IRAN: U/S JOSEPH'S JANUARY 30 DINNER WITH ISRAEL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000553

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2017
TAGS: PREL KNNP MNUC PTER IR RU IS
SUBJECT: IRAN: U/S JOSEPH'S JANUARY 30 DINNER WITH ISRAEL
MFA DG ABRAMOVITCH

Classified By: Marc J. Sievers, Political Counselor.
Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d).

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SUMMARY
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1. (S) During his January 30 - February 2 visit to Israel,
Under Secretary Robert Joseph participated in talks with
Israeli representatives from the MFA, MOD, Israeli Atomic
Energy Commission (IAEC) and affiliated research centers, IDF
intelligence, and the Mossad. Discussions focused on the
threats posed to Israel and the international community by
Iran, North Korea, Syria, and terrorist groups operating in
Lebanon and the region. Under Secretary Joseph was
accompanied by Assistant Secretary John Rood, DOE/NNSA Deputy
Administrator William Tobey, and T Senior Advisor James
Timbie. This cable focuses on the Under Secretary's working
dinner discussion with MFA DG Aharon Abramovitch and MOD
POL-MIL Bureau Chief Amos Gilad on Iran. Additional cables
will cover discussions at the MFA and the Israeli Atomic
Energy Commission (IAEC).


2. (S) Abramovitch and his MFA colleagues probed for the U.S.
position on a second UN Security Council resolution after
IAEA Director General ElBaradei issues his next report on
Iran as required by UNSCR 1737. He and his colleagues asked
for a readout of Under Secretary Joseph's meetings in Moscow.
MFA Deputy DG Miriam Ziv reported that financial measures
are having an impact on Iran. Gilad said he believes Iran
will not stop its nuclear program, and that Russia is using
Iran against the U.S. Under Secretary Joseph provided an
overview of his meetings in Moscow. Together with Assistant
Secretary Rood, he laid out U.S. thinking on how to prevent

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Iran from forcing accommodation by the Gulf States and Saudi
Arabia. END SUMMARY.

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RUSSIA AND IRAN
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3. (S) Under Secretary Joseph's discussions on Iran with his
Israeli interlocutors began at a dinner hosted by MFA DG
Aharon Abramovitch the evening before the January 31
interagency plenary at the MFA. Abramovitch inquired about
the Under Secretary's meetings in Moscow, stressing that
Russia's interaction with Iran and Syria is very worrisome
for Israel. Under Secretary Joseph reviewed the U.S.
position on arrangements being discussed with the Russians to
replace the START Treaty when it expires, stressing that we
wish to move our interactions with the Russians away from
traditional, Cold War-style arms control, to cooperation on
countering the proliferation threats of the future, including
nuclear terrorism. Joseph noted that while Russia had been
unconstructive during the negotiations on UNSCR 1737, he had
detected greater resolution on the part of some of his
Russian interlocutors to move forward with stronger measures,
if Iran does not comply with UNSCR 1737. Under Secretary
Joseph said he was encouraged by his discussions with ROSATOM
Director Kiriyenko, especially as he plays an important role
in Russian policy on the Bushehr reactor in Iran. Under
Secretary Joseph said that Russia provides advanced

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conventional arms to Iran, and is not taking action on
financial measures in accordance with UNSCR 1737.


4. (S) MFA DG Abramovitch said that Russia's behavior during
the UNSCR 1737 negotiations worried Israel, especially
Russia's attempts to remove important parts of the
resolution. Israel was surprised that the resolution passed,
and is grateful for the U.S. role in making that happen.
Abramovitch observed that Russia's logic in dealing with Iran
is unclear -- that the situation for Russia is more risky for
it due to Russia's proximity to Iran and other Muslim nations.


5. (S) MOD POL-MIL Bureau Head MGEN (Res.) Amos Gilad said
that as a result of his recent visit to Moscow, it had become
clear to him that the Russians intend to strengthen their
position vis-a-vis the U.S. in global affairs, and "hurt the
U.S. and its proxy, Israel." Gilad said that the Russians
claim the timetable for Iran becoming a nuclear power is
longer than that estimated by Israel. Based on this, the
Russians say there is time to maneuver on Iran. Gilad
observed that Iran is more susceptible to financial sanctions
than North Korea, and said that intelligence suggests that
financial sanctions are working. Under Secretary Joseph
agreed with this assessment, noting that there is more debate

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on the nuclear program in Iran than before. Under Secretary
Joseph acknowledged that the Russian MFA is problematic, but
suggested that it might be looking at Iran and the timetable
anew. He noted that DFM Kislyak had been taken aback by
Iran's plans for February 11 and March declarations of its
achievements in its nuclear program. Under Secretary Joseph
recounted that his Russian interlocutors told him that while
Russia is reluctant to move forward on financial sanctions
beyond those called for in UNSCR 1737, new legislation had
been drawn up for Duma consideration that will allow the
sanctions under UNSCR 1737 to be implemented. Under
Secretary Joseph cautioned that passage of the legislation

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will probably take some time, but observed that there may yet
be some reason for optimism.

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THE IMPACT OF PRESSURE ON IRAN
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6. (S) Gilad said he believes Iran will never surrender its
nuclear weapons program, as its attainment is part of Iran's
vision of its "place on earth." He admitted that the
Iranians might fail, and observed that they are having many
technical problems. Gilad said that it is certain that Iran
has a military program, and that Iran could still be
"stopped," but did not elaborate on either assertion. Under
Secretary Joseph agreed that there is broad consensus across

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Iran's political spectrum in favor of nuclear weapons, and
that this fits into Iran's aggressive agenda for the Middle
East. He added that Ahmadinejad views the nuclear weapons
program as an instrument to be used against Israel, to which
Abramovitch and Gilad agreed.


7. (S) MFA Deputy DG Miriam Ziv said it is clear that there
is unrest in Iran, and that UNSCR 1737 has increased pressure
on Iran's leadership and has led to increased criticism of
President Ahmadinejad. Under Secretary Joseph cautioned that
while Ahmadinejad is disturbing, he is preferable to
Rafsanjani, as the latter is clever and more effective and
enjoys support among Europeans, who view him as a moderate.
Ziv claimed that the economy has seen some movement, and that
the Iranian government is tapping its hard currency reserves,
converting its budget from dollars to Euros, and attempting
to move its bank accounts to the Far East. Abramovitch
cautioned that nobody in Iran is seriously speaking about
stopping the nuclear program, and expressed doubt as to
whether existing measures will slow Iran's progress on
nuclear weapons. He observed that getting the Russians, East
Asians and Gulf countries to restrict their trade with Iran
could have a significant impact. Abramovitch expressed
surprise that the U.S. is running exchange programs with
Iranian students. Under Secretary Joseph responded that the
programs are intended to show that U.S. policies are not
meant to hurt the Iranian people.

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PROSPECTS FOR A SECOND UNSC RESOLUTION
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8. (S) Abramovitch asked about U.S. thinking on a second UNSC
resolution after the IAEA issues its report on Iran and
enrichment suspension as called for in UNSCR 1737. Under
Secretary Joseph cautioned to expect no surprises from the

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IAEA's report, and said that DG ElBaradei will need to be
encouraged to be accurate. He said that it would be helpful
to have a Chapter 7 resolution to get the Europeans to pass
legislation to move forward with financial measures on Iran.
He cautioned, however, that all parties need to consider the
wisdom of moving forward with a second resolution. If Russia
were to behave as it did in the negotiations on UNSCR 1737,
this would not send a signal of resolve to Iran. Under
Secretary Joseph said that his sense was that the USG would

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support a second resolution on Iran, but also suggested that
the U.S., Israel and willing partners should focus on Iran
with existing nonproliferation tools including the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Responding to
Abramovitch's question about European execution of UNSCR 1737
financial measures, Under Secretary Joseph said that the UK
appears supportive, while France and Italy remain
questionable. He characterized the EU response to UNSCR 1737
as slightly better than what the U.S. expected, but stressed
that the U.S. and Israel need to challenge the individual
European countries to fulfill their obligations under UNSCR
1737, and go beyond the resolution via unilateral financial
and other measures against Iran. In response to
Abramovitch's question about China's response to the

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resolution, Assistant Secretary Rood said that progress is
slow with China, but not for a lack of trying.

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KEEPING THE GULF STATES ON BOARD
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9. (S) Under Secretary Joseph observed that actions on the
ground appear to make a difference in Iran's calculations.
He noted that the Gulf states had been affected by Iran's
latest military exercises, and were forced to wonder whether
the U.S. would stay the course with them. In this context,
visible measures -- like our movement of a carrier battle
group to the Gulf -- are meaningful. Under Secretary Joseph
stressed that the Gulf states need to feel confident that the
U.S. will support them through declaratory policy and support
for their defensive capabilities. In contrast, if the Gulf
States started to second-guess U.S. resolve, this might lead
either to a second round of proliferation or accommodation by
the Gulf states to Iranian demands. Abramovitch said that he
had met with officials from the Gulf states and found them
"very warm" but not motivated enough to execute financial
measures that might cost them. Gilad said that Israel now
views Saudi Arabia as a more positive power in the Middle
East. Gilad nevertheless expressed concern that fragments of
intelligence suggest that the Saudis are considering
upgrading their Chinese missiles, and may have reached out to
Pakistan on its nuclear program. He wondered if they might
be preparing a "nuclear option." Gilad claimed that Egypt is
also afraid of the possibility that Iran will achieve a
nuclear capability.


10. (U) This cable has been cleared by Under Secretary
Joseph's office.

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