EUR DAS BRYZA'S NOVEMBER 13 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 002813 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/CARC, EUR/FO AND EUR/RPM E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR GG RU SUBJECT: EUR DAS BRYZA'S NOVEMBER 13 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SAAKASHVILI Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft, reason 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a November 13 meeting EUR DAS Matt Bryza conveyed to Georgian President Micheil Saakashvili the Secretary's firm message that the state of emergency in SIPDIS Georgia must be lifted and that all TV broadcasts, especially Imedi's, must be resumed if the GOG is to restore faith in Georgia's democratic reforms and retain U.S. support. Saakashvili disputed that his concerns about Russian involvement in the recent street protests and a buildup in Abkhazia are an excuse for abandoning Georgian democracy. He considers the threats from Russia and from Imedi television to Georgia's government as quite real. At the same time, he told Bryza that he will end the state of emergency in Georgia by November 16. He also said he is ready to reopen Imedi television if appropriate safeguards on the messages it broadcasts can be found, in accordance with proposals made by Bryza and Ambassador Tefft in meetings with other GOG officials. He promised that opposition leaders will be free to speak out and hold peaceful demonstrations after the state of emergency ends, without fear of arrest. Saakashvili expressed deep concern about reports of a Russian buildup of troops and weapons in Abkhazia. He asked the USG to send a strong message to the Russians not to take such a provocative action at such a critical time in Georgia's internal political life. A dramatic increase in the Russian presence in Abkhazia would be considered an attack, he said, and would draw a Georgian response. End Summary. -------------- STATE OF EMERGENCY TO END, IMEDI TO REOPEN IF SAFEGUARDS IN PLACE -------------- ¶2. (C) DAS Bryza reviewed for Saakashvili his series of meetings with the opposition and government officials since his arrival in Tbilisi on November 11. He told Saakashvili that he has been as tough in his approach to the opposition as he has been to the government, but he was sent to Tbilisi to deliver a firm message from Secretary Rice. He said that Saakashvili's decision to call early presidential elections was welcome, but that the state of emergency and closure of Imedi television sent shock waves throughout Washington. It is now crucial to lift the state of emergency and to reopen Imedi, he said. ¶3. (C) Saakashvili said that the country faced a choice in November of "either Imedi or Georgia". His government fully realized and took into account the damage to its reputation that would result from its decision to announce a state of emergency and take Imedi off the air. He said that the demonstrators on the street on November 7 were far different from those who took part in the November 2 demonstrations. On November 7, they were "criminals and dismissed, corrupt policemen" in contrast to the political and civil society activists of November 2. The November 7 protests, he insisted, were not counter-revolution, but counter-reform. He observed that the demonstrations were limited to Rustaveli Avenue in front of the Parliament, and not county-wide as was the case during the Rose Revolution in 2003. He claimed that Imedi journalists had been overheard discussing provoking the killing of demonstrators in order to inspire the people to overrun the Parliament building. He also said that Imedi's security director was organizing criminals and distributing weapons. Saakashvili expressed his view that Imedi is under the control of Badri Patarkatsishvili, and that Patarkatsishvili and even the station's co-owner, Rupert Murdoch, are cooperating with Vladimir Putin. He based his belief about Murdoch on a recent telephone discussion with Richard Holbrooke, who, he said, told him that Murdoch is also beholden to Putin. ¶4. (C) Saakashvili said that he will end the state of emergency he announced on November 7 early, on November 16. After the state of emergency is lifted, he said, the opposition will have full access to the media and will be able to hold rallies and peaceful demonstrations. The opposition leaders' fears of arrest are simply groundless, he said. However, he said that street hooligans must be arrested and prosecuted as a matter of keeping order. Also, he said, Irakli Okruashvili is a different case. In his view, Okruashvili is deeply corrupt and stole from the Ministry of Defense, and should be prosecuted. Bryza countered that the USG had long ago warned Saakashvili about Okruashvili's alleged corruption. Saakashvili replied that he should have listened to us. ¶5. (C) Some of Imedi's actions up to November 7 were criminal and will be prosecuted according to normal procedures, Saakashvili said. As examples of Imedi's incitement during TBILISI 00002813 002 OF 003 the protests, he said it had broadcast calls for people to attack Parliament and false reports of the death of children and pregnant women and of a police attack on the Tbilisi cathedral. He intends to announce that the station can reopen if appropriate safeguards are agreed with Murdoch and with European powers who might supply an appropriate person to monitor its messages, as Bryza had discussed with prosecutor General Adeishvili and parliamentary leaders Bokeria and Rurua. Such a deal could be implemented quickly, he said. In spite of the doubts he expressed about Murdoch, he said he intends to contact him and discuss the conditions for reopening the station. He promised that all damage done to the station's equipment will be fully compensated. ¶6. (C) Saakashvili said that as the demonstrations turned violent, all his advisors, including Nino Burjanadze, demanded that a state of emergency be imposed in order to allow the use of military troops to keep order. The Georgian government mobilized as never before, he said. Now, as calm returns, he is resigning, calling presidential elections and holding a plebiscite on the date of parliamentary elections. His own term in office is being shortened by one and one-half years, he said -- which should be compared to how others in the region cling to power. He promised that he would not ignore the results of the plebiscite on the date of parliamentary elections if it does not go his way. Saakashvili also defended himself against charges that he relies on only a narrow circle of advisors. He said that he has frequent conversations with journalists, and that he has successfully kept disparate politicians like Zurab Noghaideli and Burjanadze together in the National Movement by listening, by empowering and by delegating. Only Irakli Okruashvili preferred to go his own way. His circle seems narrow only to those who are outside of it, he said, and those people are out only because of poor results and lack of talent. -------------- -- DEEP CONCERNS ABOUT RUSSIAN BUILDUP IN ABKHAZIA -------------- -- ¶7. (C) Saakashvili became impassioned as he discussed the current and growing threat of Russian action to seize Abkhazia. No Georgian leader can tolerate an attack on Abkhazia by Russia and hope to survive in office, he said. His own family, he said, lives with the guilt that it did not take action when Georgia was occupied by the Red Army in ¶1921. He said that Georgia will fight back, whatever the cost, if Russia attacks in Abkhazia. He told how Putin had at one time threatened him with using "Cyprus" tactics, meaning that he would seize Abkhazia at some time when the government in Tbilisi is caught up in internal problems, as was the government in Athens when the Turkish republic in Cyprus was created. Now, he said, Russia is preparing to quickly insert up to 5000 troops into Abkhazia in order to expand Russia's military presence in Abkhazia in anticipation of possible Russian recognition of Abkhazia during the Kosovo endgame. He urged the USG to send a strong message to Russia not to take such a step. ¶8. (C) Saakashvili referred to a recent New York Times editorial which termed U.S. interests in Georgia "moderate". The fact is, he said, if the United States loses Georgia, it loses Central Asia and the Caspian Basin as well. ¶9. (C) Bryza said that the Russian threat to Abkhazia Saakashvili describes is viewed by some key observers in Washington as an excuse to prolong the state of emergency. and a perception exists that Saakashvili is ready to walk away from his record as a democrat because of his exaggerated fear of Russian intrigue. Saakashvili emphatically denied that. He said such a reaction is "exactly what the Russians want," so they can achieve their ends in Abkhazia and in Georgia. The situation in Abkhazia will become clear within three or four days, he said, and the USG should pay attention to the increasingly bellicose statements from the Russian Duma and Moscow Mayor Luzhkov as well as the actions of the Russian military. He warned that Putin will act if he does not get a clear signal from the United States that a provocation in Abkhazia will not be tolerated. Recalling his promise to lift the state of emergency, find a way to restore Imedi to the air, and to hold elections, he urged that "you secure Abkhazia, and I will secure the situation in Georgia." Bryza countered that it would be easier to gain traction in Washington on this latest Abkhazia issue if the GOG lifted the state of emergency and reopened Imedi Television. ¶10. (C) Saakashvili called Bryza back to the Chancery for further consultations on Abkhazia at 12:30 a.m. Saakashvili had convened his nearly nightly meeting of his national TBILISI 00002813 003 OF 003 security team. In attendance were Speaker Burjanadze, Minister of Internal Affairs Merabishvili, Minister of Defense Kezerashvili, State Minister for Conflict Resolution Bakradze, Minister of Economic Development Arveladze, parliamentary leader Bokeria and Tbilisi Mayor Ugulava. Saakashvili showed Bryza grainy photos taken from video footage shot by a Georgian UAV of a military base at Ochamchire in Abkhazia. MOD Kezerashvili said the photos depicted five T-72 tanks and 6 D-30 howitzers that had allegedly been moved into Abkhazia from Sochi, Russia by rail three days earlier. In response to Saakashvili's appeal for Washington to intervene at the highest levels in Moscow, Bryza suggested the GOG first lift the state of emergency and resume Imedi TV broadcasts. Bryza also suggested the need for higher resolution images. Bryza underscored the unwavering support of the United States for Georgia's territorial integrity and for a peaceful, political settlement in Abkhazia. He added that if true, such Russian military movements could have a chilling impact on CFE treaty negotiations. ¶11. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this telegram. TEFFT