NEW ISRAELI MOD DG BUCHRIS SHARES HIS PRIORITIES

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 001558 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2017 TAGS: PREL PTER PINR MARR MASS ETTC KNNP KWBG KPAL MFO, IS SUBJECT: NEW ISRAELI MOD DG BUCHRIS SHARES HIS PRIORITIES CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR RICHARD H. JONES. REASONS: 1.4 (B)(D). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) ON MAY 22, AMBASSADOR JONES HELD HIS FIRST MEETING WITH NEW ISRAELI MOD DIRECTOR GENERAL PINCHAS BUCHRIS. BUCHRIS, WHO HAD BEEN IN OFFICE ONLY 14 DAYS, FOCUSED HIS COMMENTS ON THE U.S.-ISRAEL RELATIONSHIP, STRESSING HIS PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO SEEING THE RELATIONSHIP PUT "BACK ON TRACK," AND TO IMPLEMENTING THE AUGUST 2005 STATEMENT OF UNDERSTANDING, AND RESTORING U.S. CONFIDENCE IN ISRAELS EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM. BUCHRIS ADMITTED THAT DURING THE PREVIOUS TWO WEEKS HE HAD FOCUSED MOST OF HIS ATTENTION ON THE SITUATION IN THE GAZA STRIP. HE SAID THAT THE IDF WOULD DO ALL THAT IT COULD TO ASSIST THE RESIDENTS OF SDEROT -- SHORT OF EVACUATION -- BUT STRESSED THAT ISRAEL INTENDS TO AVOID ESCALATING THE SITUATION WITH THE PALESTINIANS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. HE SAID THAT IT IS CLEAR TO THE MOD THAT THE PALESTINIANS ARE TRYING TO DRAW ISRAEL INTO THE GAZA STRIP IN ORDER TO PUT AN END TO THE FIGHTING BETWEEN FATAH AND HAMAS FORCES THERE. BUCHRIS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT SYRIA'S MILITARY PREPARATIONS ALONG ISRAEL'S BORDER, AND ITS CONTINUING EFFORT TO RE-SUPPLY HIZBALLAH WITH SOPHISTICATED MILITARY EQUIPMENT. BUCHRIS ASKED ABOUT CURRENT U.S. THINKING ON IRAQ AND IRAN. WHILE DISCUSSING U.S. ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL AND ISRAEL'S QUALITATIVE MILITARY EDGE, BUCHRIS SAID THAT ISRAEL IS CONCERNED ABOUT REGIME CHANGE IN SYRIA, EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA, AND THE THREAT IMPLICATIONS FOR ISRAEL. ON THE MFO, BUCHRIS ASSISTANT STRESSED THAT EGYPT AND ISRAEL SEE "EYE-TO-EYE" AND OPPOSE SECRETARY GATES' PROPOSAL TO WITHDRAW THE BULK OF U.S. FORCES -- BOTH COUNTRIES BELIEVE THIS WOULD UNDERMINE INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENT TO THE MFO AND ITS EFFECTIVENESS, AND ONLY EMBOLDEN THEIR ADVERSARIES IN THE REGION. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- FIRST PRIORITY: SETTING RELATIONSHIP ON RIGHT TRACK -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) BUCHRIS SAID THAT IT WAS A TOUGH DECISION TO TAKE THE JOB AS MOD DIRECTOR GENERAL, BUT THE SITUATION IN ISRAEL COMPELLED HIM TO DO IT. HE HAD RETIRED FROM THE IDF FIVE YEARS EARLIER, AND HAD LEFT THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR ON A SUCCESSFUL NOTE. AFTER REVIEWING THE CURRENT SITUATION, BUCHRIS SAID HE VIEWS THE U.S.-ISRAEL RELATIONSHIP AS "VERY COMPLICATED." IN SPITE OF THIS, HE STRESSED THAT HE IS COMMITTED TO SETTING THE RELATIONSHIP ON THE RIGHT TRACK: "THIS WILL BE MY MAIN PRIORITY. I WANT TO WORK WITH YOU, AND HOPE I WILL NOT MAKE ANY MISTAKES." -------------- -------------- BUCHRIS COMMITTED TO TIGHTENING ISRAEL'S EXPORT CONTROLS -------------- -------------- ¶3. (S) BUCHRIS SAID THAT HE IS "PERSONALLY COMMITTED" TO FULFILLING THE TERMS OF THE AUGUST 2005 U.S.-ISRAEL STATEMENT OF UNDERSTANDING (SOU),AND THAT THIS WOULD BE HIS MAIN FOCUS AS DG. HE PRAISED HIS PREDECESSORS -- GABI ASHKENAZI AND JACOB TOREN -- FOR THE PROGRESS THEY MADE ON TRANSFORMING ISRAEL'S EXPORT CONTROLS SYSTEM, AND PROMISED HE WOULD SPARE NO EFFORT HIMSELF. HE NOTED THAT THE DRAFT DEFENSE EXPORT CONTROL ACT (DECA) IS BEING REVIEWED BY THE KNESSET FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENSE COMMITTEE, AND SAID THAT HE WILL PUSH TO HAVE THE SECOND AND THIRD READINGS IN THE KNESSET PLENARY CARRIED OUT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. THE AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THAT HE WAS ENCOURAGED BY THE NEWS THAT THE DECA MAY UNDERGO ITS SECOND READING WITHIN TWO WEEKS. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THE KNESSET WOULD APPROVE THE LEGISLATION AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE THEREAFTER, BEFORE ITS ATTENTION MIGHT BE DIVERTED ELSEWHERE. ¶4. (C) BUCHRIS NOTED THAT HE WOULD BE VISITING THE U.S. THE FIRST WEEK OF JUNE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE STRATEGIC DIALOGUE AND OTHER MEETINGS, AND WOULD BE BRINGING THE MESSAGE THAT HE WANTS TO PUT THE U.S.-ISRAEL RELATIONSHIP BACK ON THE RIGHT TRACK. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THIS MESSAGE WOULD BE RECEIVED WELL IN WASHINGTON, AND URGED BUCHRIS TO DISCUSS TIMING FOR THE NEXT MEETING OF THE JOINT POLITICAL-MILITARY GROUP (JPMG) WHILE IN WASHINGTON. -------------- BUCHRIS ON SDEROT, PALESTINIAN IN-FIGHTING -------------- ¶5. (C) RESPONDING TO THE AMBASSADOR'S SYMPATHIES CONCERNING THE QASSAM ATTACKS AGAINST SDEROT, BUCHRIS SAID THAT THE MOD IS DOING WHAT IT CAN TO ASSIST THE POPULATION OF THE BELEAGUERED CITY. ISRAEL, HE SAID, IS NEITHER SEEKING TO "STOP THE LIFE CYCLE" OF SDEROT, NOR TO ESCALATE THE SITUATION WITH THE PALESTINIANS. BUCHRIS MAINTAINED THAT PALESTINIAN TERRORISTS ARE DOING THEIR UTMOST TO ESCALATE THE CONFLICT WITH ISRAEL AND DRAW ISRAEL INTO THE FIGHT BETWEEN HAMAS AND FATAH IN THE GAZA STRIP. THE AMBASSADOR COMMENDED BUCHRIS FOR ISRAELS HANDLING OF THE CRISIS IN THE GAZA STRIP, CHARACTERIZING ITS RESPONSE AS DELIBERATE, PROPORTIONAL AND WELL-TARGETED. ¶6. (C) BUCHRIS SAID THAT ISRAEL FELT THAT IT HAD TO RESPOND TO THE RECENT BARRAGE OF QASSAM ROCKETS AGAINST SDEROT AND OTHER NEGEV COMMUNITIES. THAT SAID, HE UNDERSCORED THAT ISRAEL IS RESPONDING IN AN UNEMOTIONAL, TACTICAL MANNER. THE IDF WOULD SHOW RESTRAINT, WHILE 1,500 OF SDEROT'S RESIDENTS WOULD BE RELOCATED FOR THE SHAVUOT HOLIDAY. BUCHRIS CLARIFIED THAT NO DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN TO EVACUATE THE CITY OF APPROXIMATELY 23,000 RESIDENTS: "MOST OF THE RESIDENTS IN SDEROT WANT TO STAY THERE. THE PROBLEM IS THAT PRESS REPORTS ARE TRYING TO DRAMATIZE THE SITUATION. MY MINISTRY'S PEOPLE ARE THERE DAY AND NIGHT, AND ARE PROVIDING ASSISTANCE." BUCHRIS NOTED THAT THE MOD HAD DECIDED TO PURSUE RAFAEL'S MISSILE DEFENSE PROPOSAL FOR SDEROT, AND THAT PM OLMERT HAD APPROVED THE DECISION. THE AMBASSADOR ENCOURAGED COOPERATION IN MISSILE DEFENSE, NOTING THAT THE U.S. HAD BEEN USING SYSTEMS FOR LOW-FLYING PROJECTILES WITH SOME SUCCESS IN IRAQ. BUCHRIS SAID THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE OPEN TO COOPERATION IN THIS AREA. ¶7. (C) BUCHRIS CHARACTERIZED THE FIGHT BETWEEN FATAH AND HAMAS AS VERY COMPLEX, AND SUGGESTED THAT HAMAS WANTS TO TAKE CONTROL OF THE ENTIRE GAZA STRIP: "IF HAMAS IS SUCCESSFUL, IT WILL PRESENT ISRAEL AND EGYPT WITH A NEW SITUATION AND WILL OPEN UP A NEW FRONT. IRAN WILL HAVE EXPANDED ITS INFLUENCE IN OUR NEIGHBORHOOD." BUCHRIS EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT HAMAS WAS GAINING CONTROL IN THE GAZA STRIP, AND MIGHT TAKE COMPLETE CONTROL OF MILITARY FORCES IN THE AREA. FRUSTRATED, HE ASKED, "WHERE IS (PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY PRESIDENT) ABU MAZEN? WHERE IS (PA NSA) MOHAMMED DAHLAN?" -------------- -------------- BUCHRIS ON ASSISTANCE TO PALESTINIAN SECURITY FORCES -------------- -------------- ¶8. (S) THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT U.S. SECURITY COORDINATOR LTG DAYTON HAS BEEN WORKING TO REFORM THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY SECURITY FORCES (PASF),THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD, AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES. THE PREVIOUS WEEK, THE EMBASSY HAD TRANSMITTED A LETTER TO THE MOD REQUESTING ISRAELI APPROVAL OF THE TURNOVER OF A LIST OF EQUIPMENT FOR THE PASF. LTG DAYTON HAD REVIEWED THE EQUIPMENT LIST AND PARED IT BACK TO THE MOST ESSENTIAL ITEMS. THE EQUIPMENT WOULD BE PROCURED AND SUPPLIED THROUGH EGYPT. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THE U.S. IS WAITING FOR A RESPONSE FROM ISRAEL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IT WOULD HELP IF LTG DAYTON COULD TELL THE PASF WHAT EQUIPMENT WOULD SOON ARRIVE. BUCHRIS RESPONDED THAT POL-MIL BUREAU CHIEF MGEN (RES.) AMOS GILAD WAS REVIEWING THE LIST, AND THAT IT HAD ALSO BEEN SHARED WITH THE ISRAEL SECURITY AGENCY (ISA),IDF AND OTHER OFFICES WITHIN THE MOD. BUCHRIS ONLY CONCERN WAS WHETHER THE EQUIPMENT WOULD END UP IN THE RIGHT HANDS OR NOT. HE OBSERVED, FOR INSTANCE, THAT WHILE KARNI CROSSING WAS OPEN ON THE ISRAELI SIDE, THERE WAS NOBODY ON THE PALESTINIAN SIDE TO RECEIVE GOODS PASSED THROUGH THE CROSSING: "WE DO NOT WANT THE EQUIPMENT TO GO TO HAMAS SO THAT IT CAN BE USED AGAINST US." THE AMBASSADOR STRESSED THAT MOST OF THE WEAPONS THAT WOULD BE PROVIDED WERE SMALL ARMS, AND THAT IF FATAH DID NOT RECEIVE HELP, HAMAS WOULD GAIN TOTAL CONTROL OF GAZA. THE U.S. WOULD ALERT THE PALESTINIANS TO PROVIDE A PLAN FOR DELIVERY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. -------------- -------------- BUCHRIS WORRIED ABOUT SITUATION IN ISRAEL'S NORTH -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) BUCHRIS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE SITUATION ALONG ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDER, OBSERVING THAT ISRAEL'S KIDNAPPED SOLDIERS HAD NOT BEEN RETURNED AS REQUIRED IN UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1701. HE WARNED THAT HIZBALLAH CONTINQD TO RECEIVE SOPHISTICATED MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM IRAN AND SYRIA. THE AMBASSADOR ASSURED BUCHRIS THAT THE U.S. TAKES THE SITUATION SERIOUSLY, AND IS DISCUSSING IT WITH THE EUROPEANS, WHO PROVIDE TROOPS TO THE ENHANCED UNIFIL. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT AN ARMS EMBARGO ALREADY EXISTS, AND THERE MIGHT BE WAYS TO STRENGTHEN UNSCR 1701'S PROVISIONS. HE POINTED OUT THAT GERMANY HAD BEEN ASSISTING LEBANON WITH BORDER CONTROL, AND THAT ITS EXPERIENCE MIGHT HELP ISRAEL IN MAKING ITS ARGUMENTS TO A BROADER AUDIENCE. THE AMBASSADOR ASSURED BUCHRIS THAT THE U.S. IS ACTIVELY FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS ON THE NORTHERN BORDER. BUCHRIS REPLIED THAT HE HOPED THAT IS THE CASE, AS SYRIA -- HE CLAIMED -- IS PREPARING ITS FORCES ON ITS SIDE OF THE BORDER: "I HOPE WE WILL NOT HAVE AN ESCALATION WITH SYRIA." ¶10. (C) BUCHRIS ADMITTED THAT HE HAD BEEN PREOCCUPIED WITH GAZA DURING HIS FIRST 14 DAYS IN OFFICE, BUT STRESSED NEVERTHELESS THAT HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT SYRIAS PREPARATIONS ALONG ITS BORDER, AND ITS CONTINUING EFFORT TO RE-SUPPLY HIZBALLAH WITH WEAPONS. "LAST YEAR, THEY ONLY ATTACKED A PATROL, AND WE WENT TO WAR OVER THAT," HE WARNED, "IT WAS A SURPRISE FOR BOTH OF US -- THEIR AMBUSH, AND OUR REACTION TO IT." BUCHRIS SAID HE BELIEVES THAT HIZBALLAH FORCES HAVE RE-INFILTRATED SOUTHERN LEBANON, BUT HAVE DISGUISED THEMSELVES IN CIVILIAN CLOTHING, AND HAVE HIDDEN THEIR WEAPONS. HE OBSERVED THAT HIZBALLAH "SHEPHERDS" COULD EASILY PERFORM THE WORK OF THE OBSERVATION POSTS THAT THEY HAD BEFORE LAST SUMMER'S WAR. ADMITTING THAT THE SITUATION FOR HIZBALLAH WAS MORE DIFFICULT THAN IT USED TO BE, BUCHRIS NEVERTHELESS STRESSED THAT HIZBALLAH MUST BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. IT IS, HE SAID, ONE OF THE MOST PROFICIENT ORGANIZATIONS IN TERMS OF LEARNING FROM ITS MISTAKES AND FIXING THEM. -------------- BUCHRIS ASKS ABOUT IRAQ, IRAN -------------- ¶11. (S) IN RESPONSE TO BUCHRIS' QUESTION ABOUT THE SITUATION IN IRAQ, THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT IN GENERAL, PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT THE SURGE HAS REDUCED SHIA VIOLENCE AGAINST SUNNIS, AND THAT MUKTADA AL-SADR'S FORCES HAD BEEN RELATIVELY QUIET. THIS SITUATION ALLOWED U.S. FORCES TO FOCUS ON THE SUNNI INSURGENTS. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT U.S. FORCES HAD ALSO SHUT DOWN A FEW CAR BOMB WORKSHOPS IN THE PREVIOUS WEEKS. HE STRESSED THAT THE TACTICAL SUCCESSES WERE HELPFUL, BUT NOT ENOUGH ON THEIR OWN. MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE U.S. WAS PUTTING POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT TO TAKE STEPS TO PREPARE FOR AN EVENTUAL U.S. WITHDRAWAL. THE AMBASSADOR CLARIFIED THAT PRESIDENT BUSH HAD SAID THAT THE U.S. WILL MAINTAIN TROOPS IN IRAQ THROUGH HIS PRESIDENCY, BUT ADDED THAT HIS PRESIDENCY WOULD EVENTUALLY COME TO AN END, AND THAT THE MOOD OF CONGRESS WAS TO GET THE U.S. OUT OF IRAQ SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. BUCHRIS EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THE U.S. TROOPS KIDNAPPED IN IRAQ WOULD BE RETURNED SOON. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT AMBASSADOR CROCKER WOULD SHORTLY MEET WITH IRANIAN OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS IRAQS SECURITY SITUATION. ¶12. (C) IN RESPONSE TO BUCHRIS' QUESTION ABOUT HOW THE U.S. VIEWS IRAN, THE AMBASSADOR STRESSED THAT PRESIDENT BUSH HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT ALLOW IRAN TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE AMBASSADOR UNDERSCORED, HOWEVER, THAT FOR THE TIME BEING, THE U.S. IS PURSUING A DIPLOMATIC RESOLUTION. THE TWO UNSCRS UNANIMOUSLY PASSED AGAINST IRAN HAD SURPRISED TEHRAN. IRAN'S ALLEGED SUCCESSES IN THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE WERE PROBABLY OVERSTATED BUT A SOURCE OF CONCERN NONETHELESS. UN AND UNILATERAL FINANCIAL SANCTIONS ON IRAN HAVE HAD A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THAT COUNTRY. THE AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THAT DIFFERENCES OF OPINION WITHIN IRAN'S RULING REGIME REGARDING THE ACCEPTABLE PRICE OF ACQUIRING A NUCLEAR WEAPON COULD BE EXPLOITED BY USING SANCTIONS TO FORCE A DEBATE WITHIN IRAN'S LEADERSHIP, AND EVENTUALLY A CESSATION OF ITS WEAPONS PROGRAM. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THE U.S. OFFER OF DIRECT TALKS WITH IRAN ONCE IT SUSPENDS ENRICHMENT REMAINS ON THE TABLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE U.S. HAD ALSO MOVED A SECOND CARRIER GROUP INTO THE GULF TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE U.S. HAS OTHER OPTIONS IN CASE DIPLOMACY FAILS. -------------- BUCHRIS ON U.S. ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL -------------- ¶13. (C) TURNING TO THE ONGOING DISCUSSION ABOUT U.S. ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL, BUCHRIS REFERRED TO THE PAPER ISRAEL HAD RECENTLY SUBMITTED, AND STRESSED THAT ISRAEL IS "REALLY WORRIED" ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF REGIME CHANGE IN SYRIA, EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA. HE SAID THAT THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT WOULD REVISIT INTERNALLY ITS FMS AND FMF REQUEST TO THE U.S., BUT FELT NEVERTHELESS THAT AFTER THE PREVIOUS SUMMERS WAR WITH HIZBALLAH, ISRAEL NEEDS TO INCREASE PREPARATIONS FOR "ANY KIND OF SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST." THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT MORE INFORMATION ON ISRAEL'S EXPECTED PROCUREMENTS DURING THE NEXT TEN YEARS WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR U.S. PLANNERS. HE ADDED THAT WASHINGTON WOULD ALSO WANT TO REVIEW INFORMATION ON ISRAELS OWN SPENDING PLANS. ¶14. (C) THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT WHILE SECDEF GATES WAS IN ISRAEL, HE HAD REITERATED THE USG'S COMMITMENT TO MAINTAINING ISRAEL'S QUALITATIVE MILITARY EDGE. WHILE THE U.S. UNDERSTANDS ISRAEL'S CONCERNS AND THAT THE QME IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR ISRAEL, THE GOI NEEDS TO LIKEWISE UNDERSTAND THAT THE U.S. IS TRYING TO HELP ISRAEL'S NEIGHBORS AGAINST THEIR THREATS, INCLUDING AN ASCENDANT IRAN. BUCHRIS NOTED THAT GILAD AND MGEN IDO NEHUSTAN WOULD SOON TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON TO DISCUSS THIS TOPIC FURTHER. -------------- BUCHRIS ON THE FUTURE OF THE MFO -------------- ¶15. (C) THE AMBASSADOR RAISED THE FUTURE OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS (MFO) IN THE SINAI, NOTING THAT SECDEF GATES HAD TOLD THE ISRAELIS DURING HIS RECENT VISIT THAT THE U.S. INTENDS TO DRAW DOWN ITS FORCES BY LATE FALL 2008, AND LEAVE A FORCE OF 200 AMERICANS AT MFO HEADQUARTERS. HE ASKED ABOUT REPORTS THAT EGYPT AND ISRAEL HAD COME TO A COMMON POSITION ON THE ISSUE. WITH BUCHRIS' PERMISSION, MOD CIVILIAN ADVISOR RAMI YUNGMAN REPLIED THAT ISRAEL AND EGYPT HAD NOT YET COORDINATED A POSITION ON THE ISSUE, BUT "SEE EYE-TO-EYE" ON IT, AND SHARE THE VIEW THAT U.S. FORCES FORM THE "CORE" OF THE MFO. ISRAEL, HE SAID, IS CONCERNED THAT IF THE U.S. WITHDRAWS, OTHER COUNTRIES WILL FOLLOW SUIT, AND THE EFFICIENCY OF THE MFO WOULD DECLINE. "IT WOULD BE," YUNGMAN SAID, "THE WRONG POLITICAL SIGNAL TO SEND TO ADVERSARIES IN THE REGION. THEY WOULD SEE IT AS THE U.S. WITHDRAWING ITS COMMITMENT TO PEACE BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL." ********************************************* ******************** VISIT EMBASSY TEL AVIV'S CLASSIFIED WEBSITE: HTTP://WWW.STATE.SGOV.GOV/P/NEA/TELAVIV YOU CAN ALSO ACCESS THIS SITE THROUGH THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S CLASSIFIED SIPRNET WEBSITE. ********************************************* ******************** JONES