IRAN-UNSC: UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH'S DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAELI GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 000557 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2017 
TAGS: PREL, KNNP, MNUC, PTER, UNSC, IR, RU, IS 
SUBJECT: IRAN-UNSC: UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH'S DISCUSSIONS 
WITH ISRAELI GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS (CABLE 4 OF 4) 
 
REF: A. TEL AVIV 00553 
 B. TEL AVIV 00554 
 C. TEL AVIV 00555 
 D. TEL AVIV 00556 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones. Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d). 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
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>specific benchmarks for Iran and the Europeans.



D. The Israeli MFA will send a team to Moscow the week of

February 4 to discuss Iran and other issues, and will share

with the U.S. what it learns.



3. (S) In response, Under Secretary Joseph suggested that

Israel might raise the level at which it talks with the

Russians on Iran, and use stronger language. He laid out a

list of what he called obvious next steps for the USG on

Iran. END SUMMARY.



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NEXT STEPS ON IRAN

--------------



4. (S) Under Secretary Joseph's discussions on Iran with his

Israeli counterparts at the MFA on January 30 considered the

internal situation in Iran, Iran and the IAEA, and Russia and

Iran. They then moved to a discussion of next steps, with

MFA Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs, Miriam

Ziv, noting that there are various fora for action, including

the UNSC and IAEA. Although she thought it likely that Iran

would not suspend its enrichment activity, she wondered aloud

what should be done if Iran says that it accepts the

conditions set forth in UNSCR 1737.



5. (S) Under Secretary Joseph listed what he termed obvious

next steps for the USG:



A. Full implementation of UNSCR 1737.



B. Designating the entities in UNSCR 1737's annex under a WMD



TEL AVIV 00000557 002 OF 004





Executive Order.



C. Encouraging other countries to sanction the entities

listed in UNSCR 1737's annex, and those linked to the Iranian

Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Iran's Aerospace

Industries Organization (AIO).



D. Continuing the process in New York of adding entities to

the sanctions annex.



E. Working within the IAEA to restrict technical cooperation

with Iran to a minimum.



F. Working with other states to carry out financial measures

similar to those the U.S. is executing, and consistent with

UNSCR 1737.



G. Approaching other governments about their countries'

broader commercial relations with Iran, emphasizing the

damage those relations could cause to their reputations, and

the risk factor in doing business with Iran.



H. Maintaining the Gulf Security Dialogue, using declaratory

policy and enhancing the Gulf states' defensive capabilities

to show them that they can make a difference and that the

U.S. is with them for the long run and committed to their

security.



I. Working to strengthen the Proliferation Security

Initiative (PSI).



J. Working with the IAEA to ensure that its reports reflect

the facts.



6. (S) Under Secretary Joseph said that the U.S. has made it

clear that it is willing to participate in discussions with

Iran only if Iran suspends enrichment and reprocessing

activities. The U.S. does not want the Europeans to start

negotiations with Iran until Iran suspends enrichment per

UNSCR 1737. The Under Secretary suggested that all parties

might consider looking anew at an arms embargo on Iran,

noting that the British favor such a sanction.



7. (S) CAPT Soifer from Israeli Defense Intelligence (IDI)

urged:



A. Freezing the assets of the IRGC globally;



B. Freezing the assets of an expanded set of Iranian

government officials, including members of Iran's National

Security Council, Larijani, and the Supreme Leader himself;



C. Taking measures that hit at Iran's banks and important

people within Iran's economy;



D. Encouraging a coalition of like-minded countries to cut

their export guarantees to Iran, and curb economic

cooperation with Iran;



E. Tracking contracts and taking steps to cut commercial

negotiations, if possible. (Soifer said that the IDF is

exploring this in working groups.);



F. Working with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, from where Iran

imports gas;



G. Looking into oil swap deals, which are important to the

ruling regime in Iran, and affect how the Iranian people view

the regime's promises;



H. Taking steps to fuel public debate in Iran and encourage

the public to increase its demands on the regime with respect

to the economy and its nuclear policy.



8. (S) Ziv stressed that many of the IDF's recommendations

compliment the sanctions called for in UNSCR 1737. She noted

that Israel could use radio and Internet blogs to influence

the public in Iran.



9. (S) The Mossad representative stressed the importance of



TEL AVIV 00000557 003 OF 004





China and the Gulf Starts to Iran in financial terms and with

respect to trade (which he said is increasing). He said that

the UAE and Dubai are the most important outlets for Iran's

legal and illegal trade.



10. (S) Shmuel Limone from the MOD stressed the importance of

tying political efforts to the growing U.S. military presence

in the Gulf as part of a broader psychological operation. He

observed that in a "race against time," the U.S., Israel and

like-minded countries could also "bluff and bazaar," and

thereby turn the tables on Iran. Limone suggested that

sanctions and the threat of sanctions are more promising than

providing incentives to Iran to behave. He expressed

confidence that Western countries could broaden and deepen

internal debate in Iran over its nuclear policy.



11. (S) Yehuda Yaakov from the MFA said that EU High

Representative Javier Solana's office is "in denial" about

Iranian negotiator Larijani's meetings with terrorists in

Lebanon. He observed that Larijani's children are studying

in European colleges, and suggested that they could be used

in means to pressure the negotiator. The IDF intelligence

analysts added that Larijani has "tricked" Solana into

believing that Larijani was ready to compromise when -- in

their view -- he never was.



12. (S) Gil Reich from the IAEC expressed concern that the

Iranians are using semi-official track two discussions with

the U.S. and Germany to drive wedges between Western partners.



13. (S) Efrat Reshev from the MFA stressed that she saw no

prospect in the near term for regime change in Iran, and

cautioned against preaching to the public. She suggested

that if the smaller Gulf states received backing in the form

of a resolution from the UN or Arab League, that this would

allow them to be more cooperative on Iran.



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A SECOND UNSC RESOLUTION ON IRAN

--------------



14. (S) The Israelis turned the discussion to a second UNSC

resolution on Iran, and sanctions. Yaakov urged adding back

into the mix of punitive measures those items that the

Russians removed from UNSCR 1737. In the interim, he said

that it is necessary to start behind-the-scenes, dynamic

preparations for a second resolution, and ensure that Iran

knows they are underway. Yaakov stressed the importance of

sticking to the February 23 deadline called for in UNSCR

1737, as this will demonstrate international credibility. He

called for a U.S.-Israel "pincer movement" in European

capitals prior to when the European Union meets on February

27, to urge the Europeans to add senior IRGC and AIO

officials to UNSCR 1737's annex, and adopt an incremental,

benchmark-based approach to returning to negotiations with

Iran. Such an approach should involve a roadmap that Iran

and the Europeans would have to follow to get to a starting

point for negotiations. It would have to address concrete

benchmarks that have already been reached, including uranium

enrichment, centrifuges and UF-6. Yaacov suggested that the

U.S. and Israel consider engaging EU bodies that are likely

to show a more responsible approach to the Iranian nuclear

issue, including the European parliament. He noted that

there is increased apprehension among the Europeans about a

possible Iranian-Russian alliance on gas. This might be a

point of leverage to get the Europeans to pressure the

Russians.



15. (S) Under Secretary Joseph cautioned that all parties

need to think carefully about how to best approach a second

UNSC resolution. He said we must avoid prolongued

maneuvering that would send the wrong message to Iran. MFA

DDG Ziv observed that Iran is not isolated, receives support

from the NAM countries. and is very effective as portraying

itself as a victim. She cautioned that it is not clear how

the NAM countries would react to a second UNSC resolution,

and noted that the UNSC now includes South Africa and

Indonesia. She promised to turn over for U.S. consideration

a list of specific measures that could be included in a

second resolution.



TEL AVIV 00000557 004 OF 004







16. (S) On lessons learned from Iraq, DOE/NNSA Deputy

Administrator Tobey reminded all present of the generally

accepted view now that sanctions actually empowered Saddam.

All agreed that nobody knows for certain how sanctions will

ultimately affect Iran. Jeremy Issacharoff -- the DCM at the

Israeli Embassy in Washington -- suggested that the path to

war in Iraq began when international consensus on Iraq broke

down after UNSCR 1284 was passed. He stressed that the

Russians should be reminded of this when they are approached

about a second resolution, and should be urged to keep the

diplomatic option on the table. Ziv noted that she and the

MFA's Arms Control Department Director, Alon Bar, would

travel to Russia the week of February 4. Under Secretary

Joseph stressed that the Russians will be a determining

factor in whether there is a second UNSC resolution on Iran.

Nobody in the USG wants to see a repeat of their behavior

during the negotiations of the first resolution.



17. (S) Bar observed that Russia is blocking most of the

initiatives on Iran, and in doing so, gives skeptical

Europeans cover to be less helpful. He stressed that

Russia's policies contradict Israel's interests in a number

of areas. Under Secretary Joseph suggested that Israel raise

the level of its interaction with Russia and use "stronger

words." He reiterated that Israel, the U.S. and like-minded

countries cannot afford a repeat of the "performance" leading

to UNSCR 1737. The message to Russia should be that it needs

to show resolve and support the international community's red

lines on Iran.



18. (S) Assistant Secretary Rood cautioned that the Europeans

will want to preserve unity, and that tends to manifest

itself in the Europeans starting at the bottom line with the

Russians. He cautioned that we must all be wary of a

tendency towards the lowest common denominator in negotiating

solutions. Yaakov suggested that the Russians might be

limited in their veto capability due to UNSCR 1718. Under

Secretary Joseph stressed that it would not be in our



SIPDIS

interests to allow the Europeans to draft a second resolution.



19. (U) Under Secretary Robert Joseph has cleared on this

cable.



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