Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TELAVIV1063
2007-04-11 12:50:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tel Aviv
Cable title:
ISRAELI MOD CONTACTS SHARE VIEWS ON PALESTINIANS,
VZCZCXRO1332 PP RUEHROV DE RUEHTV #1063/01 1011250 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 111250Z APR 07 FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0477 INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0145
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 001063
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2017
TAGS: PREL KPAL KWBG NATO IZ IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI MOD CONTACTS SHARE VIEWS ON PALESTINIANS,
IRAQ, IRAN AND NATO WITH POLAD YATES
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Gene A. Cretz. Reasons: 1.4 (b)
(d).
-------
SUMMARY
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 001063
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2017
TAGS: PREL KPAL KWBG NATO IZ IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI MOD CONTACTS SHARE VIEWS ON PALESTINIANS,
IRAQ, IRAN AND NATO WITH POLAD YATES
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Gene A. Cretz. Reasons: 1.4 (b)
(d).
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) In a March 29 meeting, Israeli officials from the
MOD's POL-MIL Bureau briefed EUCOM Political Advisor (POLAD)
Mary Carlin Yates on their assessment of the Palestinian
National Unity Government (NUG) and its implications for
Palestinian-Israel relations, Israeli thinking about the
negative effects of any precipitous U.S. withdrawal from
Iraq, and the current status of Israel-NATO relations. They
said that the Palestinian NUG poses a challenge for Israel in
that it might help to legitimize Hamas' role in Palestinian
political life, and urged that the U.S. lead the
international community in maintaining pressure on the NUG to
accept the Quartet Conditions. They also underscored MOD's
commitment to making progress on movement, access and other
quality-of-life issues for the Palestinians. They listed
five likely, negative consequences they believe would result
from any early U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, and noted that
Israel would not allow chaos emanating from a destabilized
Iraq to reach its border. They painted a NATO-Israel
relationship in standstill, acknowledging that this is partly
due to Israel's lack of vision, but also suggesting that the
relationship could not reach its full potential as long as
Israel is dealt with only within the context of the
Mediterranean Dialogue. END SUMMARY.
--------------
POLAD YATES' ISRAELI MOD INTERLOCUTORS
--------------
2. (C) On March 29, POLAD Yates met with four officials at
the Israeli MOD to discuss the Palestinian situation, Iraq,
and Israel and NATO. The four officials were:
-- Rami Yungman (COL., Res.),Director for Strategic
Dialogues with U.S., Turkey, Jordan and India; responsible
for coordinating the Israeli MOD's bilateral relationship
with the Pentagon.
-- Shmuel Limone (COL., Res.),Senior Advisor on
Nonproliferation and Iran's Nuclear Weapons and Missile
Programs.
-- Uri Naumann (COL., Res.),an advisor in the MOD, and
former Head of the External Relations Department. He has a
background in military intelligence. His current assignment
is to coordinate the Israeli MOD's activities to build
relations between Israel, NATO and the EU. He has also been
tasked to work on issues concerning UN peacekeeping
activities, specifically the enhanced UNIFIL in southern
Lebanon.
-- Yoav Peleg (LTCOL., Res.),an advisor in the MOD on
Palestinian issues.
POLAD Yates was accompanied by Embassy Tel Aviv's POL-MIL
Officer. Highlights of the meeting follow, by subject.
--------------
THE PALESTINIAN SITUATION AND THE NUG
--------------
3. (C) Yoav Peleg said that the main issue now facing the GOI
is how to address the formation of the Palestinian National
Unity Government (NUG). Peleg said Israel views the
formation of the NUG as the response to an internal conflict
among Palestinian groups, and an attempt to reduce
international pressure on the Palestinians. The GOI, he
said, is conditioning its approach to the NUG on the NUG's
acceptance of the Quartet principles (e.g., recognition of
Israel, acceptance of previous agreements, nonviolence).
Peleg said that the U.S. and Israel agree that the NUG has
not accepted any of the three principles, and expressed
skepticism that the NUG would ever do so. Israel's concern
is that the NUG will gain legitimacy from Arab states and the
international community.
4. (C) Peleg said that Israel's other concern is that Hamas
will use the NUG in order to establish its own role in the
Palestinians' political life for years to come. In this way,
the NUG will be used to strengthen Palestinian terrorist
groups by helping them to smuggle arms, equipment and funds
into the Palestinian territories, and secure training in
TEL AVIV 00001063 002 OF 004
Iran. Peleg lamented that as long as the NUG is around, it
appears likely that the Arabs and other countries will not
keep pressure on Hamas. The NUG, he said, may direct
attention away from ongoing terrorist activities including
the daily launches of Qassam rockets from the Gaza Strip, and
attacks in the West Bank.
5. (C) In light of this, Peleg urged that the international
community, the U.S. and Israel continue to put pressure on
the NUG. There should be no dialogue with NUG ministers, and
no money transfers through the NUG. Peleg expressed
appreciation for what he described as the "policy of
Secretary Rice and the Quartet to maintain pressure on the
SIPDIS
NUG." At the same time, he said that moderates need to be
helped and encouraged: "Abu Mazen is the obvious address.
Prime Minister Olmert is to meet him bi-weekly. Israel will
cooperate with Abu Mazen and his apparatus, as well as with
National Security Advisor Dahlan, and the Presidential Guard
under the Palestinian Authority government."
6. (C) Peleg noted that Israel is still pressing for the
release of kidnapped IDF Corporal Gilad Shalit -- "Abu
Mazen's failure in this regard has been disappointing" -- and
wants Abu Mazen to work more effectively to stop Qassam
rocket launches and cross-border smuggling. Here, Peleg
noted that the NUG's existence helps by removing Abu Mazen's
excuse that he cannot do anything: "If Abu Mazen tries more,
he will achieve more." Rami Yungman added that Israel is
concerned that Shalit's captors will try to smuggle Gilad
Shalit out of the Gaza Strip and into Egypt through a tunnel.
He stated that the recent terrorist bombing in Eilat was
perpetrated by a Palestinian trained in the Gaza Strip who
made his way to Eilat through Egypt.
7. (C) Peleg said that Israel is working to improve the
economic and quality-of-life conditions of the Palestinians,
cooperating with U.S. Security Coordinator General Dayton and
Ambassador Jones on a daily basis. He said that there has
been an overall improvement over the last six months, and
asserted that progress is being made on crossings, as well as
movement and access issues. Outside funding, Peleg said,
still enters the PA through Abu Mazen as the Temporary
International Mechanism (TIM) had been extended for another
three months. Peleg said that PA Finance Minister Salaam
Fayyad is now working in the NUG, so Israel prefers that
funds not be transferred through him, but through Abu Mazen
instead.
8. (C) Peleg noted that the Quadrilateral Security Group was
holding its second meeting in Egypt to consider ways to
improve the security situation in the Gaza Strip. Peleg said
that the EU plays a major role in the security situation in
Gaza, but could do more. As for the Palestinians, he said
that Israel could not count on them to stop cross-border
smuggling. Peleg suggested that more could be done on
tunnels and smuggling if issues were tackled through
parallel, bilateral meetings (e.g., Egypt and Israel, the
U.S. and Israel.) Peleg noted that the EU-BAM's mandate
would end in May, and that efforts were underway to extend
it. Israel, he said, is now working with the U.S. and Europe
to prevent Hamas from taking over the Rafah crossing between
Egypt and the Gaza Strip. "We need to keep monitoring the
Palestinians there," he cautioned. He added, "The extension
of the EU-BAM's mandate is not a done deal. The Europeans
have many demands. They are not satisfied with our
activities at Rafah." Peleg noted that both the Israelis and
the Palestinians have issued letters to the Europeans
requesting the EU-BAM's extension.
-------------- --------------
IRAQ: EARLY WITHDRAWAL WOULD JEOPARDIZE ISRAELI SECURITY
-------------- --------------
9. (C) Shmuel Limone spoke on Israel's perception of the
likely effects any U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would
precipitate, identifying what he termed, "five major negative
implications":
A) Iran would be viewed as the victor if the U.S. withdraws
early from Iraq. This is because the players in the Middle
East view everything in zero-sum terms. A "loss" for the
U.S. would be viewed as a "victory" for its opponents. The
images of the U.S. and Israel would be severely damaged.
B) Iran would receive a tremendous boost, and would improve
its ability to act in Iraq. Time would work in Iran's favor
as it would pick up momentum. Overall fear of and respect
for America in the region would decrease. "It is the choice
TEL AVIV 00001063 003 OF 004
now of appearing as a wounded tiger versus a paper tiger,"
Limone warned.
C) Terrorists will gain encouragement from any U.S.
withdrawal, and will re-dQct their energies towards other
targets, including Israel. LimoQclaimed that there is
evidence that Al Qaida and the Global Jihad are looking at
how to strike at Israel, but did not elaborate.
D) After any U.S. withdrawal, Iraq would probably break into
three sub-states. This would, in turn, lead to a huge flow
of refugees into Jordan, Syria, and possibly even Lebanon.
(Limone noted that there are already up to 800,000 Iraqi
refugees in Jordan, and that they are "changing the face" of
that country.) The body of refugees may include many
Shiites. Limone warned, "Anything that happens to Jordan is
of colossal concern to Israel. Israel would not be able to
allow Jordan to become Iraq on its border."
E) Increased insecurity in the Middle East will lead to an
even greater arms race by all countries in the region.
10. (C) Limone admitted that the picture he painted was
gloomy, with no extenuating circumstances. He considered
Sunni-Israeli cooperation possible, but less likely than
greater cooperation between Hizballah and radical
Palestinians. The real danger, he asserted, is that groups
like Hizballah would become more adventuristic. Without
prompting, Limone stressed that Israel has no right to ask
the U.S. to stay in Iraq -- "We grieve your losses there, and
recognize that it is a domestic political issue for the U.S."
Nevertheless, Limone said that Israel feels that it can at
least point to the likely cost of an early U.S. withdrawal
from Iraq. Yungman joined in, saying that if the U.S.
decides to withdraw, it could help to mitigate the
consequences if it left some U.S. forces deployed elsewhere
in the region. POLAD Yates responded that, whatever Israel
is seeing about how the issue is being treated by the general
public in the U.S., the current policy of President Bush and
Secretary Rice is not to withdraw from Iraq.
SIPDIS
-------------- --------------
ISRAEL FRUSTRATED WITH THE CURRENT ISRAEL-NATO RELATIONSHIP
-------------- --------------
11. (C) Uri Naumann spoke on what he characterized as a
frustrating relationship between Israel and NATO. Israel is
partly to blame, he admitted, because -- in his words -- it
does not yet have a vision of its relationship with NATO:
"It is still undecided. We have a team that is working on
this right now, trying to develop a vision, and then turning
that vision into a strategy and tactics." Naumann stressed,
however, that Israel has decided nevertheless that it should
work with NATO, upgrade the relationship, and get what it can
out of the relationship. Naumann noted that Israel does not
have a bilateral relationship -- it relates to the alliance
within the framework of the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD),in
which Arab states also participate: "We want, nevertheless,
to build a bilateral relationship with NATO. NATO is doing
more work in research and development, and on armaments. We
have experience we can share with NATO, including in the area
of IEDs. Some of what we have, we do not want to share with
the Arabs and North Africans."
12. (C) Naumann claimed that Israel had cajoled NATO into
offering MD countries Individual Cooperation Programs (ICPs).
Israel, he boasted, was the first MD country to have its ICP
approved by the alliance. Naumann said that two weeks
earlier, Israel tried to flesh out its ICP framework but
concluded the exercise in frustration. According to Naumann,
Israel's interlocutors pressed it to focus on
counterterrorism and nonproliferation issues: "We cannot
focus on these issues, because the Arabs in the MD will not
let us do this." On the positive side, Naumann acknowledged
that the MD allows Israel to sit down with countries with
which it does not have relations.
13. (C) Naumann noted that Israel agreed to participate in
Operation Active Endeavor by placing a liaison officer at
AFSOUTH in Naples in order to facilitate information exchange
on the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. He said that
the Israeli officer has been identified, but claimed that
bureaucracy has prevented the officer's deployment for over a
year. He said he hopes the issue will be resolved in the
not-too-distant future. Naumann observed that the lack of a
NATO-Israel Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is complicating
the officer's deployment.
TEL AVIV 00001063 004 OF 004
14. (C) Naumann also noted that Israel has been working on
the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) issue for the
last seven years. He claimed that Israel is waiting for
approval of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between MD
countries and NATO. Naumann said that Israel had requested
to buy services and spare parts from NAMSA. NATO presented
it a draft MOU that -- according to Naumann -- grants Israel
access to NAMSA spare parts and services, on the condition
that Israel fulfills NATO's requirements for parts and
services unconditionally. Naumann characterized the
agreement as "one-sided and absurd" and said that Israel will
not sign it in its current form.
15. (C) Naumann concluded his briefing by underscoring that
Israel will participate in as many NATO activities as is
possible considering its budget and the situation of the
Israeli Defense Forces. He expressed interest in learning
about the current U.S. vision for NATO, and the implications
for Israel. How, for instance, would Israel fit into the
drive to bring like-minded countries closer to NATO in a
"global partnership"? POLAD Yates noted that SECDEF Gates
had stated categorically that NATO is the premier security
alliance at the Munich security conference earlier in the
year. She pointed out that the strong U.S. team at NATO --
including Ambassador Nuland and General Craddock --
demonstrates U.S. commitment to the transatlantic alliance.
POLAD Yates suggested that one way Israel could help the
alliance would be to explain to the Europeans the danger that
terrorism poses to them. Placing the liaison officer in
Naples would be a good start.
--------------
NOTES ABOUT THE MOD AND ITS POL-MIL BUREAU
--------------
16. (C) In the course of the discussion Yungman described the
make-up and mission of the MOD's Political-Military Bureau.
It consists of 25-30 persons, of which 12-15 are senior
personnel -- all civilians (albeit with military experience).
Yungman noted that the MOD's new Director General, Pinchas
Buchris (BGEN, Ret.),would start work on May 9. He said
that Buchris' background was military intelligence, and that
he formerly was commander of Israel's equivalent to the U.S.
National Security Agency (NSA).
17. (U) This cable was cleared by POLAD Mary Carlin Yates.
********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
You can also access this site through the State Department's
Classified SIPRNET website.
********************************************* ********************
JONES
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2017
TAGS: PREL KPAL KWBG NATO IZ IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI MOD CONTACTS SHARE VIEWS ON PALESTINIANS,
IRAQ, IRAN AND NATO WITH POLAD YATES
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Gene A. Cretz. Reasons: 1.4 (b)
(d).
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) In a March 29 meeting, Israeli officials from the
MOD's POL-MIL Bureau briefed EUCOM Political Advisor (POLAD)
Mary Carlin Yates on their assessment of the Palestinian
National Unity Government (NUG) and its implications for
Palestinian-Israel relations, Israeli thinking about the
negative effects of any precipitous U.S. withdrawal from
Iraq, and the current status of Israel-NATO relations. They
said that the Palestinian NUG poses a challenge for Israel in
that it might help to legitimize Hamas' role in Palestinian
political life, and urged that the U.S. lead the
international community in maintaining pressure on the NUG to
accept the Quartet Conditions. They also underscored MOD's
commitment to making progress on movement, access and other
quality-of-life issues for the Palestinians. They listed
five likely, negative consequences they believe would result
from any early U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, and noted that
Israel would not allow chaos emanating from a destabilized
Iraq to reach its border. They painted a NATO-Israel
relationship in standstill, acknowledging that this is partly
due to Israel's lack of vision, but also suggesting that the
relationship could not reach its full potential as long as
Israel is dealt with only within the context of the
Mediterranean Dialogue. END SUMMARY.
--------------
POLAD YATES' ISRAELI MOD INTERLOCUTORS
--------------
2. (C) On March 29, POLAD Yates met with four officials at
the Israeli MOD to discuss the Palestinian situation, Iraq,
and Israel and NATO. The four officials were:
-- Rami Yungman (COL., Res.),Director for Strategic
Dialogues with U.S., Turkey, Jordan and India; responsible
for coordinating the Israeli MOD's bilateral relationship
with the Pentagon.
-- Shmuel Limone (COL., Res.),Senior Advisor on
Nonproliferation and Iran's Nuclear Weapons and Missile
Programs.
-- Uri Naumann (COL., Res.),an advisor in the MOD, and
former Head of the External Relations Department. He has a
background in military intelligence. His current assignment
is to coordinate the Israeli MOD's activities to build
relations between Israel, NATO and the EU. He has also been
tasked to work on issues concerning UN peacekeeping
activities, specifically the enhanced UNIFIL in southern
Lebanon.
-- Yoav Peleg (LTCOL., Res.),an advisor in the MOD on
Palestinian issues.
POLAD Yates was accompanied by Embassy Tel Aviv's POL-MIL
Officer. Highlights of the meeting follow, by subject.
--------------
THE PALESTINIAN SITUATION AND THE NUG
--------------
3. (C) Yoav Peleg said that the main issue now facing the GOI
is how to address the formation of the Palestinian National
Unity Government (NUG). Peleg said Israel views the
formation of the NUG as the response to an internal conflict
among Palestinian groups, and an attempt to reduce
international pressure on the Palestinians. The GOI, he
said, is conditioning its approach to the NUG on the NUG's
acceptance of the Quartet principles (e.g., recognition of
Israel, acceptance of previous agreements, nonviolence).
Peleg said that the U.S. and Israel agree that the NUG has
not accepted any of the three principles, and expressed
skepticism that the NUG would ever do so. Israel's concern
is that the NUG will gain legitimacy from Arab states and the
international community.
4. (C) Peleg said that Israel's other concern is that Hamas
will use the NUG in order to establish its own role in the
Palestinians' political life for years to come. In this way,
the NUG will be used to strengthen Palestinian terrorist
groups by helping them to smuggle arms, equipment and funds
into the Palestinian territories, and secure training in
TEL AVIV 00001063 002 OF 004
Iran. Peleg lamented that as long as the NUG is around, it
appears likely that the Arabs and other countries will not
keep pressure on Hamas. The NUG, he said, may direct
attention away from ongoing terrorist activities including
the daily launches of Qassam rockets from the Gaza Strip, and
attacks in the West Bank.
5. (C) In light of this, Peleg urged that the international
community, the U.S. and Israel continue to put pressure on
the NUG. There should be no dialogue with NUG ministers, and
no money transfers through the NUG. Peleg expressed
appreciation for what he described as the "policy of
Secretary Rice and the Quartet to maintain pressure on the
SIPDIS
NUG." At the same time, he said that moderates need to be
helped and encouraged: "Abu Mazen is the obvious address.
Prime Minister Olmert is to meet him bi-weekly. Israel will
cooperate with Abu Mazen and his apparatus, as well as with
National Security Advisor Dahlan, and the Presidential Guard
under the Palestinian Authority government."
6. (C) Peleg noted that Israel is still pressing for the
release of kidnapped IDF Corporal Gilad Shalit -- "Abu
Mazen's failure in this regard has been disappointing" -- and
wants Abu Mazen to work more effectively to stop Qassam
rocket launches and cross-border smuggling. Here, Peleg
noted that the NUG's existence helps by removing Abu Mazen's
excuse that he cannot do anything: "If Abu Mazen tries more,
he will achieve more." Rami Yungman added that Israel is
concerned that Shalit's captors will try to smuggle Gilad
Shalit out of the Gaza Strip and into Egypt through a tunnel.
He stated that the recent terrorist bombing in Eilat was
perpetrated by a Palestinian trained in the Gaza Strip who
made his way to Eilat through Egypt.
7. (C) Peleg said that Israel is working to improve the
economic and quality-of-life conditions of the Palestinians,
cooperating with U.S. Security Coordinator General Dayton and
Ambassador Jones on a daily basis. He said that there has
been an overall improvement over the last six months, and
asserted that progress is being made on crossings, as well as
movement and access issues. Outside funding, Peleg said,
still enters the PA through Abu Mazen as the Temporary
International Mechanism (TIM) had been extended for another
three months. Peleg said that PA Finance Minister Salaam
Fayyad is now working in the NUG, so Israel prefers that
funds not be transferred through him, but through Abu Mazen
instead.
8. (C) Peleg noted that the Quadrilateral Security Group was
holding its second meeting in Egypt to consider ways to
improve the security situation in the Gaza Strip. Peleg said
that the EU plays a major role in the security situation in
Gaza, but could do more. As for the Palestinians, he said
that Israel could not count on them to stop cross-border
smuggling. Peleg suggested that more could be done on
tunnels and smuggling if issues were tackled through
parallel, bilateral meetings (e.g., Egypt and Israel, the
U.S. and Israel.) Peleg noted that the EU-BAM's mandate
would end in May, and that efforts were underway to extend
it. Israel, he said, is now working with the U.S. and Europe
to prevent Hamas from taking over the Rafah crossing between
Egypt and the Gaza Strip. "We need to keep monitoring the
Palestinians there," he cautioned. He added, "The extension
of the EU-BAM's mandate is not a done deal. The Europeans
have many demands. They are not satisfied with our
activities at Rafah." Peleg noted that both the Israelis and
the Palestinians have issued letters to the Europeans
requesting the EU-BAM's extension.
-------------- --------------
IRAQ: EARLY WITHDRAWAL WOULD JEOPARDIZE ISRAELI SECURITY
-------------- --------------
9. (C) Shmuel Limone spoke on Israel's perception of the
likely effects any U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would
precipitate, identifying what he termed, "five major negative
implications":
A) Iran would be viewed as the victor if the U.S. withdraws
early from Iraq. This is because the players in the Middle
East view everything in zero-sum terms. A "loss" for the
U.S. would be viewed as a "victory" for its opponents. The
images of the U.S. and Israel would be severely damaged.
B) Iran would receive a tremendous boost, and would improve
its ability to act in Iraq. Time would work in Iran's favor
as it would pick up momentum. Overall fear of and respect
for America in the region would decrease. "It is the choice
TEL AVIV 00001063 003 OF 004
now of appearing as a wounded tiger versus a paper tiger,"
Limone warned.
C) Terrorists will gain encouragement from any U.S.
withdrawal, and will re-dQct their energies towards other
targets, including Israel. LimoQclaimed that there is
evidence that Al Qaida and the Global Jihad are looking at
how to strike at Israel, but did not elaborate.
D) After any U.S. withdrawal, Iraq would probably break into
three sub-states. This would, in turn, lead to a huge flow
of refugees into Jordan, Syria, and possibly even Lebanon.
(Limone noted that there are already up to 800,000 Iraqi
refugees in Jordan, and that they are "changing the face" of
that country.) The body of refugees may include many
Shiites. Limone warned, "Anything that happens to Jordan is
of colossal concern to Israel. Israel would not be able to
allow Jordan to become Iraq on its border."
E) Increased insecurity in the Middle East will lead to an
even greater arms race by all countries in the region.
10. (C) Limone admitted that the picture he painted was
gloomy, with no extenuating circumstances. He considered
Sunni-Israeli cooperation possible, but less likely than
greater cooperation between Hizballah and radical
Palestinians. The real danger, he asserted, is that groups
like Hizballah would become more adventuristic. Without
prompting, Limone stressed that Israel has no right to ask
the U.S. to stay in Iraq -- "We grieve your losses there, and
recognize that it is a domestic political issue for the U.S."
Nevertheless, Limone said that Israel feels that it can at
least point to the likely cost of an early U.S. withdrawal
from Iraq. Yungman joined in, saying that if the U.S.
decides to withdraw, it could help to mitigate the
consequences if it left some U.S. forces deployed elsewhere
in the region. POLAD Yates responded that, whatever Israel
is seeing about how the issue is being treated by the general
public in the U.S., the current policy of President Bush and
Secretary Rice is not to withdraw from Iraq.
SIPDIS
-------------- --------------
ISRAEL FRUSTRATED WITH THE CURRENT ISRAEL-NATO RELATIONSHIP
-------------- --------------
11. (C) Uri Naumann spoke on what he characterized as a
frustrating relationship between Israel and NATO. Israel is
partly to blame, he admitted, because -- in his words -- it
does not yet have a vision of its relationship with NATO:
"It is still undecided. We have a team that is working on
this right now, trying to develop a vision, and then turning
that vision into a strategy and tactics." Naumann stressed,
however, that Israel has decided nevertheless that it should
work with NATO, upgrade the relationship, and get what it can
out of the relationship. Naumann noted that Israel does not
have a bilateral relationship -- it relates to the alliance
within the framework of the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD),in
which Arab states also participate: "We want, nevertheless,
to build a bilateral relationship with NATO. NATO is doing
more work in research and development, and on armaments. We
have experience we can share with NATO, including in the area
of IEDs. Some of what we have, we do not want to share with
the Arabs and North Africans."
12. (C) Naumann claimed that Israel had cajoled NATO into
offering MD countries Individual Cooperation Programs (ICPs).
Israel, he boasted, was the first MD country to have its ICP
approved by the alliance. Naumann said that two weeks
earlier, Israel tried to flesh out its ICP framework but
concluded the exercise in frustration. According to Naumann,
Israel's interlocutors pressed it to focus on
counterterrorism and nonproliferation issues: "We cannot
focus on these issues, because the Arabs in the MD will not
let us do this." On the positive side, Naumann acknowledged
that the MD allows Israel to sit down with countries with
which it does not have relations.
13. (C) Naumann noted that Israel agreed to participate in
Operation Active Endeavor by placing a liaison officer at
AFSOUTH in Naples in order to facilitate information exchange
on the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. He said that
the Israeli officer has been identified, but claimed that
bureaucracy has prevented the officer's deployment for over a
year. He said he hopes the issue will be resolved in the
not-too-distant future. Naumann observed that the lack of a
NATO-Israel Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is complicating
the officer's deployment.
TEL AVIV 00001063 004 OF 004
14. (C) Naumann also noted that Israel has been working on
the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) issue for the
last seven years. He claimed that Israel is waiting for
approval of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between MD
countries and NATO. Naumann said that Israel had requested
to buy services and spare parts from NAMSA. NATO presented
it a draft MOU that -- according to Naumann -- grants Israel
access to NAMSA spare parts and services, on the condition
that Israel fulfills NATO's requirements for parts and
services unconditionally. Naumann characterized the
agreement as "one-sided and absurd" and said that Israel will
not sign it in its current form.
15. (C) Naumann concluded his briefing by underscoring that
Israel will participate in as many NATO activities as is
possible considering its budget and the situation of the
Israeli Defense Forces. He expressed interest in learning
about the current U.S. vision for NATO, and the implications
for Israel. How, for instance, would Israel fit into the
drive to bring like-minded countries closer to NATO in a
"global partnership"? POLAD Yates noted that SECDEF Gates
had stated categorically that NATO is the premier security
alliance at the Munich security conference earlier in the
year. She pointed out that the strong U.S. team at NATO --
including Ambassador Nuland and General Craddock --
demonstrates U.S. commitment to the transatlantic alliance.
POLAD Yates suggested that one way Israel could help the
alliance would be to explain to the Europeans the danger that
terrorism poses to them. Placing the liaison officer in
Naples would be a good start.
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NOTES ABOUT THE MOD AND ITS POL-MIL BUREAU
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16. (C) In the course of the discussion Yungman described the
make-up and mission of the MOD's Political-Military Bureau.
It consists of 25-30 persons, of which 12-15 are senior
personnel -- all civilians (albeit with military experience).
Yungman noted that the MOD's new Director General, Pinchas
Buchris (BGEN, Ret.),would start work on May 9. He said
that Buchris' background was military intelligence, and that
he formerly was commander of Israel's equivalent to the U.S.
National Security Agency (NSA).
17. (U) This cable was cleared by POLAD Mary Carlin Yates.
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