Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TBILISI2089
2007-08-21 11:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tbilisi
Cable title:  

GEORGIA MISSILE INVESTIGATION UPDATE -- AUGUST 21

Tags:  PREL PGOV OSCE GG 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 002089 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV OSCE GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA MISSILE INVESTIGATION UPDATE -- AUGUST 21

REF: TBILISI 2075

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Mark X. Perry for reasons 1.4(b&d).

Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 002089 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV OSCE GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA MISSILE INVESTIGATION UPDATE -- AUGUST 21 REF: TBILISI 2075 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Mark X. Perry for reasons 1.4(b&d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) A second round of the International Group of Experts (IGE) has completed a report on the August 6 missile impact, endorsing the conclusions made by earlier experts while providing additional detail and more specific information to confirm that Georgian aircraft could not have fired the missile. In a candid meeting with Charge halfway through his visit to Tbilisi, visiting OSCE representative Miomir Zuzul indicated it was clear to him that the August 6 missile came from a Russian plane that crossed into Georgia. He said the Russian Ambassador had hotly disputed this charge, leading Zuzul to believe the Russians will not change their story, regardless of the evidence. While saying the general picture of the incident was clear, Zuzul noted there was some difference of opinion on the motive: Georgian investigators tend to believe the missile was released as part of evasive maneuvers, while members of the current installment of the International Group of Experts (IGE) have spelled out in their report a "possible scenario" of an intentional attack. End Summary. New International Report Builds the Record -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On August 21 post obtained (and e-mailed to EUR/CARC and elsewhere) the report produced by the second version of the IEG, consisting of two experts from Estonia, two from Poland, and one from the U.K. The report endorsed the conclusions of the earlier IGE report, and added further technical details about the firing of the missile and the reaction of Georgian personnel manning a nearby radar installation, who turned off the radar when they spotted the missile. The experts reported examining all Georgian SU-25 aircraft and confirming that none of them could have fired the missile. According to the report, the missile was made in Russia in 1992, and "within the region Russia is the only feasible nation capable of using the weapon correctly." While noting that the IGE is not claiming that the radar was deliberately attacked, the reports lays out a "possible scenario" in which the missile was launched intentionally, but then missed the target because it was unable to home in on the radar after it was deactivated. ¶3. (SBU) The report makes a number of recommendations
for further investigation, including seeking information from the Russian manufacturer, from pilots who fly this type of aircraft and use this missile, and radar tracks from neighboring countries. In particular, the IGE argued that "more information about the incident could be determined if Russia supplied the military (primary) radar tracks in addition to the secondary tracks already received." Zuzul Sees a Clear Picture -------------- ¶4. (C) Accompanied by Spain's Charge to OSCE Perez and Acting OSCE Head of Mission in Georgia Nikolaev, Zuzul, a former Croatian Foreign Minister acting as a Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, told Charge August 20 that there was a "clear general picture" of the August 6 incident, with compelling evidence that Russia was responsible. He noted that there remained some disagreement about why the incident happened: members of the second wave of the IGE were inclined to the view that it was a planned Russian attack, while Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOIA) investigators believed the missile was dropped as the plane tried to evade an attack by the South Ossetians, who apparently believed the plane was Georgian. While acknowledging he was a layman and the IEG experts were impressive, Zuzul said he personally found the MOIA explanation more convincing, adding that it was notable that the Georgians favored an interpretation that cast Russian intentions in a less negative light. ¶5. (C) Zuzul said his Georgian interlocutors had taken a constructive approach to the investigation, in contrast to Russian Ambassador Kovalenko. Zuzul said Kovalenko had been highly agitated in their meeting, pitching a story that the Georgians fabricated the attack and showing no readiness to listen to other arguments. Zuzul was not impressed with Kovalenko's "evidence," saying the Russian's arguments defied TBILISI 00002089 002 OF 002 logic and contradicted themselves in a number of ways. When Kovalenko criticized the IGE investigation, Zuzul told him the IGE was willing to meet with Russian experts, but Kovalenko did not respond to the offer. Zuzul said that, despite the strong evidence, he thought it highly unlikely the Russians would "change their story" and admit responsibility. ¶6. (C) Zuzul agreed with Charge on the importance of responding to this incident in a way that will deter future such incidents, recognizing that another missile attack could produce fatalities and lead to even greater problems. Zuzul said that, in order to produce an even more credible and clear report of what happened, he was close to deciding to recommend that OSCE or the UN invite a higher-level group of experts for a more official report. He said he envisioned Russia and Georgia being invited to participate, but he took Charge's point that it would be problematic to include the accused parties in the investigation. He also expressed interest in the idea of OSCE providing a radar expert to work with the Georgians, in order to provide an independent confirmation of airspace incursions, at least until Georgia is linked up to NATO radar this fall. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) We are somewhat skeptical of supporting another higher-level investigation by the OSCE or the UN. We wonder how Zuzul, as a representative of the OSCE, can argue effectively at the OSCE for a higher-level investigation that excludes the Georgians and the Russians. If the Russians and Georgians are included in the investigation, we would expect an outcome similar to the UN-led report on the March 11 Kodori attack, which took months to generate and did not explicitly point out responsibility for the attack. PERRY

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