SUPREME COURT VOTES TO ALLOW PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 001915 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM HO SUBJECT: SUPREME COURT VOTES TO ALLOW PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS MICHELETTI TO RUN FOR PRESIDENT REF: A. TEGUCIGALPA 0906 ¶B. TEGUCIGALPA 1909 Classified By: Ambassador Charles Ford, Reasons 1.4 (b & d) ¶1. (C) Summary: On December 12 the Constitutional Court was unable to muster a unanimous decision in the President of Congress Roberto Micheletti case. President Manuel Zelaya was able to manipulate this outcome and saw this as a personal victory. This forced the case to go to the entire plenary of the Supreme Court, who rendered a "knock-out" decision with lightning speed in two days. The court found in favor of Micheletti, thus allowing him to run for President in 2009. Micheletti celebrated but then got down to business, saying that all the stalled legislation in the Congress, including the consumer protection law and telecoms reforms, will now be considered. Micheletti also proposed three reforms to the electoral law: mixed single party and individual votes on the ballots; moving the primaries to November 2008, and abolishing Vice Mayorships. End summary. ¶2. (C) On December 12 the Constitutional Court, comprised of five Supreme Court magistrates who consider only cases regarding the Constitution, issued a surprise four to one decision in favor of President of Congress Roberto Micheletti's bid to run for President (see ref a). In order for the decision to be binding, it must be unanimous. The week before, court member Jose Rolando Arriaga announced in the press that the decision was unanimous, but he was forced to retract these statements on December 12. Insider Carlos Romero of the Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) told Poloff the negotiation process for the future of the TSE, the Tribunal Superior de Cuentas, the Supreme Court, the Human Rights Commissioner, the Attorney General, and other positions had gotten away from President Zelaya, who felt his interests were not well represented by what had been decided. Romero said that Zelaya thus called Sonia Malina Dubon, the wife of one of his closest advisors, Enrique Flores Lanza, and ordered her to stop the process in its tracks. Dubon did as she was told, but after 72 hours the groups could not come to an agreement, so the final decision was split four to one. Some analysts saw this decision as a victory for Zelaya and his "Patricios," and a loss by Carlos Flores (who was supporting Micheletti) and the traditional Liberals. 
¶3. (C) Zelaya and his group celebrated too soon, however, as the case then went to the plenary of the entire Supreme Court, which consists of eight Nationalist judges and seven Liberals, who then reached a decision in a record two days. All that was needed was majority decision, but the traditional forces in both the Liberal and National parties were able to come together and muster a "knock-out" fourteen to one decision in favor of Congressional President Roberto Micheletti, ruling that reform 240 to the Constitution was unconstitutional. As the reform to the Constitution also disallowed the President of the Supreme Court to run for President, Supreme Court President Vilma Morales recused herself from the decision and sent a substitute. Morales also noted that Micheletti had been her former boss. Dubon was again the only dissenting vote. ¶4. (C) The court insists that it only ruled on the question of whether the President of Congress may run for President of the Republic, and not on the other reforms to the constitution approved at the same time. Zelaya, however, has been quoted as saying he was "studying the implications" of the decision, and that he was considering doing away with the position of the Vice President. Legal experts say that since the office of a person who would take over the position of President in his absence existed before the reforms, albeit in a slightly different form (previously there were three vice presidents),this section of the reform will probably not be overturned. (Comment: It is well known that Zelaya does not get along well with his Vice President Elvin Santos, who occasionally makes public statements or does things Zelaya does not like when he is out of the country. Zelaya may just see this as an opportunity to get rid of this thorn in his side. End Comment.) ¶5. (C) Upon hearing the announcement, Micheletti celebrated and then very publicly attended mass, looking pious and sitting in the front pew, to show his gratitude. His public message has been surprisingly coherent and low-key, saying that all of the legislation that had languished in the Congress would now be considered before the recess, including the consumer protection law and telecommunications reforms. He has, however, also publicly stated that the Congress will consider several electoral reform laws, including: ¶A. Giving voters the option of making a single vote for their party (plancha),or voting for individuals; ¶B. Moving the primary elections to November 2008; and ¶C. Abolishing the position of Vice Mayor, and establishing that the losers in mayoral elections are no longer given a position on the city council. ¶6. (C) Comment: After months of wrangling and infighting, we finally have a decision in this case that basically supports the status quo. This was a battle between the Honduran establishment and Zelaya and his group of Patricios. The battle has sucked a substantial amount of power out of Zelaya, but it has also tapped Micheletti, and many analysts are saying he might not even win the Liberal primary. Micheletti himself has told the Ambassador that he believes he will lose the Presidential election given the mess Zelaya is creating. National party leader Porfirio "Pepe" Lobo was glowing at a local holiday party, saying it was a huge victory. It appears he would like to run against Micheletti, as he thinks it is a fight he can win. ¶7. (C) Comment (continued): In regards to the proposed electoral reforms, we have seen reform lists come out of NGO's, the College of Lawyers, and various political analysts, and many of them coincide in the first two points Micheletti proposed. Moving to a mixed ballot would favor the established political parties who can muster votes of the party faithful in exchange for jobs and favors and limit the need for expensive campaigns funded by narcotraffickers or Chavez. We expect most of the rural votes to be cast to be in plancha, while educated urban dwellers may continue to vote for their favorite individuals. On the issue of making the primary vote three months earlier, we are concerned that this will diminish the number of days that NGOs and International Organizations have to clean up the voters lists (ref b),but it would also streamline the campaign season and thus get it over before the holiday season. A cleaned-up voter list is most important for the general election in November 2009 as opposed to the internal party elections. A primary in November would also advantage the front-runner and traditional candidates (like Lobo) and disadvantage the dark horses (like Mario Canahuati),who need more time to raise funds and campaign. As long as Zelaya releases the funding for the RNP (he is currently holding it hostage),and the Congress approves major new funding in the 2008 budget, we think that the change of primary date could be manageable. End Comment. FORD