BARAK IS BACK: WHAT MIGHT IT MEAN FOR U.S. POLICY?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001919 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPAL KWBG PINR IS IR SY SUBJECT: BARAK IS BACK: WHAT MIGHT IT MEAN FOR U.S. POLICY? Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Gene A. Cretz. Reason 1.4 (B/D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Newly elected Labor Party Chairman Ehud Barak swiftly assumed the Minister of Defense portfolio on June 19. PM Olmert facilitated Barak's rather dramatic reentry into public life by securing the cabinet's approval by telephone on the 15th and a Knesset vote of confidence on the 18th, but it remains to be seen whether Barak's burst of energy and enthusiasm will restore popularity to the prime minister or his government. Our political contacts anticipate that Barak's main aim will be to restore Israeli deterrence and will focus on Iran more than Palestinian or Syrian challenges. As a corollary to this assessment, they anticipate that Barak will seek close ties with the U.S., but remain cautious and risk-adverse on U.S. initiatives with the Palestinians. Summary. ¶2. (C) Two political analysts (Alon Pinkas and Nimrod Novik) familiar with Barak's thinking shared their views regarding Barak's first steps as Minister of Defense. Pinkas discounted a LONDON Sunday Times report of June 17 that Barak is planning a major military action in the Gaza Strip involving some 20,000 IDF troops. Pinkas, who has served as a foreign policy advisor to Barak and two foreign ministers in the last Barak government, underscored that Barak's approach to strategic decision-making is to look at costs and risks first -- before considering potential political benefit. Pinkas ticked off the numerous risks associated with any significant military action in Gaza, and commented that it would not be in keeping with Barak's modus operandi to advocate reoccupation of the Gaza Strip -- or even the dispatch of a brigade -- at this juncture. -------------- RESTORING ISRAELI DETERRENCE -------------- ¶3. (C) Barak has specific ideas for delivering a "short, sharp blow" that would destabilize Israel's enemies and restore Israeli pride, according to our contacts. Both Pinkas and Novik anticipated that Barak would more likely take a dramatic action, such as an assassination of a Hizballah or Hamas leader, rather than a large-scale military operation. Pinkas suggested that a Jerusalem Post report on long-range Israeli Air Force flights in preparation for potential strikes against Iranian targets -- just 48 hours after Barak was sworn into office -- is an example of the type of signal that Barak intends to project to Israel's enemies and to the Israeli public. -------------- -------------- PREPARING FOR ELECTIONS AND RETURNING TO THE PRIME MINISTRY -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Barak's political aim is to restore his credibility with the Israeli people by focusing on the task of restoring Israeli deterrence, according to our contacts. He is determined to outshine Olmert, with a view to succeeding him as Prime Minister following elections within a year or so. His target audience is the center-right of the Israeli political spectrum, represented by the 35 centrist seats in the Israeli Knesset that are, in his view, up for grabs in the next election. To do so, Barak will seek to become the go-to security minister in the Olmert government, despite the plethora of overlapping portfolios and competitive egos who wish to share the defense and foreign affairs limelight (Lieberman, Livni, Sheetrit, Mofaz). Pinkas added that Barak has not fought to secure cabinet portfolios for other Labor competitors (Ayalon, Peretz),but he had probably insisted that Olmert not re-appoint Haim Ramon (a Barak enemy) to fill a Kadima vacancy in the cabinet such as the Finance ministry. -------------- BARAK AND THE U.S. -------------- ¶5. (C) Novik predicted to the Ambassador that Barak would seek to be the "favorite son of the U.S." as Minister of Defense, and Pinkas, separately, noted that Barak would not be likely to encourage resumption of the Syria track during Olmert's tenure, or, for that matter, during the remainder of the U.S. administration's tenure as embarking down this path would only bring Barak risks, and not enough time for success. Pinkas anticipated that Barak would also remain exceedingly cautious on Palestinian initiatives, for any security breaches would be pinned on him and hurt his ability to win over more right-wingers. Thus, Pinkas discounted the likelihood that Barak would be forthcoming on movement and access issues important to the U.S., and agreed that such a recalcitrant stance would likely undermine his efforts to work closely with the U.S. TEL AVIV 00001919 002 OF 002 ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** CRETZ