PDAS MCNERNEY'S OCTOBER 24 MEETING AT THE ISRAELI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 003386 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2017 TAGS: PREL KNNP MNUC PTER IR IS SUBJECT: PDAS MCNERNEY'S OCTOBER 24 MEETING AT THE ISRAELI MFA ON IRAN: THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM (CABLE 2 OF 5) REF: TEL AVIV 03385 Classified By: Marc J. Sievers, Political Counselor. Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) In an October 24 meeting at the Israeli MFA, an Israeli government interagency team led by MFA Deputy Director General (Strategic Affairs) MIRIAM Ziv shared its assessment of the technical status of Iran's nuclear program with a U.S. team led by ISN PDAS Patricia McNerney. The Israeli side made the following points: A) Iran is running 18 cascades (nearly 3,000 centrifuges) at its enrichment facility in Natanz, and feeding UF-6 into them. The Iranians are probably figuring out how to resolve problems that previously caused cascades to crash. Apart from Natanz, Iran may be running a covert enrichment program, although nobody has as yet been able to produce a "smoking gun" to prove this. B) Israel is worried that the international community is increasingly of the view that Iran has already mastered the enrichment process, and therefore support could slacken for holding firm to the UNSC requirement that Iran suspend its enrichment program. Israel is concerned that others will buy Iran's attempt to present a "fait accompli" via a real or fictional "nuclear breakthrough," and thus press for compromise on allowing Iran some "face-saving" enrichment capability. C) The Israeli MFA is concerned by what it sees as P5 1 willingness to extend the time allowed for Iran to comply with calls for suspension or face a third UNSC resolution. PDAS McNerney noted that the USG is looking at ways to strengthen and broaden sanctions on Iran within and beyond a third UNSC resolution, and believes that a third resolution would help propel forward unilateral measures against Iran outside the UN. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (S) On October 24, ISN PDAS Patricia McNerney, ISN/RA Middle East Team Leader Kurt Kessler, ISN/CPI Office Director Tony Foley, NEA Iran Desk officer Sean Misko and embassy POL-MIL officer met at the Israeli MFA with an interagency team led by MFA DDG for Strategic Affairs, MIRIAM Ziv, to exchange information on Iran and its nuclear program. The Israeli team included representatives from the MFA, the Prime Minister's office, Israeli Defense Intelligence (IDI),and the Mossad. This is the second of three cables reporting on the discussions at the MFA, and concerns the technical status of Iran's nuclear program. Reftel concerns the discussion on Iran's internal situation, and the effect of sanctions on Iran. Septels will review discussions on ongoing and future counter-terror finance efforts, as well as discussions with Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) officials about Iran and the IAEA. -------------- - TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT OF IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM -------------- - ¶3. (S) As the discussion turned to the technical status of Iran's nuclear program, the IDI officer present on the Israeli side took the lead. Regarding Iran's uranium enrichment facility at Natanz, he said that Iran has finished installing a semi-industrial facility in underground bunkers, and that all 18 cascades (approximately 3,000 centrifuges) are being fed UF-6. To some extent, he said, Iran is capable of producing "meaningful quantities of enriched uranium." Even if they are slow, the cascades are apparently not crashing as often as they were a few months earlier. He said that the Iranians have not yet completely mastered the process, but cautioned that they are working out the problems methodically. And that, he observed, was only at Natanz; it is possible that there may be other, covert enrichment facilities that the international community does not know about. ¶4. (S) Regarding the IAEA Director General's statement about Iran's program perhaps slowing, the IDI officer said that his impression is that it was a politically-inspired statement. Construction did slow down before the summer, but has resumed pace and has been at full steam since July. He observed that the rate of feed to the enrichment site is below design TEL AVIV 00003386 002 OF 003 capacity probably as a result of technological constraints, not political restraints. He suggested that Iran might present a "freeze" at 18 cascades and focus on overcoming current technical hurdles. He wondered how the P5 1 would view such a freeze, and whether they would accept this as some form of "suspension." ¶5. (S) The officer said IDI believes Iran has a clandestine, comprehensive program to produce a nuclear weapon, and that it is "quite firmly established." He expressed his concern that Iran may "move the line" and get P5 1 acceptance of a new situation. In his view, 18 cascades is tantamount to "mastering" the enrichment technology. An MFA representative noted that there are "more voices" saying that the Iranians have already mastered the technology, and arguing that the international community should thus abandon calls for suspension and engage in direct talks with Tehran on the nuclear issue. He noted that Israel also has to concern itself with the possibility that the Iranians will present a "fait accompli" by saying they have achieved a nuclear breakthrough. He noted that the view held by Israeli experts was that Iran might achieve such a breakthrough by mid-2008. He acknowledged, nevertheless, that questions remained about how effectively the Iranians were running their centrifuges. All the IAEA appeared to know about the feed rate was what the Iranians were willing to tell them. The MFA official said Israel had hoped that the IAEA might send experts into Natanz by the end of 2007. Unfortunately, the Iranians have managed to keep pushing back the date. He said it appears that the 18 underground cascades constitute Iran's true "pilot project," vice the previous so-called "pilot" effort with the above-ground cascades at Natanz. The IDI officer observed that the Iranians can produce thousands of centrifuges a year, and that manufacturers continue to produce them. ¶6. (S) Regarding the "fait accompli," the IDI officer reported that the Russians are saying that Iran's production of low enriched uranium (LEU) negates their need to have Russia supply fuel to Bushehr. He wondered how the international community should deal with this complication. As to the lingering question whether Iran has a covert program, the IDI officer said that more focus needs to be placed on its overt program. He acknowledged that nobody can, as yet, produce a "smoking gun." ¶7. (S) The Mossad representative said that if the IAEA DG's November report says that Iran is "cooperating, but more cooperation is needed," this may be enough to postpone work on a third UNSC resolution. He added that if Iran has 18 cascades running, people will say that the sanctions are not working, and then question why more sanctions should be pursued. Instead of increasing pressure, the Mossad is worried that P5 1 partners might be inclined to call for a compromise with the Iranians. -------------- ISRAELI CONCERNS ABOUT DIRECTION OF DIPLOMACY -------------- ¶8. (S) MFA DDG Ziv wondered where diplomacy was taking us. She observed that everyone currently seemed to be waiting for another UNSC resolution. She then recounted that in the Spring, the P5 1 authorized a three month extension for IAEA DG ElBaradei's report. This delay, she stressed, has caused concern within the GOI, with many wondering why the U.S. allowed the delay. Ziv said that Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Kislyak would visit Israel in mid-November, and that the Israelis would send a delegation to EU capitals soon to raise concerns. She noted that FM Livni would be traveling to China later in the week, and that Iran would be at the top of her agenda. ¶9. (S) In response to Ziv's concerns, PDAS McNerney noted that in the Spring, the Russians and Chinese were not ready for a third sanctions resolution. Now they are pressing for further delay while the IAEA implements its Work Plan. The next P5 1 meeting in London would shed light on whether the Russians and Chinese would keep the bar high. PDAS McNerney said that the U.S. goal remains obtaining agreement on the text for another UNSC sanctions resolution as soon as possible. She acknowledged uncertainty as to whether a third resolution could be achieved in November or December, but said the USG will keep pushing hard. ¶10. (U) This cable was not reviewed by ISN PDAS Patricia McNerney. TEL AVIV 00003386 003 OF 003 ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** MORENO