IRAN: U/S JOSEPH'S JANUARY 30 DINNER WITH ISRAEL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000553 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2017 TAGS: PREL KNNP MNUC PTER IR RU IS SUBJECT: IRAN: U/S JOSEPH'S JANUARY 30 DINNER WITH ISRAEL MFA DG ABRAMOVITCH Classified By: Marc J. Sievers, Political Counselor. Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) During his January 30 - February 2 visit to Israel, Under Secretary Robert Joseph participated in talks with Israeli representatives from the MFA, MOD, Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and affiliated research centers, IDF intelligence, and the Mossad. Discussions focused on the threats posed to Israel and the international community by Iran, North Korea, Syria, and terrorist groups operating in Lebanon and the region. Under Secretary Joseph was accompanied by Assistant Secretary John Rood, DOE/NNSA Deputy Administrator William Tobey, and T Senior Advisor James Timbie. This cable focuses on the Under Secretary's working dinner discussion with MFA DG Aharon Abramovitch and MOD POL-MIL Bureau Chief Amos Gilad on Iran. Additional cables will cover discussions at the MFA and the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC). ¶2. (S) Abramovitch and his MFA colleagues probed for the U.S. position on a second UN Security Council resolution after IAEA Director General ElBaradei issues his next report on Iran as required by UNSCR 1737. He and his colleagues asked for a readout of Under Secretary Joseph's meetings in Moscow. MFA Deputy DG Miriam Ziv reported that financial measures are having an impact on Iran. Gilad said he believes Iran will not stop its nuclear program, and that Russia is using Iran against the U.S. Under Secretary Joseph provided an overview of his meetings in Moscow. Together with Assistant Secretary Rood, he laid out U.S. thinking on how to prevent SIPDIS Iran from forcing accommodation by the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. END SUMMARY. -------------- RUSSIA AND IRAN -------------- ¶3. (S) Under Secretary Joseph's discussions on Iran with his Israeli interlocutors began at a dinner hosted by MFA DG Aharon Abramovitch the evening before the January 31 interagency plenary at the MFA. Abramovitch inquired about the Under Secretary's meetings in Moscow, stressing that Russia's interaction with Iran and Syria is very worrisome for Israel. Under Secretary Joseph reviewed the U.S. position on arrangements being discussed with the Russians to replace the START Treaty when it expires, stressing that we wish to move our interactions with the Russians away from traditional, Cold War-style arms control, to cooperation on countering the proliferation threats of the future, including nuclear terrorism. Joseph noted that while Russia had been unconstructive during the negotiations on UNSCR 1737, he had detected greater resolution on the part of some of his Russian interlocutors to move forward with stronger measures, if Iran does not comply with UNSCR 1737. Under Secretary Joseph said he was encouraged by his discussions with ROSATOM Director Kiriyenko, especially as he plays an important role in Russian policy on the Bushehr reactor in Iran. Under Secretary Joseph said that Russia provides advanced SIPDIS conventional arms to Iran, and is not taking action on financial measures in accordance with UNSCR 1737. ¶4. (S) MFA DG Abramovitch said that Russia's behavior during the UNSCR 1737 negotiations worried Israel, especially Russia's attempts to remove important parts of the resolution. Israel was surprised that the resolution passed, and is grateful for the U.S. role in making that happen. Abramovitch observed that Russia's logic in dealing with Iran is unclear -- that the situation for Russia is more risky for it due to Russia's proximity to Iran and other Muslim nations. ¶5. (S) MOD POL-MIL Bureau Head MGEN (Res.) Amos Gilad said that as a result of his recent visit to Moscow, it had become clear to him that the Russians intend to strengthen their position vis-a-vis the U.S. in global affairs, and "hurt the U.S. and its proxy, Israel." Gilad said that the Russians claim the timetable for Iran becoming a nuclear power is longer than that estimated by Israel. Based on this, the Russians say there is time to maneuver on Iran. Gilad observed that Iran is more susceptible to financial sanctions than North Korea, and said that intelligence suggests that financial sanctions are working. Under Secretary Joseph agreed with this assessment, noting that there is more debate TEL AVIV 00000553 002 OF 003 on the nuclear program in Iran than before. Under Secretary Joseph acknowledged that the Russian MFA is problematic, but suggested that it might be looking at Iran and the timetable anew. He noted that DFM Kislyak had been taken aback by Iran's plans for February 11 and March declarations of its achievements in its nuclear program. Under Secretary Joseph recounted that his Russian interlocutors told him that while Russia is reluctant to move forward on financial sanctions beyond those called for in UNSCR 1737, new legislation had been drawn up for Duma consideration that will allow the sanctions under UNSCR 1737 to be implemented. Under Secretary Joseph cautioned that passage of the legislation SIPDIS will probably take some time, but observed that there may yet be some reason for optimism. -------------- THE IMPACT OF PRESSURE ON IRAN -------------- ¶6. (S) Gilad said he believes Iran will never surrender its nuclear weapons program, as its attainment is part of Iran's vision of its "place on earth." He admitted that the Iranians might fail, and observed that they are having many technical problems. Gilad said that it is certain that Iran has a military program, and that Iran could still be "stopped," but did not elaborate on either assertion. Under Secretary Joseph agreed that there is broad consensus across SIPDIS Iran's political spectrum in favor of nuclear weapons, and that this fits into Iran's aggressive agenda for the Middle East. He added that Ahmadinejad views the nuclear weapons program as an instrument to be used against Israel, to which Abramovitch and Gilad agreed. ¶7. (S) MFA Deputy DG Miriam Ziv said it is clear that there is unrest in Iran, and that UNSCR 1737 has increased pressure on Iran's leadership and has led to increased criticism of President Ahmadinejad. Under Secretary Joseph cautioned that while Ahmadinejad is disturbing, he is preferable to Rafsanjani, as the latter is clever and more effective and enjoys support among Europeans, who view him as a moderate. Ziv claimed that the economy has seen some movement, and that the Iranian government is tapping its hard currency reserves, converting its budget from dollars to Euros, and attempting to move its bank accounts to the Far East. Abramovitch cautioned that nobody in Iran is seriously speaking about stopping the nuclear program, and expressed doubt as to whether existing measures will slow Iran's progress on nuclear weapons. He observed that getting the Russians, East Asians and Gulf countries to restrict their trade with Iran could have a significant impact. Abramovitch expressed surprise that the U.S. is running exchange programs with Iranian students. Under Secretary Joseph responded that the programs are intended to show that U.S. policies are not meant to hurt the Iranian people. -------------- PROSPECTS FOR A SECOND UNSC RESOLUTION -------------- ¶8. (S) Abramovitch asked about U.S. thinking on a second UNSC resolution after the IAEA issues its report on Iran and enrichment suspension as called for in UNSCR 1737. Under Secretary Joseph cautioned to expect no surprises from the SIPDIS IAEA's report, and said that DG ElBaradei will need to be encouraged to be accurate. He said that it would be helpful to have a Chapter 7 resolution to get the Europeans to pass legislation to move forward with financial measures on Iran. He cautioned, however, that all parties need to consider the wisdom of moving forward with a second resolution. If Russia were to behave as it did in the negotiations on UNSCR 1737, this would not send a signal of resolve to Iran. Under Secretary Joseph said that his sense was that the USG would SIPDIS support a second resolution on Iran, but also suggested that the U.S., Israel and willing partners should focus on Iran with existing nonproliferation tools including the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Responding to Abramovitch's question about European execution of UNSCR 1737 financial measures, Under Secretary Joseph said that the UK appears supportive, while France and Italy remain questionable. He characterized the EU response to UNSCR 1737 as slightly better than what the U.S. expected, but stressed that the U.S. and Israel need to challenge the individual European countries to fulfill their obligations under UNSCR 1737, and go beyond the resolution via unilateral financial and other measures against Iran. In response to Abramovitch's question about China's response to the TEL AVIV 00000553 003 OF 003 resolution, Assistant Secretary Rood said that progress is slow with China, but not for a lack of trying. -------------- KEEPING THE GULF STATES ON BOARD -------------- ¶9. (S) Under Secretary Joseph observed that actions on the ground appear to make a difference in Iran's calculations. He noted that the Gulf states had been affected by Iran's latest military exercises, and were forced to wonder whether the U.S. would stay the course with them. In this context, visible measures -- like our movement of a carrier battle group to the Gulf -- are meaningful. Under Secretary Joseph stressed that the Gulf states need to feel confident that the U.S. will support them through declaratory policy and support for their defensive capabilities. In contrast, if the Gulf States started to second-guess U.S. resolve, this might lead either to a second round of proliferation or accommodation by the Gulf states to Iranian demands. Abramovitch said that he had met with officials from the Gulf states and found them "very warm" but not motivated enough to execute financial measures that might cost them. Gilad said that Israel now views Saudi Arabia as a more positive power in the Middle East. Gilad nevertheless expressed concern that fragments of intelligence suggest that the Saudis are considering upgrading their Chinese missiles, and may have reached out to Pakistan on its nuclear program. He wondered if they might be preparing a "nuclear option." Gilad claimed that Egypt is also afraid of the possibility that Iran will achieve a nuclear capability. ¶10. (U) This cable has been cleared by Under Secretary Joseph's office. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** JONES