AMBASSADOR AND DAS DANIN DISCUSS REGIONAL AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 002672

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KWBG LE SY IS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND DAS DANIN DISCUSS REGIONAL AND
BILATERAL ISSUES WITH MFA DG ABRAMOVITCH

Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b)(d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. The Ambassador and visiting NEA DAS Robert
Danin met with MFA DG Aharon Abramovitch in Jerusalem August
28 to discuss ongoing regional and bilateral issues.
Abramovitch reported significant progress in the negotiations
over stationing Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS)
ambulances in East Jerusalem, and was optimistic that a deal
could be concluded the following day (Note: Embassy
understands that it was). On UNSCR 1701, DAS Danin and
Abramovitch agreed that while it had been a general success,
the time had come to push for a more robust monitoring effort
along the Syria-Lebanon border. DAS Danin asked for the
GOI's current thinking on the Sheba Farms, noting that the
October 1701 report was likely to contain some difficult
language following the UN cartographer's visit this month.
Abromovitch responded firmly that the issue was too sensitive
for Israel to deal with at this time, and stressed the GOI's
hope that the October 1701 report would not contain any calls
for Israeli action on Sheba, either through linkage to
Siniora's 7-point plan or advocacy of a UN role in
administering the area. DAS Danin asked whether the GOI was
any closer to being able to provide targeting data to help
the UN teams in southern Lebanon locate remaining unexploded
cluster munitions from last summer's war with Hizballah,
noting that earlier Israeli pledges were now overdue.
Abramovitch said he would look into the issue and suggested
the U.S. also inquire at the MoD. Abramovitch said that he
and FM Livni had had a good meeting with Salaam Fayyad the
previous day, during which the sides had agreed to revive
some of the Oslo-era working groups to deal with ongoing
bilateral issues. Abramovitch also noted that the
Palestinians and GOI agreed on the need for the upcoming Ad
Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) meeting to stay focused on
economic and development needs and to avoid political issues.
Abramovitch urged the U.S. to increase the pressure on Egypt
to stop the smuggling into Gaza. The GOI was convinced the
problem was one of Egyptian will, not capacity, he said,
discounting Egyptian arguments that it needed more border
troops. The Ambassador and DAS Danin responded that the GOI
should still consider allowing more Egyptian troops on the
border, even if the goal was only to "call their bluff." The
Ambassador also demarched Abramovitch on U.S. concerns over
ongoing settlement and outpost expansion in the West Bank,
and DAS Danin raised the issue of Amcit mistreatment at Ben
Gurion airport, noting that the latter remained a serious
irritant in bilateral relations. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) Abramovitch was joined by MFA DDG For International
Organizations Ronny Yaar, MFA Senior Advisor Alon Ushpiz,
North America Desk Director Dan Arbell and MFA Advisor Oded
Joseph. Poloff (notetaker) joined the Ambassador and DAS
Danin.

--------------
PRCS Ambulances
--------------


3. (C) Abramovitch opened the meeting by commenting that the
Israeli and Palestinian negotiators would be meeting the
following day (August 29) to review progress on the issue of
stationing PRCS ambulances in East Jerusalem. He reported
that following the personal involvement of Olmert, Livni and
Fayyad, the GOI was cautiously optimistic that an agreement
had been reached, which he hoped could be finalized at the
next day's meeting. (Note: GOI lead negotiator MFA DDG Ronny
Yaar called the Ambassador August 29 to inform him that the
two sides had reached agreement.)

--------------
UNSCR 1701 and Border Monitoring
--------------


4. (C) Abramovitch thanked the U.S. for its work to ensure
that the June UNSCR 1701 report was as balanced as possible.
"It was not ideal," he said, "but was still good." He
stressed that it would be important to reinforce the June
report's positive elements by strengthening LAF involvement
with UNIFIL and by working to improve the situation on the
Lebanon-Syria border. On this last point, Abramovitch
wondered whether anything could be done to strengthen the
Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team (LIBAT) mission.


5. (C) DAS Danin noted that since the extent of weapons
smuggling over the Syria-Lebanon border was no longer being
seriously debated in capitals, we were turning our attention
to enhancing the capabilities of border monitors. We hoped
to convene a Contact Group meeting on the margins of next
month's UNGA, where we could discuss expanding the trial
German program and increasing the monitoring activities as
called for in the June LIBAT report. Overall, he said, the

TEL AVIV 00002672 002 OF 004


U.S. viewed 1701 as a relative -- if incomplete -- success.

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Sheba Farms: Israelis Standing Firm
--------------


6. (C) DAS Danin inquired about the GOI's thinking on Sheba
Farms, noting that the U.S. wanted to work with Israel to
minimize what was likely to be difficult language on Sheba in
the October 1701 report. Abramovitch responded that he hoped
the 1701 report would not complicate the already sensitive
issue of Sheba Farms. The GOI could accept neither Siniora's
7-point plan nor the transfer of all or part of Sheba Farms
to the UN, he said, and any reference to such ideas in the
1701 report would put Israel in a difficult situation.


7. (C) DAS Danin asked whether there was some middle ground
the Israelis could accept -- somewhere between Siniora's plan
and doing nothing. Abramovitch responded firmly that he did
not see any way for the GOI to deal with the Sheba issue at
this point. "It would be crazy," he said, "because it would
legitimate Hizballah and open a Pandora's Box, and would be
the start of chaos along the border between us and Lebanon."
Asked whether the GOI could accept some vague language
linking Sheba discussions to full implementation of 1701,
Abramovitch side-stepped the question by noting that 1701 did
not even mention Sheba Farms.


8. (C) The Ambassador asked if there were any steps Israel
could take to reduce Hizballah's ability to use the Sheba
Farms issue to its advantage. MFA Advisor Alon Ushpiz said
the GOI had already made a significant gesture by allowing
the UN's cartographer to examine the area. DAS Danin replied
that in doing so, the GOI had bought itself six months, but
that it appeared as though the Israeli strategy for dealing
with the next 1701 report was to wait and just hope that
everything turned out alright. He stressed that the U.S.
needed a little flexibility on the Israeli side in order not
to surrender the process to those who wanted to expand the
scope of 1701 to focus attention on the Sheba issue. We need
to keep the process focused where it should be -- on
Hizballah and the Syria-Lebanon border. Abramovitch
reiterated how sensitive the Sheba issue was for Israel,
"especially for Olmert and Livni, because of last summer's
war; and for Barak, because of the Lebanon withdrawal."
Abramovitch said again that he hoped the October 1701 report
would not cause problems.

--------------
Cluster Munitions
--------------


9. (C) DAS Danin asked whether the GOI was any closer to
being able to provide targeting data to help the UN teams in
southern Lebanon locate remaining unexploded cluster
munitions from last summer's war with Hizballah. He noted
that we were told two months ago by the GOI that it would be
able to provide an answer to the request for data in about
two more weeks, yet at this point we had still not received
any response. Abramovitch and Yaar said they would look into
the issue, and suggested the U.S. also inquire at the MoD.

--------------
Middle East Peace and AHLC
--------------


10. (C) Abramovitch said that he and FM Livni had a good
meeting with Salaam Fayyad and Sa'eb Erekat the previous day.
In response to a question from the Ambassador about press
reports saying the two sides had agreed to establish joint
working groups, Abramovitch said they had agreed during their
meeting the day before to revive "the five Olso working
groups." Without going into detail, he said the working
groups would deal with "ongoing bilateral relations," such as
"economics and incitement."


11. (C) Turning to the issue of the upcoming Ad Hoc Liaison
Committee (AHLC) meeting, DAS Danin said it would be
important to ensure that meeting participants stick to
economic and development needs, and avoid the temptation to
dabble in politics. Abramovitch agreed, and said that both
he and Erekat had told the Norwegian hosts that they wanted
the AHLC to only deal with economic support.

--------------
Gaza Smuggling
--------------


12. (C) On Gaza, Abramovitch stressed that the issue of
smuggling had to be dealt with in order succeed in our
efforts to marginalize Hamas. "Something must be done," he

TEL AVIV 00002672 003.2 OF 004


said, "and Fayyad agrees." He asked whether there was
anything the U.S. could do to increase the pressure on Egypt
to crack down harder on smuggling. The GOI did not accept
the argument that Egypt needed more troops on the border, he
said, and instead believed it was a problem of will rather
than capacity. "If they (the Egyptians) were serious, they
would be cracking down in the Sinai, in Cairo, et cetera," he
argued; instead, the Egyptians claim they need more forces on
the Gaza border while doing nothing in areas where they have
no restrictions. Israeli experts were unanimous in their
assessment that 750 troops were enough to control the Gaza
border and halt the smuggling, Abramovitch said. The
Ambassador asked, even if that was the case, why not "call
their bluff" by accepting the Egyptian proposal to allow 1500
Egyptian troops on the Gaza border instead of the current

750. He noted that the U.S. was not convinced that 750
troops actually were sufficient. Perhaps additional troops
would help to stiffen Egypt's resolve to deal with the
smuggling problem. The Ambassador pointed out that with only
750 troops divided into three shifts to cover the border 24
hours a day, the Egyptians could only have 250 troops
actually working at any given time. Ushpiz responded that
"no one in Israel will agree to that; we have consensus that
it is only a problem of will."


13. (C) NOTE: In DAS Danin's follow-up meeting with DDG Yaar
and DDG for the Middle East Yacov Hadas-Handelsman (SEPTEL),
Hadas-Handelsman suggested that our understanding of the
number of Egyptian troops available for border duty was
incorrect. While the Egyptians were only allowed 750 troops
on the border at any given time, there was no need to divide
them into three shifts of 250 each. Instead, the Egyptians
could have "thousands" of troops stationed just outside Zone
C and rotate the full allowance of 750 up to the border for
each working shift.

-------------- --------------
Settlement Outposts and Amcit Mistreatment at Border Crossings
-------------- --------------


14. (C) The Ambassador told Abramovitch that the U.S.
remained deeply concerned about the ongoing growth of
settlements and illegal outposts in the West Bank. He noted
that in at least one case, we have noticed the IDF supplying
electricity from a military unit to a nearby illegal outpost.
We were also convinced that -- contrary to GOI claims -- the
new construction in Nof HaSharon was not part of the existing
settlement of Alfe Menashe, but was in fact an entirely new
settlement. The Ambassador noted that Nof HaSharon is
actually three kilometers from Alfe Menashe, and that the
security barrier had to be crossed twice in order to travel
between them. Moreover, Nof HaSharon was drawing municipal
services from a neighboring town inside the Green Line, not
from Alfe Menashe. It was unreasonable to argue that Nof
HaSharon is just a new neighborhood of Alfe Menashe. Passing
Abramovitch an Embassy-prepared white paper on settlements
and illegal outposts, the Ambassador stressed that we still
expected the GOI to honor its commitment to the U.S. to
dismantle outposts and to halt settlement expansion.
Abramovitch thanked the Ambassador for the paper and said he
would look into the issue and discuss our demarche with
others.


15. (C) DAS Danin also raised the issue of Amcit mistreatment
at Ben Gurion airport, noting that we continue to receive
regular reports from Amcit travelers -- mostly but not
exclusively of Arab origin -- who were either denied entry
into Israel and/or who complained of harassment by security
officials as they were entering or exiting the country. The
Ambassador highlighted several recent cases, including that
of Georgetown University's Imam Hendi, who traveled to Israel
in August on a PD-sponsored trip to discuss interfaith peace
efforts with local religious leaders, but who was only
allowed into the country after significant high-level
interventions by the Embassy. The Ambassador and DAS Danin
stressed that we would continue to insist that our citizens
be treated fairly at ports of entry, and that they not be
discriminated against on the basis of national origin.
Abramovitch responded that he thought the situation had
gotten better in recent months, but acknowledged that
individual cases might still exist. He was pleased to hear
that Imam Hendi was able to leave Israel without incident.
(Note: Imam Hendi, who is of Palestinian origin, left via the
Allenby Bridge to Jordan, rather than via Ben Gurion as
originally planned, because GOI policy prohibits Palestinians
from using Ben Gurion for international travel.)

(U) DAS Danin has cleared this message.

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