ISRAEL-SYRIA: FORMER MFA DG DESCRIBES TRACK-TWO

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 000421 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER SY IS TU SUBJECT: ISRAEL-SYRIA: FORMER MFA DG DESCRIBES TRACK-TWO NEGOTIATIONS REF: TEL AVIV 209 Classified By: DCM Gene A. Cretz, Reason 1.4 (b) (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Former MFA Director General Alon Liel briefed DCM, PAO, and PolCouns February 5 on track two peace negotiations with Syria that lasted from January 2004 until a final meeting in July 2006 during the fighting in Lebanon. The track two discussions were initially sponsored by the Turkish government, but the Swiss took over after the Turks dropped out, reportedly out of frustration at Israel's refusal to engage officially. In contrast to information provided to us earlier by MFA and reported reftel, Liel said the Israeli MFA and Prime Minister's Office had been routinely briefed. According to Liel, former PM Sharon authorized him and two other former Israeli officials to engage with Syrian representatives, although only in an unofficial capacity. Liel said the Syrian interest in the discussions intensified after the Hariri assassination. His view is that Syrian positions put forward by Syrian-American businessman Abe Soleiman were thoroughly vetted with the Syrian leadership. Liel believes the Syrians were trying to use the talks as a means to convince the U.S. to change its policy toward Syria. He argued that the draft peace agreement meant that Syria would be prepared to "change its orientation" away from Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas in return for Israeli recognition of Syrian sovereignty over the Golan Heights and an end to U.S. pressure on Syria. Liel also said the Swiss mediator continues to be engaged in discussions on Israeli POWs, but he is not privvy to those discussions. DCM noted U.S. policy toward Syria and expressed skepticism about Syrian intentions. End Summary. Turkish Initiative -------------- ¶2. (C) Liel described the background to the talks as Bashar Al-Asad's visit to Turkey in January 2004, during which he reportedly asked Prime Minister Erdogan to mediate peace talks with Israel. Erdogan wrote to then-Prime Minister Sharon, who was not interested in Turkish mediation. Liel, who was involved in promoting Israeli-Turkish ties, heard that Erdogan was offended by Sharon's rejection, and offered track two talks instead. Liel brought in former Mossad officer and current think tank head Uzi Arad, who is close to Likud Party leader Netanyahu. The Turks invited Syrian-American businessman Abe Soleiman to meet the Turkish ambassador in Damascus, and the track two talks began. Liel stated that he obtained Sharon's approval for Arad and him to meet with Soleiman, but Sharon made clear that they were working in an unofficial capacity. After several months of discussions in the presence of Turkish diplomats, during which time the Turks continued to press unsuccessfully for official Israeli participation, Turkey withdrew from the discussions in the fall of 2004. Enter the Swiss -------------- ¶3. (C) After the Turks walked away, Swiss MFA Middle East Director Nicholas Lang met Liel and offered to sponsor the talks. From September 2004, the talks moved to Switzerland, and included American Geoffery Aronson as well as Soleiman, Liel and Arad. Liel said it became clear that the Syrians would not consider any proposal that did not include full Syrian sovereignty over the entire Golan Heights. After the Syrians rejected a proposal by Arad for a three-way land swap involving Jordan, Arad dropped out and was replaced by former Director of Israel Defense Intelligence, Uri Segui. During 2005, this group discussed ideas for a gradual Israeli withdrawal from the Golan. In this formula, Israel would announce its recognition of Syrian sovereignty, but Israelis would continue to have free access to the Golan while the phased withdrawal was carried out over a five year period. The proposed "peace park" on the shores of the Sea of Galilee was a Syrian proposal, according to Liel. Changing Syria's Regional Orientation -------------- ¶4. (C) Liel said the tenor of the talks changed in 2006, as the Israeli participants became increasingly concerned about ending Syrian ties to Iran and Hizballah. Liel and Segui explained to Soleiman that a strong majority of Israelis opposed returning the Golan to Syria even in return for peace and normal relations. Since Israeli law requires a referendum before the GOI can return the Golan, they explained the necessity of Syria taking concrete steps to end its ties to Iran and Hizballah before the withdrawal could take place. Soleiman, for his part, suggested that in addition to the return of the Golan, Syria wanted an end to U.S. sanctions and pressure as part of the package. Liel suggested a number of confidence-building measures Syria could take, including returning the remains of the Israeli spy Eli Cohen, who was hanged in Damascus in 1966. ¶5. (C) Liel said the final meeting took place in Switzerland in July 2006, during the war with Hizballah. Soleiman proposed a meeting among the Syrian deputy foreign minister, Israeli MFA Director General Abramovitch, and NEA A/S Welch to discuss stopping the fighting. Liel flew to Israel and met Abramovitch, but Abramovitch, after coordinating with Foreign Minister Livni, rejected the idea, reportedly saying that the U.S. would not like it. Liel said the discussions stopped at that point. Asad's Offer to Negotiate -------------- ¶6. (C) Liel linked the end of the track two talks in July to a series of statements by President Asad in the fall in which the Syrian leader expressed interest in resuming peace negotiations with Israel. Several Israeli cabinet members responded favorably, leading PM Olmert to instruct all GOI ministers to refrain from calling for negotiations with Syria. After Olmert commented to the press that he could not negotiate with Syria because the United States would not like it, Liel said he decided to leak the story of the track two negotiations to Ha'aretz, which published the story, complete with details of a draft peace agreement, on January 16. Liel commented that the MFA has been relatively quiet, although Olmert reacted harshly toward the leak. He described the Israeli left as strongly supporting the "opening" to Syria, with a rally held in Jaffa January 28 to launch an effort to pressure Olmert to start official talks with Syria. Liel thought the Israeli right was surprisingly quiet, which he attributed to a possible desire on the right to give up the Golan in order to hold on to the West Bank. Liel concluded that a continued impasse in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations would increase Israeli popular support for negotiating with Syria first. Briefing the Governments -------------- ¶7. (C) Pressed by the DCM about Syrian official support for the talks and draft peace agreement, Liel said Lang visited Damascus several times without Soleiman. Syrian Vice President Farouq Shara' was involved in an early phase of the talks, but Liel identified Soleiman's key SARG contacts as Bashar, Foreign Minister Muallim, and Deputy Vice President for Security Mohammed Nassif Khayrbik. Liel said he doubted that the chief of Syrian military intelligence Assif Shawqat had approved the draft agreement. ¶8. (C) On the Israeli side, Aronson reportedly took notes of the meetings and provided them to then-MFA Director General Ron Prosor, who briefed Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom. At one point, Soleiman visited Israel, met with Prosor, and even toured the Israeli side of the Golan Heights. Once Tzipi Livni became Foreign Minister and brought with her Aharon Abramovitch as Director General, however, they reacted more cautiously, according to Liel. Ongoing Swiss Role -------------- ¶9. (C) Liel said the Swiss had lowered their public profile, but remained in contact with both the Syrian and Israeli governments. While he was not certain what the Swiss were discussing, Liel said he thought they were still engaged on the question of Israeli POWs and MIAs. Liel commented that the families of the two Israeli soldiers kidnapped by Hizballah in July were fed up with the GOI's handling of the issue and were preparing to go to Damascus themselves even though they would risk prosecution in Israel under a law banning visits to "enemy countries." Neutralizing Syria? -------------- ¶10. (C) Liel concluded that an Israeli-Syrian peace agreement along the lines he negotiated with Soleiman would serve U.S. and Western interests by neutralizing Syria. Israel would not withdraw from the Golan without an end to the Syrian-Iranian alliance, so an Israeli declaration recognizing Syrian sovereignty would do no harm. Syria would then have five years to demonstrate that it had changed before Israel would come down from the Golan. The draft agreement also provided for a "peace park" along the border that could be used by both Syrians and Israelis. The DCM said Syria would demand a great deal up front, and this could undermine U.S. interests in Lebanon and elsewhere. The DCM also questioned which elements of the SARG supported the draft agreement as described by Liel. (Note: Israeli INR-equivalent head Nimrod Barkan questioned to us the extent to which Bashar was involved in the draft agreement. Barkan also felt that any draft agreement with Israel that was not endorsed by Shawqat was meaningless. We welcome Embassy Damascus's views on the Syrian leadership's involvement in these track two talks.) ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** JONES