CODEL ACKERMAN'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER OLMERT

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 001086

SIPDIS

CODEL
SIPDIS

H PLEASE PASS TO REPRESENTATIVE ACKERMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV KWBG IS
SUBJECT: CODEL ACKERMAN'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER OLMERT


CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR RICHARD H. JONES, REASON 1.4 (B) (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY. REPRESENTATIVE GARY ACKERMAN (D, NEW YORK),
CHAIRMAN OF MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE, ACCOMPANIED BY THE
AMBASSADOR, CALLED ON PRIME MINISTER EHUD OLMERT APRIL 11.
THEY DISCUSSED OLMERT'S APPROACH TO HIS UPCOMING MEETING WITH
PALESTINIAN PRESIDENT ABBAS, THE THREAT FROM IRAN, AND THEIR
DIFFERING PERSPECTIVES ON IRAQ. REGARDING THE MEETING WITH
ABBAS, OLMERT SAID HE WOULD BE READY TO DISCUSS MOVEMENT AND
ACCESS AND SECURITY ISSUES, BUT NOT JERUSALEM, BORDERS OR
REFUGEES. ACKERMAN NOTED THAT ABBAS NEEDS HELP, AND ASKED
OLMERT TO THINK ABOUT HOW TO BOLSTER HIS POSITION. OLMERT
URGED ACKERMAN TO CANCEL HIS APPOINTMENT THE NEXT DAY WITH
NUG FOREIGN MINISTER ABU AMAR, ARGUING THAT THE MEETING WOULD
GIVE THE NUG FORMAL RECOGNITION. ON IRAN AND IRAQ, ACKERMAN
EXPRESSED HIS VIEW THAT THE U.S. ROLE IN IRAQ WAS
UNDERCUTTING OUR ABILITY TO CONFRONT IRAN. OLMERT SAID THE
U.S. SHOULD MOBILIZE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AGAINST
IRAN, BUT ALSO INSISTED THAT A PREMATURE WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ
WOULD STRENGTHEN IRAN AND ISLAMIC RADICALS, WHILE UNDERMINING
MODERATE ARAB STATES. AT THE END OF THE MEETING, ACKERMAN
ASKED OLMERT TO BRING MORE ETHIOPIAN JEWS TO ISRAEL AND
SUGGESTED THE GOI FIND WAYS TO SUPPORT PALESTINIAN
CHRISTIANS. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) HOUSE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA SUBCOMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN GARY ACKERMAN, ACCOMPANIED BY THE AMBASSADOR,
SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF DIRECTOR DAVID ADAMS, STAFF MEMBER HOWARD
DIAMOND, AND POL COUNS CALLED ON PM EHUD OLMERT APRIL 11.
OLMERT WAS FLANKED BY OFFICE DIRECTOR YORAM TURBOWICZ,
FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER SHALOM TOURGEMAN, AND MFA NORTH
AMERICAS DEPARTMENT CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON EYAL SELA. OLMERT
TOLD ACKERMAN THAT HE HAD PHONED HOUSE SPEAKER NANCY PELOSI
TO THANK HER FOR HER EFFORTS WITH THE SYRIANS ON BEHALF OF
THE MISSING ISRAELI SOLDIERS.

APPROACH TO ABBAS
--------------


3. (C) OLMERT SAID HE PLANNED TO MEET ABBAS APRIL 15 AS PART
OF THEIR MUTUAL COMMITMENT TO SECRETARY RICE TO CONDUCT
BI-WEEKLY MEETINGS. THERE WAS A "LOT TO TALK ABOUT," FOR
EXAMPLE HOW TO BALANCE ISRAEL'S REMOVAL OF ROADBLOCKS AND
OPENING OF CROSSINGS WITH PALESTINIAN ACTION TO REDUCE THE
RISK OF TRUCK BOMBS GETTING THROUGH. OLMERT SAID HE HOPED TO
WORK WITH ABBAS TO SET BENCHMARKS. HE ADDED THAT ISRAEL WAS
WILLING TO COOPERATE IN THE DELIVERY OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT
TO PALESTINIAN SECURITY FORCES LOYAL TO ABBAS IN GAZA.


4. (C) ELABORATING ON ISSUES HE WANTED TO RAISE WITH ABBAS,
OLMERT STRESSED THAT HE WOULD NOT DISCUSS JERUSALEM, BORDERS
OR REFUGEES. OLMERT COMMENTED THAT IF THEY SOMEHOW REACHED
AGREEMENT ON REFUGEES, EITHER HE OR ABBAS WOULD BE DESTROYED
POLITICALLY. IF ABBAS CANNOT DELIVER SHALIT, HOW CAN HE
POSSIBLY DELIVER ON FINAL STATUS ISSUES? NONETHELESS, THEY
SHOULD START TALKING AND SEE WHERE THEIR TALKS REACHED IN A
FEW MONTHS. THE INSTITUTIONS OF A PALESTINIAN STATE, ITS
SECURITY FORCES, LAWS, AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE WERE ALL PART
OF A POLITICAL HORIZON. OLMERT SAID HE AGREED WITH SECRETARY
RICE ON THE NEED TO MOVE FORWARD AND CLAIMED THAT PROGRESS
COULD BE REGISTERED AFTER A FEW MONTHS OF BI-WEEKLY TALKS.
HE ADDED THAT MUBARAK WAS SKEPTICAL BECAUSE OF THE ARAB
EXPECTATION OF IMMEDIATE RESULTS, WHILE HE THOUGHT THE
PROCESS WOULD NOT TAKE YEARS, IT WOULD TAKE "MORE THAN DAYS."


5. (C) ACKERMAN COMMENTED THAT ABBAS WAS A VERY WEAK
PARTNER, BUT HE WAS WILLING TO BE A PARTNER. HE SAID HE DID
NOT KNOW IF ABBAS COULD "DELIVER THE MORNING PAPER, MUCH LESS
SHALIT." ACKERMAN DOUBTED THAT ABBAS KNEW HOW TO WIN AN
ELECTION OR RUN A CAMPAIGN. ABBAS WAS IN A ZERO-SUM GAME
WITH HAMAS, AND COULD NOT WIN ON HIS OWN. HIZBALLAH AND
HAMAS UNDERSTOOD THE NEED TO "BECOME SANTA CLAUS" BY
DISTRIBUTING PATRONAGE. EVEN IF A DEAL WAS REACHED FOR
SHALIT, ABBAS WOULD NOT GET THE CREDIT. ACKERMAN ASKED HOW
OLMERT PLANNED TO BOLSTER ABBAS.


6. (C) OLMERT RESPONDED THAT HE COULD NOT STRENGTHEN SOMEONE
WHO DID NOT WANT TO BE STRENGTHENED. ISRAEL HAD HAD PLANS
BUT IT HAD COME TO NOTHING DUE TO THE NUG. OLMERT COMPLAINED
THAT HIS ADVISERS HAD TALKED TO MOHAMMED DAHLAN THREE WEEKS
AGO ABOUT A SECURITY PLAN, BUT DAHLAN HAD DONE NOTHING.
NONETHELESS, IMPLEMENTING THE AGREEMENT ON MOVEMENT AND
ACCESS WOULD HELP. THE HOURS OF THE KARNI CROSSING WOULD
SOON BE EXTENDED UNTIL 11 PM AND WOULD REACH A CAPACITY OF
750 TRUCKS A DAY. OLMERT PRAISED USSC GENERAL DAYTON'S WORK,
SAYING THAT ISRAEL HAD SUPPORTED THE CONGRESSIONAL RELEASE OF
NEARLY $60 MILLION FOR DAYTON'S SECURITY PLAN. IMPROVED
MOVEMENT AND ACCESS SHOULD REDOUND TO ABBAS'S CREDIT ON THE

PALESTINIAN STREET. OLMERT ADDED THAT HE HAD TRANSFERRED
$100 MILLION OF PALESTINIAN TAX REVENUES TO ABBAS AND COULD
GIVE MORE MONEY. ASKED HOW TO PAY PALESTINIAN SECURITY
FORCES, OLMERT SAID SOME MONEY COULD GO TO THE PRESIDENTIAL
GUARD, BUT NOT THE PA SECURITY FORCES SINCE "HANIYYA IS STILL
A TERRORIST." ACKERMAN SAID HE DID NOT DISAGREE BUT STRESSED
THE NEED TO IMPACT THE PALESTINIAN STREET. ACKERMAN DID NOT
ENGAGE ON OLMERT'S REQUEST THAT HE CANCEL A MEETING WITH NUG
FOREIGN MINISTER ABU AMAR SCHEDULED FOR THE NEXT DAY, SAYING
MERELY THAT HE HEARD THE ADVICE. OLMERT STRESSED THAT HE
THOUGHT THE MEETING WOULD BE A MISTAKE SINCE IT WOULD CONVEY
FORMAL RECOGNITION OF THE NUG.

IRANIAN THREAT AND IRAQ WITHDRAWAL
--------------


7. (C) ACKERMAN STATED THAT HE SAW U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN IRAQ
AS WEAKENING THE U.S. ABILITY TO DEAL WITH IRAN. OLMERT SAID
HE DID NOT WANT TO GET INVOLVED IN THE U.S. DOMESTIC
CONTROVERSY OVER IRAQ, THOUGH HE INSISTED THAT THE FALL OF
SADDAM HAD BEEN BENEFICIAL FOR ISRAEL. THE U.S. DECISION TO
INVADE IRAQ WAS NOW HISTORY, THE QUESTION WAS HOW TO
WITHDRAW. OLMERT CALLED IRAN A SERIOUS THREAT, AND
COMPLAINED THAT "NOT A SINGLE COUNTRY" WAS BLOCKING
INVESTMENT IN IRAN OR PROHIBITING TRAVEL BY IRANIAN
OFFICIALS, THOUGH ACKERMAN AND THE AMBASSADOR NOTED U.S.
LEGAL PROHIBITIONS. OLMERT SAID HIS CONCERN WAS HOW THE U.S.
COULD BE IN THE BEST POSITION TO CONFRONT IRAN, ALTHOUGH NOT
NECESSARILY MILITARILY. HE ADDED THAT HE WANTED THE WORLD TO
IMPOSE SUCH TOUGH SANCTIONS THAT IRAN WOULD BE FORCED TO GIVE
UP ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM.


8. (C) OLMERT CAUTIONED THAT A PREMATURE U.S. PULL-OUT FROM
IRAQ WOULD STRENGTHEN IRAN AND ISLAMIC RADICALS, WHO WOULD
GAIN GREAT POWER IF THE U.S. LEFT. IT WOULD ALSO AFFECT THE
SECURITY AND STABILITY OF KUWAIT, SAUDI ARABIA, AND JORDAN.
OLMERT SAID IRAQ WAS NOT HIS ISSUE, BUT HE WAS INTERESTED IN
THE U.S. BEING READY TO RALLY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
AGAINST IRAN. ACKERMAN RESPONDED THAT IN HIS VIEW, THE U.S.
HAD LOST THE ABILITY TO LEAD THE WORLD ON IRAN DUE TO OUR
INVOLVEMENT IN IRAQ. IT WAS MORE DIFFICULT TO GET THE WORLD
TO CONDEMN IRAN DUE TO THE WEAKENED U.S. POSITION.


9. (C) OLMERT ASSURED ACKERMAN THAT HE WAS "NOT INTERESTED
IN AN ISRAELI MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH IRAN" AND WAS NOT
ENCOURAGING THE U.S. TO DO SO EITHER. SECURITY COUNCIL
SANCTIONS WERE VERY IMPORTANT, AS WERE FINANCIAL PRESSURES.
THE U.S. SHOULD RALLY THE MODERATE ARABS AGAINST IRAN, ADDING
THAT THIS WAS NOT LINKED TO THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION. THE
ARABS WANTED TO KNOW IF THE U.S. WAS STILL PREPARED TO BE
STRONG AGAINST THE RADICALS.

ETHIOPIAN JEWS AND PALESTINIAN CHRISTIANS
--------------


10. (C) AS THE MEETING CONCLUDED, ACKERMAN SAID HE WANTED TO
RAISE TWO QUICK QUESTIONS. ON ETHIOPIAN JEWS, ACKERMAN NOTED
HIS LONGTIME INTEREST IN THEIR IMMIGRATION TO ISRAEL AND SAID
THE AGREEMENT WAS STUCK IN THE MUD. ON PALESTINIAN
CHRISTIANS, ACKERMAN TERMED THEM AN "ENDANGERED SPECIES." HE
SAID THEY WERE QUIET BUT VERY DISAPPOINTED IN THE PALESTINIAN
LEADERSHIP. HE NOTED THEIR DESIRE TO CONTROL THEIR HOLY
SITES, AND POSSIBLY EVEN ESTABLISH AN AUTONOMOUS ZONE IN
BETHLEHEM. HE SUGGESTED THAT ISRAEL FIND WAYS TO SUPPORT THIS
COMMUNITY OF 40,000. OLMERT RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD SEE WHAT
HE COULD DO ABOUT THE PALESTINIAN CHRISTIANS, BUT WAS
SKEPTICAL THEY WOULD WELCOME ISRAELI HELP. REGARDING THE
ETHIOPIANS, HE STATED THERE WAS NO PROBLEM WITH JEWS BUT
THERE WERE QUESTIONS INVOLVING THE JEWISHNESS OF THE FALASH
MURA. NEVERTHELESS, THEY WERE STILL ARRIVING AT A RATE OF 300
A MONTH.


11. (U) CODEL ACKERMAN DID NOT HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CLEAR
THIS MESSAGE.

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