ISRAEL NUCLEAR COMMISSION LEADERS DISCUSS IRAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 003626 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2017 TAGS: PREL KNNP MNUC PTER IR IS SUBJECT: ISRAEL NUCLEAR COMMISSION LEADERS DISCUSS IRAN Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Richard H. Jones, reason 1.4 (b ) and (d) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: On December 19, Ambassador Jones met with the new Director General (DG) of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC),Shaul Shorev. Former DG and current Vice Chairman (VC) Gideon Frank (NOTE: PM Olmert is the IAEC Chairman.) and the recently appointed Deputy Direct General for Policy David Danieli also attended. Shorev said he will be making his first visit to the U.S. as DG in March. The Israelis repeated their assessment that they agree with most of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report, but do not think some of the conclusions are supported by the data. However, they said U/S Rood had successfully reassured them on U.S. policy during his visit (septel). The GoI still believes sanctions are the best way to deal with Iran, but feel that the actions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),particularly DG Mohamed ElBaradei, are undermining international efforts by giving Iran too much leeway. On civilian nuclear power, they supported the idea of creating a market, but emphasized that no fuel cycle technology should be provided and spent fuel needs to be tightly regulated. Finally, they added that Israel has asked to join the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD. End summary. -------------- -------------- NIE Data Does Not Rule Out Short-Term Weaponization -------------- -------------- ¶2. (S) Ambassador Jones explained that the US is now working to put the NIE into its proper context, with the message that the development of fissile material is the key "pacing item" and that creating a delivery device is also part of a weapons program. The Ambassador underscored that the efforts have been successful, as no country in favor of sanctions has backed down since the release of the report. He also pointed out that U.S. intelligence agencies are highly independent, by design, and their credibility is good for everyone. ¶3. (S) DG Shorev reiterated that he agreed with most of the body of the NIE, but thought some of the conclusions were too sharp. VC Frank added that the data in the report was strong, but the conclusions do not follow from the data. The NIE, he explained, seemed to assume that declared facilities cannot be used for military purposes, but he pointed out that declared facilities could switch from making allowable low-enriched uranium to making weapons-grade highly-enriched uranium in a matter of weeks, before the IAEA could respond. He also expressed concern that the NIE does not state how far along the weaponization program was when it stopped, and that we don't know the full involvement of the "Kahn network" which supplied Libya. ¶4. (S) Overall, Frank said, Iran was given two easy wins with the release of the NIE and the Russian decision to send nuclear fuel for the Bushehr reactor. Shorev added that Israel was very disappointed by the weak U.S. reaction to the Russian announcement. The Ambassador responded that Iran is still in a difficult situation as financial sanctions are having an effect, with even Gulf financial institutions becoming more cautious. Frank agreed that sanctions, especially those that are targeted, are a good way forward. However, he was worried that some regional players, especially Egypt, are starting to hedge their bets and reach out to Iran. Frank has already started forming his working group on sanctions as agreed during the Rood visit (septel), and is waiting for the U.S. response. -------------- ElBaradei Making Situation Worse -------------- ¶5. (S) Shorev and Frank both complained about the conduct of IAEA DG ElBaradei. They have been waiting for the final IAEA report to the UNSC but now do not expect it until March, as they believe ElBaradei has struck a deal with Iran to delay the report until Iran takes more positive actions. They are concerned the report will gloss over outstanding issues, like the past weaponization program, and only report that "nothing Iran said contradicts previous findings." They underscored that ElBaradei cannot embrace the NIE as reaffirming his position, but ignore the finding that Iran had a weaponization program until 2003, which Iran still denies. ¶6. (S) The IAEA reporting system, Frank explained, must be fixed. Originally, the Agency collected the data and the Board of Directors made judgments. Now they are letting ElBaradei make all the judgments, turning him into both prosecutor and judge, a role he is too eager to take. Frank believes ElBaradei has overstepped his bounds and must be TEL AVIV 00003626 002 OF 002 reined in. The IAEA Board should review a complete list of all outstanding questions and the Iranian response. Now, they just see ElBaradei's detailed summary, which skips key questions, covers up Iranian delays and omissions, and spins everything positively. ¶7. (S) Frank also encouraged the U.S. to share as much intelligence as possible on Iranian intentions with the IAEA, which Israel has already done, because their report needs to be sufficiently strong. However, Frank added that Israel had decided not to share their data on the Iranian weaponization program, as they see this as outside the IAEA's mandate. -------------- Civilian Nuclear Reactors Good, If Controlled -------------- ¶8. (S) Frank agreed that providing civilian reactors to more developing nations would undercut countries like Iran who use legitimate power ambitions as a cover. However, he cautioned, it must only be light-water reactors with no fuel cycle ability. For example, he said, Canadian civilian reactors are a problem because they allow online refueling, which is dangerous for proliferation. ¶9. (S) Spent fuel must also be carefully monitored, Frank explained, but Russia is the only country willing to take back its spent fuel. Although this material is not particularly dangerous, Frank lamented, countries are nervous about it for strictly political reasons. Because of this, the West is basically ceding to Russia a monopoly on civilian nuclear reactors in the developing world. Frank asserted that only by engagement, careful regulation, and reclaiming of spent fuel can the West appropriately monitor civilian nuclear power. -------------- IAEC Reaches Out Internationally -------------- ¶10. (C) Finally, Shorev told the Ambassador that he plans on going to the United States on an official visit on in March. He said he appreciated the close working relationship the IAEC has with the United States, including the recent joint radiological device detonation (RDD) exercise, which was very helpful for the Home Front Command. He was also pleased that research ties with the U.S. were strengthening, exemplified by a paper on non-proliferation technologies that Israeli and American scientists will be presenting together at a conference in Portland in 3 months. The IAEC was also working to improve it ties with the rest of the international community, Shorev explained, and they have requested membership in the OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** MORENO