GOI CAUTIOUSLY IN FAVOR OF INFORMAL UNSCR 1701

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 000252 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2017 TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV LE SY IS FR SUBJECT: GOI CAUTIOUSLY IN FAVOR OF INFORMAL UNSCR 1701 EMBARGO COMMITTEE Classified By: DCM Gene A. Cretz for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: During a January 22 meeting with NEA DAS Robert Danin, Aharon "Ronny" Yaar (MFA Deputy Director General and Head of the UN and International Organizations Division) and Tal Becker (Advisor to Foreign Minister Livni) observed that smuggling of weapons, including hundreds of long-range anti-tank missiles, to Hizballah continues uninterrupted, conveyed GOI concern about Iranian meddling, and warned that "it is only a matter of time" before the situation in Lebanon degenerates. They expressed cautious interest in the possibility of establishing an informal UNSCR 1701 Embargo Committee to tighten implementation of UNSCR 1701, and suggested that linking the reconstruction of Lebanon to the embargo could create credibility and positive momentum for the members of such a committee. Moreover, such efforts could counterbalance what they perceive as French weakness on Hizballah. Highlighting the need for strategic thinking, Yaar and Becker advocated "informal" action on enforcing the embargo before August 2007, when a Sanctions Committee resolution renewing and enhancing UNIFIL is expected, which would also complement international efforts to support Lebanese Prime Minister Siniora. Danin responded that we need to move much more quickly. Finally, Yaar and Becker requested a USG full-court press on promoting the passage of the Holocaust Denial Resolution in the UN General Assembly and urging the new UN Secretary General to put off any immediate plans to visit the Middle East. END SUMMARY. -------------- NEED TO ENFORCE THE EMBARGO ... -------------- ¶2. (C) Danin briefed Yaar and Becker on the preparations for the January 25 Paris III conference on Lebanon, and, citing Washington's concern that Hizballah is rearming, stressed the need to strengthen implementation of UNSCR 1701. Yaar observed that smuggling of weapons, including hundreds of long-range anti-tank missiles, to Hizballah continues uninterrupted. He added that Iranian meddling in Lebanon and its involvement in the "command and control" structure of Hizballah was of even greater concern to the GOI. He warned that "it is only a matter of time" before the situation in Lebanon degenerates. Since Hizballah is continuing to rebuild its forces north of the Litani River, a spring confrontation between Hizballah and Israel remains a real possibility. Yaar added that the GOI is preparing an "action plan," which it will share with the USG, on how to move forward on the embargo. -------------- ... AND THINK STRATEGICALLY -------------- ¶3. (S) Turning to international efforts in Lebanon, Becker said that the GOI has heard from a third-party European country that the Hungarians are willing to offer the UN 12 border guard officers. He also referenced a recent German report, which concluded that the current situation in Lebanon is "unsatisfactory" and recommended a fact-finding mission. Such developments, Becker argued, create a dynamic that requires action, and are worthy of pursuing. Yaar praised German efforts in Lebanon, but lamented their slow pace and low profile. ¶4. (S) Becker noted that since UN procedures would require a second resolution from the Sanctions Committee by August 31, the GOI and international community would need to think strategically about how to produce a resolution that would "renew and enhance UNIFIL," while also addressing the more immediate concern about enforcing the embargo. He conveyed GOI concern that it would "look bad" if the Sanctions Committee passes a weak resolution -- i.e. one that does not strengthen UNIFIL. Becker stressed that the GOI would like to show progress on the crucial issues before the UN Secretary General's first report on UNSCR 1701, expected in SIPDIS March. -------------- GOI IN FAVOR OF A "CONTACT GROUP" -------------- ¶5. (S) Becker said that the GOI is considering creating an informal "contact group" composed of Germany, Italy, Spain, and France, which would work collectively to support PM Siniora. Since the GOI would want to be in a position to TEL AVIV 00000252 002 OF 002 share intelligence, it would advocate having the "contact group" meet in the various capitals rather than at the UN. An advantage to having the "contact group" raise sensitive issues involving the embargo, Becker added, is that the "contact group" would have more credibility with the international community than individual countries. Due to the intelligence aspect, however, the GOI would not be willing to include any Arab countries, but would push them to be more active on UNSCR 1701. Asked by Danin which are the key Arab countries, Becker responded that Saudi Arabia and the UAE could provide the most leverage on Lebanon and Syria. Yaar added that Russia, whose client states might be providing weapons to Hizballah, as well as Qatar would "need to be de-legitimized." ¶6. (S) Danin, noting that Lebanon is in a new phase, said the USG understood these legitimate concerns, and suggested that setting up an informal "contact group" among a few European countries along with the United States would be beneficial for the GOI. Yaar and Becker cautioned that France is a "weak link," saying that an informal "code of conduct" understanding between France and Hizballah could undermine international efforts to strengthen the embargo and UNSCR 1701. -------------- VISIBILITY OF OVERFLIGHTS REDUCED -------------- ¶7. (S) Danin asked for current Israeli views on adding an aerial dimension to UNIFIL's mandate, saying that the Secretary was personally concerned about the reports of SIPDIS Hizballah's rearmament. He pointed out that UNIFIL had already expanded its UNSCR 1701 mandate by adding a naval dimension to the arms embargo; an aerial expansion could be justified by the same logic. Yaar and Becker agreed, and noted that Israel had been successful in reducing the visibility of its overflights, which, ironically, they felt had been legitimized due to French weakness in the face of Hizballah. -------------- --- GOI CLOSELY FOLLOWING LEBANESE DOMESTIC POLITICS -------------- --- ¶8. (S) Ruminating briefly on Lebanese domestic politics, Yaar noted that the GOI has been closely following the clash between Lebanese Prime Minister Siniora and Hizballah. Assessing that Hizballah and Syrian efforts to topple the government have suffered a minor setback, Yaar added, "PM Siniora is very much still alive." While this provides an opportunity for progress, Becker said, there is still concern that efforts to bolster the Lebanese Armed Forces could backfire. ¶9. (C) As an aside, Yaar and Becker requested USG support on two issues of priority to the GOI: -- Promoting the passage of the Holocaust Denial Resolution in the UN General Assembly; and -- Urging the new UN Secretary General to put off any immediate plans to visit the Middle East. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** JONES