NATO A/SYG COLSTON'S JUNE 24-26 VISIT SEES

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 002082 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2017 TAGS: PREL NATO PTER MASS MARR IS SUBJECT: NATO A/SYG COLSTON'S JUNE 24-26 VISIT SEES PROGRESS ON ISRAELI ICP IMPLEMENTATION REF: TEL AVIV 1063 Classified By: Marc J. Sievers, Political Counselor. Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) NATO Assistant Secretary General (Defense Policy and Planning) John Colston told NATO embassy representatives in Tel Aviv June 26 that his 3-day visit to Israel resulted in progress on implementation of five chapters of Israel's Individual Cooperation Program (ICP). Observing NATO and Israeli teams working with a "seriousness of purpose," Colston reported in detail (below) agreed next steps in the areas of political dialogue (defense policy and capabilities); response to terrorism; defense research and technology; intelligence sharing; and arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation. Colston characterized as still lagging the issue of Israel's relationship with the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization (NAMSO),and said that NATO's inability to date to accommodate an Israeli liaison officer at Naples was "seriously embarrassing." He reminded his audience that in some areas within the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) context, Israel will have to accept slower forward movement from the Alliance, as NATO will only be able to move ahead at a pace acceptable to the other MD countries. Colston noted that his GOI interlocutors used his visit to share with NATO Israel's assessment of the security situation in the Middle East. He made it clear to his audience -- and his GOI interlocutors -- that NATO has no plans to send a peacekeeping force to the region. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) In a June 26 briefing to NATO embassy representatives at the Czech (NATO POC) Embassy in Tel Aviv, NATO Assistant Secretary General (Defense Policy and Planning) John Colston SIPDIS reported that the main reason for his visit to Israel was to take Israel's Individual Cooperation Program (ICP) and move forward with it in practical terms. Reviewing his 3-day stay in Israel, Colston noted that he had met with senior representatives of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF),the MFA, members of the Knesset, and then-Deputy Defense Minister Ephraim Sneh. He said that the Israelis did not engage at the ministerial level, and that his visit was comparable to what he would expect if he were visiting countries like Sweden and Finland -- that is, countries that he said have an interest in a close relationship with NATO, and whatever kind of practical cooperation they can get out of it. -------------- RESULTS OF SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS -------------- ¶3. (C) Colston reported that NATO and Israeli teams worked together over the course of the three days, and that he saw a "seriousness of purpose" on the Israeli side to transform its ICP into practical work. The teams worked deliberately through five chapters of the ICP to give real substance to those Israeli proposals that were agreed upon by NATO last October. ¶4. (C) Colston said that in the area of Defense Policy and Capabilities, the two sides agreed to staff-to-staff talks. Military planners will compare notes, and discussion will focus on modernization and reform. The two sides agreed to a program of exchanges on lessons that NATO learned from its operations in Afghanistan, and lessons Israel learned from its war with Hizballah last summer. ¶5. (S) In the Fight Against Terrorism chapter, Colston said both sides agreed that the existing state of intelligence sharing and information exchange is healthy. The two sides agreed to put civilian intelligence officials in touch with one another. The Israeli MFA's Center for Political Research will meet with NATO experts. Israel will share information with NATO's Liaison Unit, and exchanges with NATO's Special Committee will intensify. ¶6. (C) Colston reported that the two sides agreed on technical and technological cooperation in the armaments area. Significant work has already been done in the area of countering IEDs, but more focus will be placed on this particular area. NATO will also share information through the NATO Battlefield Collection Exchange System, and the two sides will cooperate on small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) and on MANPADS (to include cooperation in the area of public diplomacy). ¶7. (C) Colston said that the two sides agreed to exchange views on doctrine. He said he believes the Israelis have information here that they can share that would help NATO in Afghanistan. The two sides will also exchange information on training. ¶8. (C) Colston reported that a working group looked at interoperability between the IDF and NATO armed forces, and that the two sides agreed that Israel might be able to contribute a particular military unit to NATO's Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) "pool of forces." This would open the door for Israel to training, exercising, and more information exchange. Colston noted the unit could be a Search and Rescue (SAR) unit, a jet fighter unit, or a medical unit. He thought it likely to start with the SAR unit. -------------- WMD PROLIFERATION -------------- ¶9. (C) Colston said that the two sides discussed information exchange on WMD proliferation. The NATO delegation met with MFA Deputy Director General (Strategic Affairs) MIRIAM Ziv and her team, and received a briefing from the IDF on Iran's nuclear program. Colston said that Israel and NATO's assessments of the Iran nuclear threat are fairly close, but noted that there are some differences on timing. Both sides agreed on where they think Iran is going. The two sides agreed to staff-to-staff intelligence consultations on a regular basis, and agreed that Israel should participate in crisis management exercises involving Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) scenarios. They agreed that Israel could also host seminars on the implementation of UNSCR 1540 (concerning bioterrorism). ¶10. (C) Colston reported that the two sides agreed to exchanges on scientific intelligence and Russian weapons systems, and to try to formulate a joint analysis of the Iranian nuclear program. ¶11. (C) Colston said that the two sides agreed that NATO could open up more seminars to Israeli participation, and even have Israelis brief at the seminars, "as long as other Mediterranean Dialogue countries did not object to Israeli representatives being present at these seminars." ¶12. (C) Colston stressed that the Israelis are keen on sitting with the Allies in the 26-plus-1 format to discuss proliferation issues. He said that this has been done before and so there is precedent, but noted that there is some reluctance within the Alliance to doing this until similar consultations have been held with one or more other MD countries. Colston thought that Jordan may offer the way ahead on this. He also suggested as a solution holding such a discussion within the Defense Group on Proliferation, which would allow military personnel to discuss CBRN issues. -------------- LOGISTICS -------------- ¶13. (C) Colston said that his delegation followed up on logistics issues that came up during a high-level NATO delegation's visit to Israel last May. He noted that for some time, there had been no progress on getting Israel to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization (NAMSO). The Israeli side, he said, has been holding back on this because it does not like the terms of the deal. Colston said that as a result of his visit, Israel has been persuaded to see the sense in signing the MOU and "complain" about its provisions afterwards. Colston reported that no progress was made on obtaining Israeli access to NATO's Logistics Information Systems. He explained that the Allies have not agreed to this yet. ¶14. (C) Colston said that he would look into whether Israel could run some seminars on the logistical implications of asymmetric warfare. He said the Alliance hopes it will be able to intensify dialogue with Israel in the logistical and military medical areas. -------------- PROBLEM AREAS -------------- ¶15. (C) Colston said that in a few areas, Israel's desires exceeded those that the Allies agreed to in Brussels. He claimed that he and his colleagues made it clear that cooperation with Israel would proceed within the context of the Mediterranean Dialogue as a whole, and that the Alliance would thus show restraint where appropriate. ¶16. (C) Colston observed that Israel has been trying to make a practical contribution to Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) for two years by posting a liaison officer to the relevant NATO HQ in Naples. Israel has also been struggling with how to participate in NATO exercises. Colston said that the problem is that the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) has not yet been opened to Mediterranean Dialogue countries, including Israel. The Allies do not want to open it up to Israel until at least a few other Mediterranean Dialogue countries show interest. Colston said that this needs to be debated further in Brussels if Israel is to fulfill its ICP to its potential. -------------- -------------- COLSTON SHARES GOI'S ASSESSMENTS OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY -------------- -------------- ¶17. (C) Colston reported that more senior Israeli interlocutors -- including MFA Senior Deputy Director General Yossi Gal and IDF Deputy Chief of Staff Moshe Kaplinsky -- briefed him on the security situation in the region and threats facing Israel. It was obvious, Colston said, that they hoped to convey their assessments to the broader NATO community through him. Colston reported that he took the following impressions away from his discussions with the Israelis: A) The Israelis are seeing a wide and diverse range of threats to their security. Iran poses an existential threat due to its nuclear weapons program, but is also the overall source of many problems facing Israel, as it provides funding, training and support to terrorist groups like Hizballah. Israel is also concerned about Al Qaeda activity in the region. B) Iran is the most serious threat to Israel and the region. If Iran is allowed to obtain a nuclear weapons capability, this will spur an arms race in the region, and threaten regional and international security. Israel is skeptical about the IAEA's ability to supervise Iran's nuclear program, but believes IAEA supervision could drive Iran's nuclear program underground or frustrate it. Israel sees sanctions -- especially financial ones -- working on Iran. Tehran is under great pressure. That said, Israel does not believe the international community is being tough enough on Iran. The signals to Tehran are not strong enough. Israel believes that the international community could do more to ensure that the diplomatic process frustrates Iran's nuclear program. C) The evidence is clear that Israel desires to work with Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas and the new Palestinian government. Israel, he said, wants to help Abbas by releasing tax revenues that it has been withholding, and by removing checkpoints that hamper movement within the West Bank. Israel is willing to provide humanitarian assistance to the Palestinians within the Gaza Strip, but does not want to do anything to bolster Hamas' legitimacy there. Israel is concerned about its border with Egypt, and the Egypt-Gaza border, and feels that Egypt is allowing weapons to enter the Gaza Strip through tunnels that run under the Egypt-Gaza border. Israel sees no "bad Hamas, good Hamas." All Hamas is bad. Israel welcomes the Arab League meeting at the Foreign Minister level and hopes this kind of thing will continue. Israel's contact with the Arab League, however, will never be allowed to replace direct discussions with the Palestinian Authority. Israel is looking to the international community to help empower Abbas and avoid the "legitimization" of Hamas. Israel believes that the international community could do more to make it clear to Egypt its responsibility for ensuring that arms do not make their way into the Gaza Strip. Colston said that in all of his discussions, he took the initiative to make it very clear that NATO has no role in the Israel-Palestinian conflict. D) In Lebanon, Israel welcomes the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) role in limiting the activity of jihadists there. Israel sees Hizballah operating in Lebanon, but in a low-key way. Israel is concerned about Hizballah's success in re-arming itself, and does not see the embargo on illegal weapons working. E) Israel is worried about Syria. It sees the Syrian Armed Forces re-arming, with many of the arms and supplies coming from Russia. -------------- COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS -------------- ¶18. (C) After the briefing, Czech Ambassador Zantovskiy said that Colston's visit was one of the strongest, most fruitful visits to Israel that has been conducted by a NATO delegation. ¶19. (C) In response to a question, Colston said that no GOI official ever asked him about whether NATO was considering placing a peacekeeping force in the Gaza Strip or West Bank. During a session he had at Israel's National Defense College, an academic asked him a question on this subject, and he made it very clear that NATO is not discussing this issue. ¶20. (C) Colston said that he sees growing recognition that Israel's longstanding principle of self-reliance -- bolstered by strong bilateral support -- has adjusted to reflect recognition that linkage to multilateral institutions (like NATO) can reinforce Israel's interests. The IDF, in particular, sees real advantages in interoperability and exchange of information with NATO armed forces. Israel sees in NATO an audience of North American and European countries to which it can speak. That said, Israel is also aware of the limitations NATO faces: NATO will not take an active political-military role in relation to Middle East peace, and it will not move ahead with military cooperation with Israel that would jeopardize cooperation with Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative countries. NATO's approach to the Middle East will thus be "balanced," and this sometimes frustrates Israel. ¶21. (C) Colston said that he saw the same level of interest in moving forward on the relationship with NATO in both the Israeli MOD and MFA. Colston said that the MFA's analysis of the threats to Israel was very thorough, and that its analysis and that of the IDF were almost identical. ¶22. (C) Colston characterized as "seriously embarrassing" the Alliance's approach to the problem concerning the Israeli Liaison Officer in NATO. He explained that the Israelis were the first to respond to the NATO Heads' of States invitation to join Operation Active Endeavour. Algeria and Morocco were not far behind. NATO, however, has failed to provide the machinery to make Israel's participation in OAE possible. It is putting an undue burden on the Israelis and the Italians. He suggested that one way ahead would be to have an exchange of letters between Israel and the NATO countries. This was how a similar problem was solved when NATO wanted to work with certain Partnership for Peace countries. He stressed that the NATO SOFA is the ideal solution, but until this can be resolved, the exchange of letters solution may be the way to go. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** JONES