Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TELAVIV1918
2007-06-22 14:21:00
SECRET
Embassy Tel Aviv
Cable title:  

ISRAEL WEIGHING ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES TO HAMAS

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER EAID KWBG IS 
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VZCZCXRO3358
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHTV #1918/01 1731421
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 221421Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1900
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001918 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER EAID KWBG IS
SUBJECT: ISRAEL WEIGHING ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES TO HAMAS
TAKEOVER OF GAZA

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Gene A. Cretz, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001918 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER EAID KWBG IS SUBJECT: ISRAEL WEIGHING ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES TO HAMAS TAKEOVER OF GAZA Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Gene A. Cretz, Reason 1.4 (b) (d) ¶1. (S) Summary. PM Olmert on June 24 will chair the first cabinet discussion of how to respond to the new situation in the Palestinian territories since Olmert's visit to Washington. Senior policy advisers in the MFA, NSC, and MOD have described for us the sub-cabinet discussion of options this week, as well as a range of ideas on Israeli next steps. On Gaza, the options range from sealing off the Strip and trying to force the collapse of the Hamas regime to a modulated attempt to keep Gaza afloat in order to avoid forcing Hamas (and the population of Gaza) too much into a corner. In terms of assisting Abu Mazen and the new Palestinian emergency government, the PMO has leaked that Olmert will ask the cabinet to approve a significant turn-over of tax revenues and lifting some checkpoints in the West Bank in advance of Olmert's attendance at a June 25 summit in Egypt with Mubarak, Abdallah and Abu Mazen. FM Livni is reportedly is concerned at the EU's focus on the constitutionality of the emergency government, while arguing that Western donors should not simply pour money into Palestinian coffers. NSC and MFA believe the GOI should step up engagement with the Arab League on the Arab peace initiative, while MOD remains focused on whether Egypt intends to get serious about stopping smuggling from Sinai into Gaza. Meanwhile, opposition leader Netanyahu has called for deploying the Jordan-based Badr Brigade in the West Bank, while at least one cabinet minister has advocated releasing Tanzim leader Marwan Barghouti from prison. End Summary. ¶2. (U) The Israeli cabinet will convene June 24 for its first discussion of the changed situation in the Palestinian territories since Prime Minister Olmert's meeting with the President. Olmert's office has leaked that he will ask the cabinet to approve a substantial transfer of tax revenues to the new Palestinian government ($300 million is an unconfirmed figure that is being bandied about in the media), as well as removing some checkpoints in the West Bank, but not a release of prisoners. The leaks make clear that Olmert is planning to arrive in Egypt June 25 with something concrete to offer Abu Mazen, but the extent of GOI largesse remains to be seen. HOW TO HANDLE HAMAS IN GAZA? -------------- &#
x000A; ¶3. (S) In advance of the cabinet meeting, GOI senior staff has been weighing options. Based on our conversations this week with senior advisers at MFA, NSC, and MOD, there are two opposing policy alternatives toward Gaza under discussion. One, largely supported by the security establishment but reportedly also by some in MFA, is to seal off Gaza with the exception of the bare minimum of humanitarian relief, in order to cause a collapse of the Hamas regime. The other approach, advocated largely by NSC and MFA, is based on the view that squeezing Gaza too hard is dangerous since it will likely trigger an explosion of terrorism and rocket launches, thus possibly compelling a major Israeli ground incursion. Those promoting this view say Israel should adopt a nuanced approach that avoids putting too much pressure on Gaza but at the same time does not strengthen Hamas. At least one advocate of this view argues that Israel should open at least a working level dialogue with Hamas on day to day issues such as operating the crossings, but the IDF has announced that it will not engage Hamas officials at the crossings, working instead through the UN and ICRC. ¶4. (S) MOD Arab affairs adviser David Hacham stressed to us Israel's interest in a stronger Egyptian position on Gaza. Hacham noted that some Egyptian officials have commented to him that Egypt had been too soft on Hamas in Gaza since the disengagement, adding that MOD hopes the Egyptian decision to transfer their diplomatic mission in Gaza to the West Bank and close the Egyptian side of the Rafah terminal indicates a new Egyptian decision to get tough. Hacham pointed out the significance of Egypt's willingness to allow about 60 Palestinians stuck at the Erez Crossing to transit to Egypt in a joint humanitarian operation with the IDF, noting that Egypt in the past had been extremely reluctant to assume responsibility for Gazans. Egyptian General Burhan Hammad, who has conducted the negotiations with Hamas about the release of Corporal Shalit, reportedly told Hacham that he intends to renew contacts with Hamas shortly. Hacham urged that the U.S. continue to weigh in with the Egyptians on the need for Egypt to be more effective in stopping the smuggling of people, weapons and explosives from Sinai into Gaza. AND DIFFERENT OPTIONS FOR THE WEST BANK -------------- ¶5. (S) Regarding the West Bank, all of our interlocutors TEL AVIV 00001918 002 OF 002 believe the GOI should support Abu Mazen and the Palestinian emergency government, but they also questioned the extent of Fatah's strength in the West Bank. In their view, Hamas is probably stronger in the West Bank than we think. What is holding Hamas in check in the West Bank is not Fatah's security forces but the IDF. The logic of that view tends to support maintaining a forceful IDF security regime, including keeping most obstacles and checkpoints in place, at least until the Palestinian security forces loyal to Abu Mazen demonstrate their seriousness by arresting terrorists, collecting weapons and dismantling bomb laboratories. ¶6. (S) Livni's policy adviser Tal Becker told PolCouns June 21 that during Livni's meeting with EU officials in Europe this week, Livni was struck by the European focus on the legitimacy of the Palestinian emergency government, and in particular, the constitutional requirement that the government be approved the the Palestinian Legislative Council within thirty days. Livni reportedly believes the U.S. needs to convince the EU that Hamas' coup in Gaza obviated the requirements of the Palestinian constitution. Becker said Livni also conveyed to the Europeans her view that quick, unconditional donations of financial assistance to Abu Mazen will actually undermine his position. A better approach would be to move gradually, requiring the Palestinians to undertake structural reforms and create new opportunities for their private sector. This approach, however, does not appear to be shared by PM Olmert. TAKING A NEW LOOK AT THE ARAB INITIATIVE -------------- ¶7. (S) MFA and NSC interlocutors stressed to us their view that Israel needs to step up its engagement with the Arab League on the Arab Initiative. NSC's Eran Etzion said the NSC is advising Olmert that a positive response to the Arab Initiative is the only way to give the Saudis a stake in engaging Israel and move Riyadh away from its support for Fatah-Hamas reconciliation. Etzion also thought Olmert should quickly move beyond discussion of a "political horizon," and initiate final status discussions with Abu Mazen even if both sides recognized that any agreements that could be reached would be "put on the shelf" until both parties were politically stronger. Becker, who authored Livni's op ed article that appeared June 18 in the London-based, Saudi-owned Al-Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper and argued for Arab moderates to work with Israel to achieve a two-state solution, was less ambitious, but said Livni also supports a stepped-up political dialogue with Abu Mazen. Becker cautioned that if Israel was not able to offer Abu Mazen political progress quickly, the Palestinian President would likely return to the idea of reconciling with Hamas, the violence in Gaza notwithstanding. ¶8. (C) Meanwhile, the Israeli public debate is bubbling over with various ideas, ranging from opposition leader Netanyahu's call for deploying the Jordanian-based and trained Palestinian Badr Brigade in the West Bank to the public call by Environment Minister (and former Shabak internal security service deputy director) Gideon Ezra to release former West Bank Tanzim leader Marwan Barghouti from prison, where he is serving a life sentence for multiple counts of murder. Israel's highbrow, left-leaning newspaper Haaretz endorsed Ezra's recommendation in its lead editorial June 21. Some contacts are suggesting that Jordanian police should take the lead in training Palestinian security forces, arguing that a Jordanian role would be less provocative for Palestinians than that of the U.S. ¶9. (C) Comment: PM Olmert's approach is likely to emphasize concrete measures to support Abu Mazen, but following the collapse of Fatah in Gaza there is considerable Israeli skepticism about Fatah's lack of leadership. Another new factor for Olmert will be the views of newly-installed Defense Minister Ehud Barak, who reportedly is focused on restoring Israel's deterrence and wants to avoid politically controversial steps (septel). Nonetheless, the idea of partnership with the Palestinians is once again front and center on the Israeli policy agenda. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** CRETZ

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