IRAN-RUSSIA: UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH’S DISCUSSIONS

Thursday, 22 February 2007, 06:46
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000556
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/09/2017
TAGS PREL, KNNP, MNUC, PTER, IR, RU, IS
SUBJECT: IRAN-RUSSIA: UNDER SECRETARY JOSEPH’S DISCUSSIONS
WITH ISRAELI GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS (CABLE 3 OF 4)
REF: A. TEL AVIV 00553

B. TEL AVIV 00554 C. TEL AVIV 00555
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones. Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d).
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SUMMARY
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1. (S) During his January 30 - February 2 visit to Israel, Under Secretary Robert Joseph participated in talks with Israeli representatives from the MFA, MOD, Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and affiliated research centers, IDF intelligence (IDI),and the Mossad. Discussions focused on the threats posed to Israel and the international community by Iran, North Korea, Syria, and terrorist groups operating in Lebanon and the region. Under Secretary Joseph was accompanied by Ambassador Jones, Assistant Secretary John Rood, DOE/NNSA Deputy Administrator William Tobey, and T Senior Advisor James Timbie. This cable, the third of four cables on Iran from a three-hour interagency meeting at the MFA, focuses on discussions about Russia and Iran.

2. (S) The main points the Under Secretary’s Israeli interlocutors made are as follows:

A. Israel is very concerned about Russia’s cooperation with Iran on the Bushehr reactor, and would like to see Russia withhold indefinitely its fuel for the reactor.

B. Israel understands that Russia intends to transfer to Iran sophisticated ground-to-air defense systems.

C. Israel is closely following U.S. efforts on the Global Nuclear Energy Policy (GNEP) and will support the initiative within the IAEA. Israel believes that the dissemination of nuclear energy could be used to create an anti-Iran model in the Middle East.

3. (S) Under Secretary Joseph provided an overview of his discussions with Russian MFA and ROSATOM officials in Moscow, noting that the U.S. is interested in developing a new relationship with Russia that focuses on jointly combating the threats of the future, and moving away from interaction based on Cold War-era arms control calculations. He noted that ROSATOM appears more inclined than the Russian MFA to cooperate in withholding nuclear fuel from Iran. He described the GNEP, stressing that this is an initiative that offers potential for U.S. and Russian cooperation. END SUMMARY.
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BRIEFING ON MEETINGS IN MOSCOW
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4. (S) On January 31, Under Secretary Joseph led a U.S. interagency team in nonproliferation talks with an Israeli interagency team at the MFA. Discussion of Iran began with a review of the internal situation in Iran, and the effects sanctions are having on that country. It then moved to an assessment of how the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is dealing with the Iranian nuclear weapons program. Under Secretary Joseph was then asked by his Israeli interlocutors about the meetings he had just held with the Russians. He made the following points:

A. He participated in the latest round of the U.S.-Russia Strategic Dialogue. It covered a lengthy agenda of issues, including bilateral issues, and what the two sides will do after the expiration of START in 2009. DFM Kislyak led the Russian side. The U.S. wants to get away from a relationship defined by Cold War-era arms control calculations. The U.S. wants to put certain transparency measures in place. The U.S. no longer sees Russia as a strategic threat in the old Cold War context, but would like Russia to join it in confronting real threats of the present and future. The U.S. and Russia agreed to discuss at the expert-level U.S. and Russian policies not to deploy more strategic forces than are necessary for each country’s own security requirements. The two sides agreed to discuss Missile Defense (MD) and Russian concerns about a possible third ground-based interceptor (GBI) site in Europe. The USG views Russia’s stated concerns as hollow. Assistant Secretary Rood added that the U.S. MD investment in Europe demonstrates its real concerns about Iran.
TEL AVIV 00000556 002 OF 003

B. The two sides had discussed space policy, and the conventional Trident program. The Russians have opened up on their own space doctrine. The U.S. team told the Russians that it wants to move forward on deploying some Trident missiles with conventional warheads to hold at risk unique targets such as terrorist leadership elements that could not be taken out in time with currently available conventional capabilities.

C. There was discussion about U.S.-Russian initiatives that are in train. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism is moving forward, with a second meeting in Ankara in mid-February. Presidents Bush and Putin have also discussed an initiative to strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Discussions to date have focused on how to work together to bring others along to strengthen the regime and expand the responsible use of nuclear energy. It appears that the Russians are willing to step up and be co-leaders.

D. The U.S. is forward-leaning on the need to expand nuclear energy in industrialized and industrializing countries. Environmental reasons and growing energy demand are going to require a major expansion of nuclear energy in the coming years. In order to address the nonproliferation aspects of this approach, the U.S. developed the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). It has been discussed with the UK, France, the IAEA, Russia, China, Japan and other countries. The U.S. wants to use future technology to address both ends of the nuclear fuel cycle, including recycling versus reprocessing of spent fuel. GNEP envisions recycling spent fuel. and the supply of nuclear fuel to countries for use in small, advanced reactors. To date, GNEP has been well-received. The U.S. is also talking with nuclear supplier states on the issue of assured supply of nuclear fuel. The Russians have proposed a Russian-Kazakh International Fuel Center under IAEA safeguards that would supply countries with enriched uranium and thereby eliminate the need for countries to acquire technology on their own that could be used for nuclear weapons programs. Many countries are asserting their need for nuclear energy while pursuing nuclear technology for other purposes. The U.S.-Russian dialogue on this issue is designed to bring the two countries’ ideas together to form an attractive offer for third countries as an incentive to forego enrichment and reprocessing.

E. (S) DOE/NNSA Deputy Administrator Timbie added that ROSATOM Director Kiriyenko said that if a country wants to be admitted to the Russian International Fuel Center, its government would have to sign a government-to-government guarantee not to seek its own uranium enrichment capability. Merav Zafary from the IAEC said that Israel is closely following U.S. efforts and will support the initiative within the IAEA. She supposed that the dissemination of nuclear energy could be used to create an anti-Iran model in the Middle East.
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THE BUSHEHR REACTOR
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5. (S) Discussion then shifted to Russia’s assistance to the Bushehr reactor in Iran. Under Secretary Joseph and Assistant Secretary Rood made the following points:

A. ROSATOM Chief Kiriyenko said that there are a number of ways to prevent the transfer of Russian nuclear fuel to the Bushehr reactor. If Iran were to kick out IAEA safeguards inspectors, that would suffice. A second UNSC resolution could also prohibit fuel delivery to Bushehr. Any evidence that Iran has violated the provisions of the contract establishing the reactor could also serve as justification. Stopping the fuel supply on the basis of an Iranian violation would be preferable to establishing fallback safeguards for the reactor. ROSATOM’s desire to stop nuclear fuel delivery to Iran may not be shared by Russian negotiators in New York, or Russian officials from other ministries.

B. The Russians said that their cooperation on Bushehr is conditioned on the presence of IAEA safeguards inspectors. The U.S. will urge the IAEA to insist that inspectors be present at Bushehr. At present, it appears that the IAEA might not make such a demand.
TEL AVIV 00000556 003 OF 003

C. DFM Kislyak had worked to water down the effect of UNSCR 1737 sanctions. When the U.S. raised the matter of implementing financial sanctions, he countered that there is no Russian legal framework for such measures. New legislation before the Duma should resolve this. Kislyak nevertheless maintains that if Iran is pushed too hard, it will leave the NPT, and the international community will lose its leverage. It appears Kislyak was affected by his last visit to Iran and Ahmadinejad’s suggestion that Iran will announce a breakthrough in the near future.

D. The Russians feel they have years, not months, to resolve the problem of Iran’s nuclear program. They feel the Iranians have made less progress than the U.S. assesses, especially when it comes to being able to weaponize a nuclear warhead. It does not appear that the Russians have linked Iran to other strategic issues, such as the Caucasus. Iran has always been of strategic importance to Russia.

E. The Russians did not raise U.S. sanctions on Russian entities for activities with Iran. DFM Kislyak seemed intent on focusing on areas of common interest.

6. (S) DOE/NNSA Deputy Administrator Tobey said that the U.S. has drawn an indirect linkage between Iran and the 123 Agreement, and that fuel delivery to Bushehr prior to the conclusion of the 123 Agreement would cause serious problems.

7. (U) Under Secretary Robert Joseph has cleared on this cable.
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