Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TBILISI2063
2007-08-16 06:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tbilisi
Cable title:
DAS BRYZA'S MEETING WITH STATE MINISTER FOR
VZCZCXRO1711 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHSI #2063/01 2280629 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 160629Z AUG 07 FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7329 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 002063
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM GG
SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA'S MEETING WITH STATE MINISTER FOR
CONFLICT RESOLUTION BAKRADZE
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Mark X. Perry for reasons 1.4(b
&d).
Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 002063
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM GG
SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA'S MEETING WITH STATE MINISTER FOR
CONFLICT RESOLUTION BAKRADZE
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Mark X. Perry for reasons 1.4(b
&d).
Summary
--------------
1. (C) David Bakradze, Georgia's new State Minister for
Conflict Resolution, told EUR DAS Bryza July 27 that the
Georgian government was concerned UNOMIG and the Group of
Friends had lost "strategic focus" over Abkhazia, as
reflected in a recent UN report criticizing Georgia for minor
issues, while the Abkhaz and Russians get relatively little
criticism for obstructing conflict resolution at a broader
level. Bakradze agreed with Bryza that Georgia can regain
the initiative by focusing on the issue of internally
displaced persons (IDPs) from Abkhazia, thereby drawing a
clear distinction between Kosovo and Abkhazia as we head into
UN Security Council discussion of renewing the mandate of the
UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) in October. On South
Ossetia, Bakradze said Georgia would continue its active
efforts to engage the de facto authorities in the ongoing
process of defining the region's autonomous status. End
Summary.
In Search of Momentum
--------------
2. (C) The newly appointed Bakradze told Bryza and Charge
that the Georgian government, from President Saakashvili on
down, was unhappy with the current dynamic regarding
Abkhazia. He said Russian behavior in Abkhazia was becoming
more aggressive by the day, with the most recent example
being a Russian Deputy Prime Minister's statement that Russia
would use Abkhazia in its plan for the 2014 Winter Olympics
in Sochi. Bakradze said that all signs from Moscow --
including rhetoric in the Russian media -- suggested that
Russia was approaching a "critical point" in Abkhazia,
leading either to "military buildup or recognition."
Bakradze acknowledged that it was unlikely the Russians
genuinely wanted to recognize Abkhazia -- something that
would worsen their internal headaches in the north Caucasus
-- but he feared that Russian President Putin was becoming a
hostage to his own rhetoric on the issue. In Bakradze's
analysis, Putin may have raised the prospect of Abkhazia
recognition as a tool to discourage Kosovo independence, but
his comments have hardened Russian public opinion on
Abkhazia, and at a certain point it may become impossible for
Putin not to follow through on his threats.
3. (C) Given this danger, Bakradze said it was very
disappointing that the UN Secretary General has chosen to
focus on minor issues, such as the Georgians' establishment
of a Patriot youth camp in Ganmukhuri, near the
Abkhaz-controlled Gali region, and the disappearance of Gali
de facto election official David Sigua. Bryza said the U.S.
position is opposition to ethnic cleansing, and Bakradze
strongly agreed. He said recent comments by Abkhaz "foreign
minister" Sergei Shamba that Abkhaz and Georgians could not
live together amounted to a continuation of ethnic cleansing:
the de facto authorities had expelled the majority
population, declared independence for those who remained, and
were now calling on the international community to recognize
it. Bryza agreed, noting that we were unwilling to permit
Shamba to come to New York in the current circumstances.
Bakradze expressed concern that the Abkhaz argument, however
illogical, might make inroads among the Europeans.
4. (C) Bakradze agreed with Bryza that in the run-up to the
October Security Council debate, Georgia should keep the
focus squarely on the IDPs and the importance of not
legitimizing ethnic cleansing. He said IDPs should have a
genuine right of return to all of Abkhazia, stressing that
the return of some Georgians to the Gali district was
occurring only because the Abkhaz did not have the resources
to prevent it, not because of Abkhaz goodwill. He expressed
hope that with the help of the USG, the Georgian government
could overcome the current sense of a loss of strategic
direction by emphasizing the right of return for the IDPs,
the human rights problems in Abkhazia, and the need for
security mechanisms such as international police. Bakradze's
deputy Ruslan Abashidze said Georgia would continue to push
for "go and see" visits by IDPs to their properties in
Abkhaz-controlled areas outside of Gali, as foreseen in a
1994 agreement. On the question of a UNHCR census of IDPs,
Bakradze said Georgia had no objection to counting in
principle, but was concerned that a count that started in
Gali would be used politically by the Abkhaz authorities, and
would miss the large numbers of IDPs who were now living
outside of Georgia. Bakradze said he intended to travel to
Berlin, Paris, and Washington prior to October, and would
also work closely with Group of Friends ambassadors in
Tbilisi.
Spelling Out South Ossetian Autonomy
TBILISI 00002063 002 OF 002
--------------
5. (C) Bakradze noted that two key South Ossetia-related
events on his calendar in his early days as Minister were a
meeting of the Commission on South Ossetian autonomy in Kurta
July 28, and a Joint Control Commission meeting in Tbilisi
August 9-10. He also mentioned a Steering Committee meeting
on August 2. He said the Georgians were using all channels
-- public and private -- to appeal to the de facto
authorities to take part in the autonomy discussions. In
addition to written invitations, Bakradze said he had sent
people to Tskhinvali to hold personal meetings, but they were
stopped by de facto security forces. Bakradze stressed that
Georgia was not undertaking the autonomy process as a vehicle
for Dmitry Sanakoyev, but as something for the whole region;
Sanakoyev, he said, was "already on our side" and the
important thing now was to appeal to others in South Ossetia.
American Corners and Quadripartite Meetings
--------------
6. (C) On other subjects, Bakradze's reaction was generally
positive to the idea of opening one or more American Corners
in Abkhazia, provided it did not in any way recognize the de
facto authorities. He said the government was currently
considering a similar proposal from the EU. He stressed that
it should be made clear that any such initiatives were
extensions of existing programs in Georgia, not new bilateral
U.S.-Abkhaz programs. He said his Ministry was currently
collecting comments from other ministries on proposed new
terms of reference for a series of meetings to fill the role
of the Quadripartite Meetings on the security situation in
Gali. He said there would be a meeting on the Sigua
investigation August 6, and it was important to get this
investigation and the Quadripartite meetings started quickly.
PERRY
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM GG
SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA'S MEETING WITH STATE MINISTER FOR
CONFLICT RESOLUTION BAKRADZE
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Mark X. Perry for reasons 1.4(b
&d).
Summary
--------------
1. (C) David Bakradze, Georgia's new State Minister for
Conflict Resolution, told EUR DAS Bryza July 27 that the
Georgian government was concerned UNOMIG and the Group of
Friends had lost "strategic focus" over Abkhazia, as
reflected in a recent UN report criticizing Georgia for minor
issues, while the Abkhaz and Russians get relatively little
criticism for obstructing conflict resolution at a broader
level. Bakradze agreed with Bryza that Georgia can regain
the initiative by focusing on the issue of internally
displaced persons (IDPs) from Abkhazia, thereby drawing a
clear distinction between Kosovo and Abkhazia as we head into
UN Security Council discussion of renewing the mandate of the
UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) in October. On South
Ossetia, Bakradze said Georgia would continue its active
efforts to engage the de facto authorities in the ongoing
process of defining the region's autonomous status. End
Summary.
In Search of Momentum
--------------
2. (C) The newly appointed Bakradze told Bryza and Charge
that the Georgian government, from President Saakashvili on
down, was unhappy with the current dynamic regarding
Abkhazia. He said Russian behavior in Abkhazia was becoming
more aggressive by the day, with the most recent example
being a Russian Deputy Prime Minister's statement that Russia
would use Abkhazia in its plan for the 2014 Winter Olympics
in Sochi. Bakradze said that all signs from Moscow --
including rhetoric in the Russian media -- suggested that
Russia was approaching a "critical point" in Abkhazia,
leading either to "military buildup or recognition."
Bakradze acknowledged that it was unlikely the Russians
genuinely wanted to recognize Abkhazia -- something that
would worsen their internal headaches in the north Caucasus
-- but he feared that Russian President Putin was becoming a
hostage to his own rhetoric on the issue. In Bakradze's
analysis, Putin may have raised the prospect of Abkhazia
recognition as a tool to discourage Kosovo independence, but
his comments have hardened Russian public opinion on
Abkhazia, and at a certain point it may become impossible for
Putin not to follow through on his threats.
3. (C) Given this danger, Bakradze said it was very
disappointing that the UN Secretary General has chosen to
focus on minor issues, such as the Georgians' establishment
of a Patriot youth camp in Ganmukhuri, near the
Abkhaz-controlled Gali region, and the disappearance of Gali
de facto election official David Sigua. Bryza said the U.S.
position is opposition to ethnic cleansing, and Bakradze
strongly agreed. He said recent comments by Abkhaz "foreign
minister" Sergei Shamba that Abkhaz and Georgians could not
live together amounted to a continuation of ethnic cleansing:
the de facto authorities had expelled the majority
population, declared independence for those who remained, and
were now calling on the international community to recognize
it. Bryza agreed, noting that we were unwilling to permit
Shamba to come to New York in the current circumstances.
Bakradze expressed concern that the Abkhaz argument, however
illogical, might make inroads among the Europeans.
4. (C) Bakradze agreed with Bryza that in the run-up to the
October Security Council debate, Georgia should keep the
focus squarely on the IDPs and the importance of not
legitimizing ethnic cleansing. He said IDPs should have a
genuine right of return to all of Abkhazia, stressing that
the return of some Georgians to the Gali district was
occurring only because the Abkhaz did not have the resources
to prevent it, not because of Abkhaz goodwill. He expressed
hope that with the help of the USG, the Georgian government
could overcome the current sense of a loss of strategic
direction by emphasizing the right of return for the IDPs,
the human rights problems in Abkhazia, and the need for
security mechanisms such as international police. Bakradze's
deputy Ruslan Abashidze said Georgia would continue to push
for "go and see" visits by IDPs to their properties in
Abkhaz-controlled areas outside of Gali, as foreseen in a
1994 agreement. On the question of a UNHCR census of IDPs,
Bakradze said Georgia had no objection to counting in
principle, but was concerned that a count that started in
Gali would be used politically by the Abkhaz authorities, and
would miss the large numbers of IDPs who were now living
outside of Georgia. Bakradze said he intended to travel to
Berlin, Paris, and Washington prior to October, and would
also work closely with Group of Friends ambassadors in
Tbilisi.
Spelling Out South Ossetian Autonomy
TBILISI 00002063 002 OF 002
--------------
5. (C) Bakradze noted that two key South Ossetia-related
events on his calendar in his early days as Minister were a
meeting of the Commission on South Ossetian autonomy in Kurta
July 28, and a Joint Control Commission meeting in Tbilisi
August 9-10. He also mentioned a Steering Committee meeting
on August 2. He said the Georgians were using all channels
-- public and private -- to appeal to the de facto
authorities to take part in the autonomy discussions. In
addition to written invitations, Bakradze said he had sent
people to Tskhinvali to hold personal meetings, but they were
stopped by de facto security forces. Bakradze stressed that
Georgia was not undertaking the autonomy process as a vehicle
for Dmitry Sanakoyev, but as something for the whole region;
Sanakoyev, he said, was "already on our side" and the
important thing now was to appeal to others in South Ossetia.
American Corners and Quadripartite Meetings
--------------
6. (C) On other subjects, Bakradze's reaction was generally
positive to the idea of opening one or more American Corners
in Abkhazia, provided it did not in any way recognize the de
facto authorities. He said the government was currently
considering a similar proposal from the EU. He stressed that
it should be made clear that any such initiatives were
extensions of existing programs in Georgia, not new bilateral
U.S.-Abkhaz programs. He said his Ministry was currently
collecting comments from other ministries on proposed new
terms of reference for a series of meetings to fill the role
of the Quadripartite Meetings on the security situation in
Gali. He said there would be a meeting on the Sigua
investigation August 6, and it was important to get this
investigation and the Quadripartite meetings started quickly.
PERRY