OLMERT: DESPITE FRUSTRATION, GOI WILL MAINTAIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 000542 SIPDIS CODEL SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2017 TAGS: PREL KPAL IS SUBJECT: OLMERT: DESPITE FRUSTRATION, GOI WILL MAINTAIN PALESTINIAN CHANNEL Classified By: DCM Gene A. Cretz for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: During a February 20 meeting, Prime Minister Olmert told CODEL Kyl that despite Israeli frustration with Mahmoud Abbas and the Mekka Agreement, the GOI would keep open a channel to him. Olmert asserted that there could be no distinction between a non-Hamas minister and others in a Hamas cabinet. The PM said bilateral discussions would continue on how to provide for the immediate needs of the Palestinian people but that Abbas also had to follow-through with concrete actions on the security front. He reiterated that if Hamas PM Hanniyah accepted the Quartet's conditions, he would meet with him. The PM had high praise for the President and Secretary's continuing efforts to maintain momentum in the peace process despite the difficulties. Olmert also registered strong opposition to any premature US withdrawal from Iraq, arguing that Iran would emerge the winner from the ensuing regional instability. End summary. -------------- RESULTS OF THE TRILATERAL -------------- ¶2. Prime Minister Olmert, just having concluded the trilateral meeting with the Secretary and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, told CODEL Kyl (accompanied by DCM) that he very much appreciated President Bush and Secretary Rice's hands-on efforts to keep the peace process moving forward. Olmert acknowledged GOI unhappiness with the Mekka Agreement, asserting that the results went far beyond what many thought was the original agenda. When the Palestinians went to Saudi Arabia, he said, the GOI supported efforts at inter-Palestinian reconciliation, saying that the recent bloodshed in Gaza was in nobody's interest, including Israel. Olmert then, somewhat bitterly, recalled that he told Abbas during today's meeting that the latter had previously come to him for support and help to defeat Hamas. Now, Olmert said he conveyed to Abbas, "You are kissing this terrorist?" ¶3. (C) Olmert continued that in today's summit he had told Abbas in the clearest possible terms that Israel would not cooperate or recognize any Palestinian government -- or part of it -- that did not recognize the Quartet's conditions. Speaking confidentially, he told the CODEL that he had also cautioned Mohammed Dahlan "not to join the cabinet." Olmert rejected Abbas's argument that the Mekka agreement had improved the situation because it had resulted in a new cabinet of less than 100 percent Hamas ministers as was the case previously. Olmert said that a situation which resulted in "50 percent of Fatah under the umbrella of Hamas" reflected a significantly worse situation. Olmert expected that the USG position would also be clear that there would be no distinction between non-Hamas ministers and other members of the cabinet. ¶4. (C) Olmert said he had considered cutting off all relations with the Palestinians in the wake of Mekka but decided to keep at least one channel to President Abbas open given that he still represented the most acceptable individual on the Palestinian side. While expressing frustration with Abbas and anger at his "mistake," Olmert said that Abbas was elected independently, the new cabinet had yet to be formed,and he (Olmert) did not want to spoil the Secretary's efforts at creating momentum in the process. For that reason, Olmert had agreed to go on with the trilateral meeting today. ¶5. (C) Looking to the future, Olmert said he had not ruled out another meeting (we believe the PM was definitely referring to the trilateral format) with Abbas but did warn that it would not be soon if the new cabinet is formed and Hanniyah was named prime minister. With respect to the Palestinian people, Olmert insisted that Israel had no intention to punish them for "the sins of their leadership" and would continue to insure immediate needs were met. But, he added, Abbas had to take care of security and really deliver with actions. Olmert asserted that the GOI would continue with upgrading Palestinian quality of life and would keep open a bilateral track which would focus on these issues and also on efforts to continue combating terror. If Hamas accepts the Quartet conditions, Olmert said he would sit with them. Senator Kyl commented that the current situation could provide real opportunities to support moderates. Olmert replied that anyone who was not a part of the Hamas governmental apparatus would be a candidate for such support. Responding to a question as to whether Palestinian elections could offer a chance for moderates to regain dominance, Olmert said that he favored democracy but that the essential dilemma remained as in the last Palestinian election as to TEL AVIV 00000542 002 OF 002 whether there was room in the democratic process for groups that, even though they enjoyed public support, also participated in terror. -------------- -------------- IRAQ; OLMERT CAUTIONS AGAINST PREMATURE WITHDRAWAL -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) On Iraq, Olmert was almost singularly focused on the question of what would be the consequences for Iran if the US were to withdraw from Iraq because it could not cope with the situation there. Olmert asserted that Iran was the most serious, fundamental threat facing Israel and that if Tehran had just one atomic weapon it would be used against Israel. But beyond Israel's situation, Olmert argued that Iraq is a "problem" while Iran is an acute threat to the whole region. Were the US to withdraw prematurely, the key will be how the Iranians perceive it, not how the US explains it. Olmert believes that in the event, the Gulf sheikhdoms would be shaken to their foundations and there would troubling reverberations in Jordan and Egypt as well. ¶7. (C) Having just visited Iraq, CODEL members offered differing perceptions of the situation there Rep. Giffords (D-AZ) said that the Congressional debate was just what the American people needed to have. Iraq was a test for the US on how to deal with an enemy not encountered before. She lamented the wide gap between advanced weaponry and a lack of intelligence. Rep. Pearce (R-NM) said he found the Iraqi leadership willing to take hard positions, including going into mosques if necessary. He believed that if the Iraqi leadership really engages, the American people will be more patient. Pearce agreed with Olmert that a premature withdrawal would impact on those regional states who believed that the US would always back them up. Iran, he said, would be empowered by an early US withdrawal. Rep. Harman (D-CA) argued that the 20,000 troops would not do the job; she did not advocate leaving early but rather finding another strategy more in line with the findings of the Iraq study group. Harman said we needed to find a new strategy for the violence in Iraq, contain it, and turn our attention to the problem of Iran 8.(C) Senator Kyl (R-AZ) said he found the Iraqis more confident with the new strategy since they were taking credit for it. He also believed that US military commanders were cautiously optimistic. Kyl argued that we needed to give the new strategy a chance to succeed. He believed that what we do in Iraq will impact on how successful we are in containing the Iranian threat. 9.(U) The CODEL did not have the opportunity to clear this message before departing. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** JONES