NATO A/SYG COLSTON'S JUNE 24-26 VISIT SEES

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 002082

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2017
TAGS: PREL NATO PTER MASS MARR IS
SUBJECT: NATO A/SYG COLSTON'S JUNE 24-26 VISIT SEES
PROGRESS ON ISRAELI ICP IMPLEMENTATION

REF: TEL AVIV 1063

Classified By: Marc J. Sievers, Political Counselor.
Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d).

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SUMMARY
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1. (S) NATO Assistant Secretary General (Defense Policy and
Planning) John Colston told NATO embassy representatives in
Tel Aviv June 26 that his 3-day visit to Israel resulted in
progress on implementation of five chapters of Israel's
Individual Cooperation Program (ICP). Observing NATO and
Israeli teams working with a "seriousness of purpose,"
Colston reported in detail (below) agreed next steps in the
areas of political dialogue (defense policy and
capabilities); response to terrorism; defense research and
technology; intelligence sharing; and arms control,
disarmament and nonproliferation. Colston characterized as
still lagging the issue of Israel's relationship with the
NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization (NAMSO),and said
that NATO's inability to date to accommodate an Israeli
liaison officer at Naples was "seriously embarrassing." He
reminded his audience that in some areas within the
Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) context, Israel will have to
accept slower forward movement from the Alliance, as NATO
will only be able to move ahead at a pace acceptable to the
other MD countries. Colston noted that his GOI interlocutors
used his visit to share with NATO Israel's assessment of the
security situation in the Middle East. He made it clear to
his audience -- and his GOI interlocutors -- that NATO has no
plans to send a peacekeeping force to the region. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) In a June 26 briefing to NATO embassy representatives
at the Czech (NATO POC) Embassy in Tel Aviv, NATO Assistant
Secretary General (Defense Policy and Planning) John Colston

SIPDIS
reported that the main reason for his visit to Israel was to
take Israel's Individual Cooperation Program (ICP) and move
forward with it in practical terms. Reviewing his 3-day stay
in Israel, Colston noted that he had met with senior
representatives of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF),the MFA,
members of the Knesset, and then-Deputy Defense Minister
Ephraim Sneh. He said that the Israelis did not engage at
the ministerial level, and that his visit was comparable to
what he would expect if he were visiting countries like
Sweden and Finland -- that is, countries that he said have an
interest in a close relationship with NATO, and whatever kind
of practical cooperation they can get out of it.

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RESULTS OF SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS
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3. (C) Colston reported that NATO and Israeli teams worked
together over the course of the three days, and that he saw a
"seriousness of purpose" on the Israeli side to transform its
ICP into practical work. The teams worked deliberately
through five chapters of the ICP to give real substance to
those Israeli proposals that were agreed upon by NATO last
October.


4. (C) Colston said that in the area of Defense Policy and
Capabilities, the two sides agreed to staff-to-staff talks.
Military planners will compare notes, and discussion will
focus on modernization and reform. The two sides agreed to a
program of exchanges on lessons that NATO learned from its
operations in Afghanistan, and lessons Israel learned from
its war with Hizballah last summer.


5. (S) In the Fight Against Terrorism chapter, Colston said
both sides agreed that the existing state of intelligence
sharing and information exchange is healthy. The two sides
agreed to put civilian intelligence officials in touch with
one another. The Israeli MFA's Center for Political Research
will meet with NATO experts. Israel will share information
with NATO's Liaison Unit, and exchanges with NATO's Special
Committee will intensify.


6. (C) Colston reported that the two sides agreed on
technical and technological cooperation in the armaments

area. Significant work has already been done in the area of
countering IEDs, but more focus will be placed on this
particular area. NATO will also share information through
the NATO Battlefield Collection Exchange System, and the two
sides will cooperate on small arms and light weapons (SA/LW)
and on MANPADS (to include cooperation in the area of public
diplomacy).


7. (C) Colston said that the two sides agreed to exchange
views on doctrine. He said he believes the Israelis have
information here that they can share that would help NATO in
Afghanistan. The two sides will also exchange information on
training.


8. (C) Colston reported that a working group looked at
interoperability between the IDF and NATO armed forces, and
that the two sides agreed that Israel might be able to
contribute a particular military unit to NATO's Operational
Capabilities Concept (OCC) "pool of forces." This would open
the door for Israel to training, exercising, and more
information exchange. Colston noted the unit could be a
Search and Rescue (SAR) unit, a jet fighter unit, or a
medical unit. He thought it likely to start with the SAR
unit.

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WMD PROLIFERATION
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9. (C) Colston said that the two sides discussed information
exchange on WMD proliferation. The NATO delegation met with
MFA Deputy Director General (Strategic Affairs) Miriam Ziv
and her team, and received a briefing from the IDF on Iran's
nuclear program. Colston said that Israel and NATO's
assessments of the Iran nuclear threat are fairly close, but
noted that there are some differences on timing. Both sides
agreed on where they think Iran is going. The two sides
agreed to staff-to-staff intelligence consultations on a
regular basis, and agreed that Israel should participate in
crisis management exercises involving Chemical, Biological,
Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) scenarios. They agreed that
Israel could also host seminars on the implementation of
UNSCR 1540 (concerning bioterrorism).


10. (C) Colston reported that the two sides agreed to
exchanges on scientific intelligence and Russian weapons
systems, and to try to formulate a joint analysis of the
Iranian nuclear program.


11. (C) Colston said that the two sides agreed that NATO
could open up more seminars to Israeli participation, and
even have Israelis brief at the seminars, "as long as other
Mediterranean Dialogue countries did not object to Israeli
representatives being present at these seminars."


12. (C) Colston stressed that the Israelis are keen on
sitting with the Allies in the 26-plus-1 format to discuss
proliferation issues. He said that this has been done before
and so there is precedent, but noted that there is some
reluctance within the Alliance to doing this until similar
consultations have been held with one or more other MD
countries. Colston thought that Jordan may offer the way
ahead on this. He also suggested as a solution holding such
a discussion within the Defense Group on Proliferation, which
would allow military personnel to discuss CBRN issues.

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LOGISTICS
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13. (C) Colston said that his delegation followed up on
logistics issues that came up during a high-level NATO
delegation's visit to Israel last May. He noted that for
some time, there had been no progress on getting Israel to
sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the NATO Maintenance
and Supply Organization (NAMSO). The Israeli side, he said,
has been holding back on this because it does not like the
terms of the deal. Colston said that as a result of his
visit, Israel has been persuaded to see the sense in signing
the MOU and "complain" about its provisions afterwards.
Colston reported that no progress was made on obtaining
Israeli access to NATO's Logistics Information Systems. He

explained that the Allies have not agreed to this yet.


14. (C) Colston said that he would look into whether Israel
could run some seminars on the logistical implications of
asymmetric warfare. He said the Alliance hopes it will be
able to intensify dialogue with Israel in the logistical and
military medical areas.

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PROBLEM AREAS
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15. (C) Colston said that in a few areas, Israel's desires
exceeded those that the Allies agreed to in Brussels. He
claimed that he and his colleagues made it clear that
cooperation with Israel would proceed within the context of
the Mediterranean Dialogue as a whole, and that the Alliance
would thus show restraint where appropriate.


16. (C) Colston observed that Israel has been trying to make
a practical contribution to Operation Active Endeavour (OAE)
for two years by posting a liaison officer to the relevant
NATO HQ in Naples. Israel has also been struggling with how
to participate in NATO exercises. Colston said that the
problem is that the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)
has not yet been opened to Mediterranean Dialogue countries,
including Israel. The Allies do not want to open it up to
Israel until at least a few other Mediterranean Dialogue
countries show interest. Colston said that this needs to be
debated further in Brussels if Israel is to fulfill its ICP
to its potential.

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COLSTON SHARES GOI'S ASSESSMENTS OF ISRAEL'S SECURITY
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17. (C) Colston reported that more senior Israeli
interlocutors -- including MFA Senior Deputy Director General
Yossi Gal and IDF Deputy Chief of Staff Moshe Kaplinsky --
briefed him on the security situation in the region and
threats facing Israel. It was obvious, Colston said, that
they hoped to convey their assessments to the broader NATO
community through him. Colston reported that he took the
following impressions away from his discussions with the
Israelis:

A) The Israelis are seeing a wide and diverse range of
threats to their security. Iran poses an existential threat
due to its nuclear weapons program, but is also the overall
source of many problems facing Israel, as it provides
funding, training and support to terrorist groups like
Hizballah. Israel is also concerned about Al Qaeda activity
in the region.

B) Iran is the most serious threat to Israel and the region.
If Iran is allowed to obtain a nuclear weapons capability,
this will spur an arms race in the region, and threaten
regional and international security. Israel is skeptical
about the IAEA's ability to supervise Iran's nuclear program,
but believes IAEA supervision could drive Iran's nuclear
program underground or frustrate it. Israel sees sanctions
-- especially financial ones -- working on Iran. Tehran is
under great pressure. That said, Israel does not believe
the international community is being tough enough on Iran.
The signals to Tehran are not strong enough. Israel believes
that the international community could do more to ensure that
the diplomatic process frustrates Iran's nuclear program.

C) The evidence is clear that Israel desires to work with
Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas and the
new Palestinian government. Israel, he said, wants to help
Abbas by releasing tax revenues that it has been withholding,
and by removing checkpoints that hamper movement within the
West Bank. Israel is willing to provide humanitarian
assistance to the Palestinians within the Gaza Strip, but
does not want to do anything to bolster Hamas' legitimacy
there. Israel is concerned about its border with Egypt, and
the Egypt-Gaza border, and feels that Egypt is allowing
weapons to enter the Gaza Strip through tunnels that run
under the Egypt-Gaza border. Israel sees no "bad Hamas, good
Hamas." All Hamas is bad. Israel welcomes the Arab League
meeting at the Foreign Minister level and hopes this kind of

thing will continue. Israel's contact with the Arab League,
however, will never be allowed to replace direct discussions
with the Palestinian Authority. Israel is looking to the
international community to help empower Abbas and avoid the
"legitimization" of Hamas. Israel believes that the
international community could do more to make it clear to
Egypt its responsibility for ensuring that arms do not make
their way into the Gaza Strip. Colston said that in all of
his discussions, he took the initiative to make it very clear
that NATO has no role in the Israel-Palestinian conflict.

D) In Lebanon, Israel welcomes the Lebanese Armed Forces
(LAF) role in limiting the activity of jihadists there.
Israel sees Hizballah operating in Lebanon, but in a low-key
way. Israel is concerned about Hizballah's success in
re-arming itself, and does not see the embargo on illegal
weapons working.

E) Israel is worried about Syria. It sees the Syrian Armed
Forces re-arming, with many of the arms and supplies coming
from Russia.

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COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
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18. (C) After the briefing, Czech Ambassador Zantovskiy said
that Colston's visit was one of the strongest, most fruitful
visits to Israel that has been conducted by a NATO delegation.


19. (C) In response to a question, Colston said that no GOI
official ever asked him about whether NATO was considering
placing a peacekeeping force in the Gaza Strip or West Bank.
During a session he had at Israel's National Defense College,
an academic asked him a question on this subject, and he made
it very clear that NATO is not discussing this issue.


20. (C) Colston said that he sees growing recognition that
Israel's longstanding principle of self-reliance -- bolstered
by strong bilateral support -- has adjusted to reflect
recognition that linkage to multilateral institutions (like
NATO) can reinforce Israel's interests. The IDF, in
particular, sees real advantages in interoperability and
exchange of information with NATO armed forces. Israel sees
in NATO an audience of North American and European countries
to which it can speak. That said, Israel is also aware of
the limitations NATO faces: NATO will not take an active
political-military role in relation to Middle East peace, and
it will not move ahead with military cooperation with Israel
that would jeopardize cooperation with Mediterranean Dialogue
and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative countries. NATO's
approach to the Middle East will thus be "balanced," and this
sometimes frustrates Israel.


21. (C) Colston said that he saw the same level of interest
in moving forward on the relationship with NATO in both the
Israeli MOD and MFA. Colston said that the MFA's analysis of
the threats to Israel was very thorough, and that its
analysis and that of the IDF were almost identical.


22. (C) Colston characterized as "seriously embarrassing" the
Alliance's approach to the problem concerning the Israeli
Liaison Officer in NATO. He explained that the Israelis were
the first to respond to the NATO Heads' of States invitation
to join Operation Active Endeavour. Algeria and Morocco were
not far behind. NATO, however, has failed to provide the
machinery to make Israel's participation in OAE possible. It
is putting an undue burden on the Israelis and the Italians.
He suggested that one way ahead would be to have an exchange
of letters between Israel and the NATO countries. This was
how a similar problem was solved when NATO wanted to work
with certain Partnership for Peace countries. He stressed
that the NATO SOFA is the ideal solution, but until this can
be resolved, the exchange of letters solution may be the way
to go.

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