IN A MATTER OF MINUTES, HE SAID, AND "NOTHING CAN MAKE UP FOR LOSING SUCH AN ADVANTAGE." ********************************************* ******************** VISIT EMBASSY TEL AVIV'S CLASSIFIED WEBSITE: HTTP://WWW.STATE.SGOV.GOV/P/NEA/TELAVIV YOU CAN ALSO ACCESS THIS SITE THROUGH THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S CLASSIFIED SIPRNET WEBSITE. ********************************************* ******************** CRETZ

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