Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TELAVIV3386
2007-11-29 07:22:00
SECRET
Embassy Tel Aviv
Cable title:  

PDAS MCNERNEY'S OCTOBER 24 MEETING AT THE ISRAELI

Tags:  PREL KNNP MNUC PTER IR IS 
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VZCZCXRO8533
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHTV #3386/01 3330722
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 290722Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4366
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHEBAAA/USDOE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 003386 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2017
TAGS: PREL KNNP MNUC PTER IR IS
SUBJECT: PDAS MCNERNEY'S OCTOBER 24 MEETING AT THE ISRAELI
MFA ON IRAN: THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM (CABLE 2 OF 5)

REF: TEL AVIV 03385

Classified By: Marc J. Sievers, Political Counselor.
Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d).

-------
SUMMARY
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 003386

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2017
TAGS: PREL KNNP MNUC PTER IR IS
SUBJECT: PDAS MCNERNEY'S OCTOBER 24 MEETING AT THE ISRAELI
MFA ON IRAN: THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM (CABLE 2 OF 5)

REF: TEL AVIV 03385

Classified By: Marc J. Sievers, Political Counselor.
Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) In an October 24 meeting at the Israeli MFA, an
Israeli government interagency team led by MFA Deputy
Director General (Strategic Affairs) Miriam Ziv shared its
assessment of the technical status of Iran's nuclear program
with a U.S. team led by ISN PDAS Patricia McNerney. The
Israeli side made the following points:

A) Iran is running 18 cascades (nearly 3,000 centrifuges) at
its enrichment facility in Natanz, and feeding UF-6 into
them. The Iranians are probably figuring out how to resolve
problems that previously caused cascades to crash. Apart
from Natanz, Iran may be running a covert enrichment program,
although nobody has as yet been able to produce a "smoking
gun" to prove this.

B) Israel is worried that the international community is
increasingly of the view that Iran has already mastered the
enrichment process, and therefore support could slacken for
holding firm to the UNSC requirement that Iran suspend its
enrichment program. Israel is concerned that others will buy
Iran's attempt to present a "fait accompli" via a real or
fictional "nuclear breakthrough," and thus press for
compromise on allowing Iran some "face-saving" enrichment
capability.

C) The Israeli MFA is concerned by what it sees as P5 1
willingness to extend the time allowed for Iran to comply
with calls for suspension or face a third UNSC resolution.

PDAS McNerney noted that the USG is looking at ways to
strengthen and broaden sanctions on Iran within and beyond a
third UNSC resolution, and believes that a third resolution
would help propel forward unilateral measures against Iran
outside the UN. END SUMMARY.


2. (S) On October 24, ISN PDAS Patricia McNerney, ISN/RA
Middle East Team Leader Kurt Kessler, ISN/CPI Office Director
Tony Foley, NEA Iran Desk officer Sean Misko and embassy
POL-MIL officer met at the Israeli MFA with an interagency
team led by MFA DDG for Strategic Affairs, Miriam Ziv, to
exchange information on Iran and its nuclear program. The
Israeli team included representatives from the MFA, the Prime
Minister's office, Israeli Defense Intelligence (IDI),and
the Mossad. This is the second of three cables reporting on
the discussions at the MFA, and concerns the technical status
of Iran's nuclear program. Reftel concerns the discussion on
Iran's internal situation, and the effect of sanctions on
Iran. Septels will review discussions on ongoing and future

counter-terror finance efforts, as well as discussions with
Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) officials about Iran
and the IAEA.

-------------- -
TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT OF IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
-------------- -


3. (S) As the discussion turned to the technical status of
Iran's nuclear program, the IDI officer present on the
Israeli side took the lead. Regarding Iran's uranium
enrichment facility at Natanz, he said that Iran has finished
installing a semi-industrial facility in underground bunkers,
and that all 18 cascades (approximately 3,000 centrifuges)
are being fed UF-6. To some extent, he said, Iran is capable
of producing "meaningful quantities of enriched uranium."
Even if they are slow, the cascades are apparently not
crashing as often as they were a few months earlier. He said
that the Iranians have not yet completely mastered the
process, but cautioned that they are working out the problems
methodically. And that, he observed, was only at Natanz; it
is possible that there may be other, covert enrichment
facilities that the international community does not know
about.


4. (S) Regarding the IAEA Director General's statement about
Iran's program perhaps slowing, the IDI officer said that his
impression is that it was a politically-inspired statement.
Construction did slow down before the summer, but has resumed
pace and has been at full steam since July. He observed that
the rate of feed to the enrichment site is below design

TEL AVIV 00003386 002 OF 003


capacity probably as a result of technological constraints,
not political restraints. He suggested that Iran might
present a "freeze" at 18 cascades and focus on overcoming
current technical hurdles. He wondered how the P5 1 would
view such a freeze, and whether they would accept this as
some form of "suspension."


5. (S) The officer said IDI believes Iran has a clandestine,
comprehensive program to produce a nuclear weapon, and that
it is "quite firmly established." He expressed his concern
that Iran may "move the line" and get P5 1 acceptance of a
new situation. In his view, 18 cascades is tantamount to
"mastering" the enrichment technology. An MFA representative
noted that there are "more voices" saying that the Iranians
have already mastered the technology, and arguing that the
international community should thus abandon calls for
suspension and engage in direct talks with Tehran on the
nuclear issue. He noted that Israel also has to concern
itself with the possibility that the Iranians will present a
"fait accompli" by saying they have achieved a nuclear
breakthrough. He noted that the view held by Israeli experts
was that Iran might achieve such a breakthrough by mid-2008.
He acknowledged, nevertheless, that questions remained about
how effectively the Iranians were running their centrifuges.
All the IAEA appeared to know about the feed rate was what
the Iranians were willing to tell them. The MFA official
said Israel had hoped that the IAEA might send experts into
Natanz by the end of 2007. Unfortunately, the Iranians have
managed to keep pushing back the date. He said it appears
that the 18 underground cascades constitute Iran's true
"pilot project," vice the previous so-called "pilot" effort
with the above-ground cascades at Natanz. The IDI officer
observed that the Iranians can produce thousands of
centrifuges a year, and that manufacturers continue to
produce them.


6. (S) Regarding the "fait accompli," the IDI officer
reported that the Russians are saying that Iran's production
of low enriched uranium (LEU) negates their need to have
Russia supply fuel to Bushehr. He wondered how the
international community should deal with this complication.
As to the lingering question whether Iran has a covert
program, the IDI officer said that more focus needs to be
placed on its overt program. He acknowledged that nobody
can, as yet, produce a "smoking gun."


7. (S) The Mossad representative said that if the IAEA DG's
November report says that Iran is "cooperating, but more
cooperation is needed," this may be enough to postpone work
on a third UNSC resolution. He added that if Iran has 18
cascades running, people will say that the sanctions are not
working, and then question why more sanctions should be
pursued. Instead of increasing pressure, the Mossad is
worried that P5 1 partners might be inclined to call for a
compromise with the Iranians.

--------------
ISRAELI CONCERNS ABOUT DIRECTION OF DIPLOMACY
--------------


8. (S) MFA DDG Ziv wondered where diplomacy was taking us.
She observed that everyone currently seemed to be waiting for
another UNSC resolution. She then recounted that in the
Spring, the P5 1 authorized a three month extension for IAEA
DG ElBaradei's report. This delay, she stressed, has caused
concern within the GOI, with many wondering why the U.S.
allowed the delay. Ziv said that Russian Deputy Foreign
Minister Sergey Kislyak would visit Israel in mid-November,
and that the Israelis would send a delegation to EU capitals
soon to raise concerns. She noted that FM Livni would be
traveling to China later in the week, and that Iran would be
at the top of her agenda.


9. (S) In response to Ziv's concerns, PDAS McNerney noted
that in the Spring, the Russians and Chinese were not ready
for a third sanctions resolution. Now they are pressing for
further delay while the IAEA implements its Work Plan. The
next P5 1 meeting in London would shed light on whether the
Russians and Chinese would keep the bar high. PDAS McNerney
said that the U.S. goal remains obtaining agreement on the
text for another UNSC sanctions resolution as soon as
possible. She acknowledged uncertainty as to whether a third
resolution could be achieved in November or December, but
said the USG will keep pushing hard.


10. (U) This cable was not reviewed by ISN PDAS Patricia
McNerney.


TEL AVIV 00003386 003 OF 003


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