CODEL PRICE AND PM OLMERT DISCUSS LEBANON, SYRIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 001590 SIPDIS CODEL SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2012 TAGS: PREL PINR SY LE KPAL IS SUBJECT: CODEL PRICE AND PM OLMERT DISCUSS LEBANON, SYRIA AND THE PALESTINIANS REF: TEL AVIV 1258 (NOTAL) Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones. Reason 1.4 (B/D) ¶1. (C) Summary: CODEL Price met with PM Ehud Olmert on May 30, and asked for updates on Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinians. Rep. Rahall (D-WV) encouraged Olmert to take up Syrian President Asad's offer to talk "without preconditions." Olmert replied that he had never said "no" regarding Syria, and affirmed that "Neither President Bush, nor Secretary Rice nor Secretary of Defense Gates had said anything that could be interpreted as saying 'don't negotiate with Syria.'" He reiterated "I am not against peace or negotiations with Syria. To the contrary, if Asad invited me to Syria to negotiate, I would not say no." Olmert also emphasized his readiness to move ahead with the Palestinians, provided there is no further Qassam rocket fire. He argued that he would face no internal political difficulties in doing so in such conditions. On Lebanon, Olmert described his earlier (and potentially prospective) view on the Sheb'a farms: ISRAEL would show flexibility if Hizballah were disarmed. End Summary. -------------- Palestinians -------------- ¶2. (C) In response to Rep. Price (D-NC),PM Olmert said that he is "anxious to carry out a political dialogue with President Abbas." Olmert said he trusts President Abbas and "is ready to cooperate with him and to take serious political risks." Olmert shared his intention to meet Abbas in Jericho on June 7, underscoring that this would be the first such PM meeting in PA-controlled territory. Rep. Price welcomed this gesture, and asked what more the GOI could do to show progress. Olmert claimed that the GOI was ready to make many concessions, but that it was not possible to do so "with half a million (Israelis) under the threat of Qassam rockets. ... We are ready and anxious to make a move forward in a significant way with the Palestinians, but it is very hard to reach agreement with a president who does not control his own government. Half (the government) shoots at the other half." ¶3. (C) PM Olmert emphasized that he faced no political impediments to moving ahead, claiming he has "complete freedom to do what it (the GOI) thinks is right." Rep. Fortenberry (R-NE) and Rep. Moore (D-WI) inquired about Israeli arrests of Palestinian parliamentarians. Olmert responded that "'Parliamentarian' is a title. The guys we arrested followed investigations by the Attorney General, who had proof that all engaged in terror. It's not a political decision." Olmert cited the Palestinian Minister of Education as an example of someone who encouraged kids to become suicide bombers. Rep. Moore challenged the Prime Minister on this point, recalling that Israeli judges had released several of the arrested parliamentarians who had not been charged, only for the IDF to re-arrest them. ¶4. (C) On the issue of Palestinian refugees, Olmert told the codel that "If the Palestinians agree not to return refugees to Israel, then we can move forward. We have no problem with Palestinian refugees returning to territories of the Palestinian state." He affirmed that in this respect, the Israeli vision was reflecting that of President Bush. Rep. Moore concluded from the Prime Minister's discussion that a Hamas acceptance of Israel's right to exist and a renunciation of violence would not be sufficient for ISRAEL absent a renunciation of the right of return. -------------- Lebanon -------------- ¶5. (C) Rep. Price (D-NC) briefed PM Olmert on the aims of the Congressional Democracy Assistance Commission, and its particular role in Lebanon. Price emphasized the importance of a strong Lebanon, including its parliament, and his hope that Lebanon held the potential to be a model in the region as a bulwark against extremism. He stressed the importance of countering Syria's ambitions. In response, Olmert argued that Lebanon currently presents a more positive picture to Israel than it did a year ago. He cited the deployment of Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, and their roles in quieting Israel's northern border. Olmert commended PM Siniora's leadership, but said he was not certain Lebanon's fragmented society and weak government constitute a model for the region. He pointed to the negative role that Hizballah played, as it is "not bound by democratic rules." He also pointed to Syria's "unpleasant intervention" in Lebanon. Olmert expressed his hope that Israel could cooperate more with Siniora, but averred that there was not much ISRAEL can do in current circumstances. ¶6. (C) Rep. Rahall (D-WV) also apprised Olmert of USG efforts to support the LAF in its efforts in south Lebanon and against militants in the refugee camps. He expressed his hope that ISRAEL would place "no strings" on what the USG sends to the LAF. He also said he hoped that the GOI would assist UNIFIL to identify cluster bombs in south Lebanon. -------------- Sheb'a Farms -------------- ¶7. (C) On Sheb'a, Olmert maintained that there is no formal dispute between Lebanon and Israel. "Sheb'a farms are not Lebanese territory, and (Israel) has implemented UNSCR 425 to the letter." He added that "if there would be a change, (Israel) would cooperate with the UN." He reiterated an Israeli willingness to be "flexible to resolve these issues," and revealed that he had discussed options in this regard with President Bush in May 2006 (before the Second Lebanon War). At that time, Olmert said ISRAEL would have been ready to make a "major move on Sheb'a -- provided Lebanon and Syria would have gone to the UN and agreed that the Sheb'a farms were Lebanese, not Syrian." Olmert continued, with what appeared to be a prospective comment: "If the UN would decide to reverse its position and if it defined the Sheb'a farms, we are ready to conclude a deal with Lebanon (NB: he made a slip and said Syria first, then said he meant Lebanon). Of course, such a deal would be conditional on the removal of Hizballah from south Lebanon and (its) disarmament." Olmert noted that events of last summer proceeded in a different manner, and he assured Codel Price that the GOI tried to focus its response on Hizballah and to refrain from targeting Lebanon qua Lebanon. Olmert also emphasized the importance of effective implementation of UNSCR 1701. -------------- Syria -------------- ¶8. (C) Rep. Rahall informed PM Olmert that CODEL Pelosi had relayed his message (reftel) to President Asad, and the Speaker had raised the Israeli POW issue (and dogtags) with every Arab leader she encountered, including Asad. Rahall recalled that Rep. Waxman (D-CA) had read the names of missing Israeli soldiers, and asked Syria to intercede with Hizballah. Rahall noted that Asad sought an expression of Israeli interest to have SARG help on the question of Israeli soldiers, (as well as a willingness to discuss Lebanese/Syrian prisoners). Olmert drew a distinction between abducted Israeli soldiers and Lebanese/Syrian detainees. The latter, he claimed, "were caught inside Israel carrying out terrorist actions." Citing the exclusive UN role on prisoner matters, Olmert indicated that he thought Speaker Pelosi can do a great deal, but that he would have to consult before accepting Speaker Pelosi's offer to follow up given ongoing UNSYG involvement in this issue. He confirmed that Egypt was engaged on the Gilad Shalit abduction. ¶9. (C) Rep. Rahall argued that the Syria-Israel track would be easier than the Palestinian track, and encouraged Olmert to take up Asad's offer to talk "without preconditions." Olmert replied that he had never said "no" regarding Syria, and affirmed that "Neither President Bush, nor Secretary Rice nor Secretary of Defense Gates had said anything that could be interpreted as saying 'don't negotiate with Syria.'" He reiterated "I am not against peace or negotiations with Syria. To the contrary, if Asad invited me to Syria to negotiate, I would not say no." Rahall responded that he would hope that Lebanon (sovereignty) would not be the price (for such a peace). Olmert commented that ISRAEL would not betray basic principles, friends, or democracies for anything. "I won't agree to negotiate (with Syria) on the basis of sacrificing (Lebanon)," Olmert affirmed. -------------- Arab Peace Initiative -------------- ¶10. (C) Asked by Rep. Fortenberry (R-NE) about the import of the Arab Summit in Riyadh, Olmert asserted that "The Riyadh meeting was revolutionary, with Arabs sitting down to talk about peace with Israel." Olmert noted that in Petra, earlier in May, he had expressed his willingness to talk "without conditions" -- but then he added that "of course, no one would talk while Qassams are falling on your head." ¶11. (U) Codel Price did not have an opportunity to review this message prior to departure. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** JONES