IRAN: ISRAELI ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION ASSESSMENT

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 001729

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2017
TAGS: PREL PINR KNNP MNUC IAEA IR IS
SUBJECT: IRAN: ISRAELI ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION ASSESSMENT
OF IRAN'S CURRENT ENRICHMENT CAPABILITIES AT NATANZ


Classified By: Gene A. Cretz, Deputy Chief of Mission.
Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d).


1. (S) In a June 12 meeting, Israel Atomic Energy Commission
Nonproliferation Department Director Gil Reich (accompanied
by new External Relations Director Joshua Zarka and Arms
Control Department Director Merav Zafary) provided poloff
with the IAEC's current assessment of Iran's uranium
enrichment capability. Reich noted that the IAEC's
assessment diverged in many areas from the International
Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) May 23 report on Iran, which,
he said, contains facts, but also raises some questions.
Reich labeled as factual the IAEA report's statement that 260
kilograms of uranium gas had been fed into the cascades at
Iran's enrichment facility in Natanz. At the time of the
report, there were 11 cascades running at Natanz. Israel
believes there are now a total of 18 cascades located
"upstairs and downstairs" in the facility. The question,
Reich continued, is why -- if 260 kilograms were fed into the
cascades -- the Iranians did not report the quantity of
enriched uranium produced, but only the grade (4.8 percent).
The IAEC's interpretation of this, Reich said, is that the
amount of output must have been very low -- hence Iran's
decision not to publish figures on the quantity of output.
Reich added, however, that the IAEA is not in the position to
verify any numbers. He noted that virtually the same thing
happened one year earlier, and that the IAEA was also then
not in a position to verify facts on the ground. Reich also
complained that the West tends to forget about Iran's IR-40
heavy water research reactor at Arak. He called "ridiculous"
the IAEA report's claim that activities at the IR-40 reactor
were being verified by satellite, observing that there is no
way to verify enrichment activities without people on the
ground.


2. (S) Reich continued with his analysis: Taking 260
kilograms of feed, and running it through an average of 6-8
cascades over a three month period does not make sense. The
number of cascades involved should suggest an input of 900
kilograms. In Israel's analysis, feeding only 260 kilograms
of uranium gas into the cascades suggests that Natanz is
operating at only 33 percent capability, which in turn
suggests that the facility is suffering serious technical
problems.


3. (S) Reich stressed, however, that nobody should be content
with this. All indicators suggest that the political impetus
still plays the dominant role in Iran's nuclear weapons
program, and that technical issues are still secondary in
importance. The best thing that could happen for Iranian
technicians, Reich said, would be a suspension of enrichment
activity. This would take some of the political pressure off
of them, and give them time and breathing space to analyze
the situation and map out a way ahead to resolve technical
obstacles. Reich said that Israel assumes that research and
development only takes place in the cascades in the
"upstairs," part of the Natanz enrichment facility, where
there are 5-8 cascades in a hall. He claimed that the
cascades located in the "basement" of the Natanz facility are
used for the "rushed" or accelerated part of Iran's
enrichment process.


4. (S) Reich requested that poloff also relay a message that
IAEC Director General Gideon Frank reportedly delivered
during the June 7 session in Washington, D.C. of the
U.S.-Israel Strategic Dialogue -- that Israel believes IAEA
Deputy Director General for Safeguards Olli Heinonen has
moved closer to IAEA DG Mohammed El-Baradei because he is
feeling "neglected" professionally (e.g., on policy issues)
and "personally betrayed" by friendly countries that
apparently are no longer willing to share information with
him. Reich said he understood that this issue is being
examined within the interagency process in Washington.
Without elaborating, he stressed that in Israel's view, this
is a very important issue, and said that Israel will inform
the USG if it decides to meet again with Heinonen.

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