Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TBILISI1976
2007-08-08 13:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tbilisi
Cable title:
DAS BRYZA MEETS WITH PARLIAMENTARY LEADERS
VZCZCXRO4797 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHSI #1976/01 2201302 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 081302Z AUG 07 FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7238 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 001976
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR DAS BRYZA, EUR/CARC, AND DRL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM GG RU
SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA MEETS WITH PARLIAMENTARY LEADERS
REF: TBILISI 1638
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Mark X. Perry for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 001976
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR DAS BRYZA, EUR/CARC, AND DRL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM GG RU
SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA MEETS WITH PARLIAMENTARY LEADERS
REF: TBILISI 1638
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Mark X. Perry for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).
1. (C) Summary: On July 27, EUR DAS Matt Bryza met with
influential majority Members of Parliament. Saakashvili
insider Giga Bokeria complained that the recent UN report
on the situation in Abkhazia was unbalanced. Bryza argued
that the UNOMIG Joint Fact Finding Group (JFFG) report made
a strong case regarding Russian responsibility in the March
11 Upper Kodori bombing. He stressed that Georgia must
continue to work constructively with the UN and OSCE
regarding the separatist conflicts. Bryza affirmed that a
Membership Action Plan (MAP) for NATO before the 2008
meeting in Bucharest is the mutual goal of the USG and
GOG. Bokeria, supported by all the others, expressed
skepticism about the idea of an American Corner in
Abkhazia, fearing it would be seen as USG support for
independence aspirations of the de facto authorities.
Turning to South Ossetia, Bryza praised the Georgian
approach, but cautioned against the GOG embracing Sanakoyev
too closely. Bryza advised the GOG to work closely with
the OSCE to improve conditions in South Ossetia. On
elections, Bokeria and the others said that the government
would likely lower the threshold from seven to five percent
to enter Parliament, but argued that the majoritarian
system is the only way to ensure opposition voices in
Parliament and that a professional Central Election
Commission (CEC) keeps politics out of the technical
running of the elections (reftel). End Summary.
--------------
Abkhazia - Pointing Fingers
--------------
2. (C) On July 27, DAS Matt Bryza and Charge met with
influential United National Movement (UNM) Members of
Parliament, Giga Bokeria (Deputy Chair of the Legal Issues
Committee),Nick Rurua (Deputy Chair of the Defense and
Security Committee),Nino Nakashidze (Deputy Chair of the
Foreign Relations Committee),and Irina Kurtadze (Chairman
of the Speaker's Cabinet). Saakashvili insider Bokeria
dominated the conversation. He stressed that the
Government of Georgia (GOG) believes the recent UN interim
report on the situation in Abkhazia is prejudiced against
Georgia. He claimed there is no mention of ethnic
cleansing by the de facto Abkhaz authorities, forced
conscription of ethnic Georgians into the Abkhaz army, or
of the dire human rights situation in Gali. The MPs
complained that instead the GOG was singled out for
provoking the situation with a youth camp, something that
was in fact positive and needed. Bryza countered that the
recent United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)
Joint Fact Finding Group (JFFG) report was a victory for
Georgia, clearly suggesting that only Russia could have
been responsible for the March 11 attack.
3. (C) Bryza stressed that Georgia has played a smart hand
regarding Abkhazia, and must continue to drive a wedge
between the Abkhaz authorities and Russia. He said Georgia
must continue to work in the UN and OSCE to improve
Georgia's standing in Europe. Citing concerns of the
potential for an unintended accident or provocation caused
by young Georgians at the new youth camp established by the
GOG on the north side of the Enguri River, he said the camp's
provocative location undercut Georgia's diplomatic position
in NATO and the UN. Rurua and Bokeria complained
that they "don't have much time" to counter Russian
propaganda against Georgia. Bryza countered that Georgia
needed to slow down, perhaps focusing first on resolving the
South Ossetia conflict, which was moving in the right
direction. Next, Georgia should advance its NATO-MAP
aspirations. With South Ossetia out of the way and MAP on
the way, Tbilisi would find the Abkhazia conflict more
manageable. Bryza reaffirmed the USG's enduring support for
Georgia's territorial integrity, and would try to deter
Russian recognition of Abkhazia (in the context of Kosovo) by
arguing: (1) recognition of Abkhazia would open a Pandora's
Box in the North as well as South Caucasus; and (2) neither
Abkhazia nor any political entity can garner legitimacy on
the foundation of ethnic cleansing. Until the IDP issue is
resolved, any Abkhaz claims of independence on the basis of a
referendum held while hundreds of thousands of ethnic
Georgians were disenfranchised will remain illegitimate.
Finally, Bryza reassured the group that a Membership Action
Plan (MAP) for NATO before the 2008 meeting in Bucharest is
the mutual goal of the GOG and USG. He told the group that
MAP will greatly increase Georgian ability to withstand
Russian pressure. In cautioning against further
provocation by the GOG, Bryza advised that the Olympics in
TBILISI 00001976 002 OF 003
Sochi may also moderate Russian action in the region.
--------------
Possible USG Assistance?
--------------
4. (C) Charge suggested the idea of establishing two
American Corners in Abkhazia, one in Sokhumi and one in
Gali, which could improve the standing of the USG in the
region and serve as a conduit for information and political
reporting. Bokeria said he personally opposed the idea,
fearing it would be seen as USG support for the de facto
Abkhaz authorities. Rurua and Nakashidze agreed. Charge
advised that five American Corners are already operating
throughout Georgia, and this could be a natural extension
of the program in Georgia's internationally-recognized
territory. Bokeria said the GOG is in the process of
considering a similar EU proposal. The condition on that
proposal would likely be that any information center in
Abkhazia follow the opening of other centers in Georgia.
Although clearly not a supporter of the idea, he indicated
that, if agreed, this could be one way to consider the
opening of an American Corner as well.
--------------
South Ossetia - Close, But Not Too Close
--------------
5. (C) Bryza said he agree with Georgian thinking that the
conflict in South Ossetia could be resolved first, enabling
Abkhazia to follow. Bryza encouraged the GOG to resolve
the water issue in South Ossetia, and to work closely with
the OSCE to improve living conditions there. Bokeria said
Kokoity
is blocking any resolution of the matter. Bryza advised
the USG will push the issue at the OSCE. In the meantime,
he suggested, the GOG should let Sanakoyev gather ethnic
Ossetian support and not embrace him too tightly as a puppet.
Only through an organic process of gaining the support of
local Ossetians can Sanakoyev develop political legitimacy in
South Ossetia as well as Europe.
-------------- --------------
Elections and Representation - No Deal For The Opposition
-------------- --------------
6. (C) Bryza said that NATO Allies would look closely at
the upcoming 2008 elections in gauging how quickly to proceed
with Georgia's NATO aspirations. He asked Bokeria about
the opposition's request for electoral reforms (reftel),
and mentioned the recent Parliamentary elections in Turkey
as a positive development. Now the Turkish
Parliament is much more representative of that country's
diverse population, with the AK Party's number of seats in
parliament more closely reflecting the percentage of the vote
it received in the election. Could not such a development
also
benefit Georgia, and allow for a viable opposition to emerge?
7. (C) Bokeria expressed frustration (as Speaker Burjanadze
did later - septel) that now that the majority is willing
to agree to opposition complaints about the 7 percent
threshold, they say that this issue is no longer important
and have raised two others instead. On the opposition
criticism of the majoritarian system, he said we will "not
give away our majority, and a strong party could still
compete" under the proposed system. Bokeria claimed that
the majoritarian system was in fact put in place to ensure
that the opposition would receive representation in
Parliament. Without it, he said, the ruling party would
take every single seat. PolChief mentioned OSCE concern
that the electoral system could be more representative, and
asked if it could be, which in turn would build Georgia's
diplomatic support in Europe. Bokeria said lowering the
threshold
would address that concern. Bryza asked why the UNM would
not want to adapt electoral procedures to reflect a less
managed - albeit European-standard - system, and thereby
garner more political support in Europe. He claimed that the
most recent polls of at
least 70% support for the UNM reflect the composition of
Parliament, and that it represents the electorate.
(Comment: Opposition MPs gave Bryza a figure of 30% support
for the UNM, but approximately 60% support for President
Saakashvili. In the October 2006 local elections, UNM
received 66.5 percent of the vote in Tbilisi and 77 percent
in the regions. End Comment.)
8. (U) Bryza thanked the group and congratulated them on
the enactment of the bill to ban ex-parte communication in
court proceedings, and encouraged the implementation of
TBILISI 00001976 003 OF 003
this and other legislation on judicial reform.
9. (U) DAS Bryza cleared this cable.
PERRY
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR DAS BRYZA, EUR/CARC, AND DRL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM GG RU
SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA MEETS WITH PARLIAMENTARY LEADERS
REF: TBILISI 1638
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Mark X. Perry for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).
1. (C) Summary: On July 27, EUR DAS Matt Bryza met with
influential majority Members of Parliament. Saakashvili
insider Giga Bokeria complained that the recent UN report
on the situation in Abkhazia was unbalanced. Bryza argued
that the UNOMIG Joint Fact Finding Group (JFFG) report made
a strong case regarding Russian responsibility in the March
11 Upper Kodori bombing. He stressed that Georgia must
continue to work constructively with the UN and OSCE
regarding the separatist conflicts. Bryza affirmed that a
Membership Action Plan (MAP) for NATO before the 2008
meeting in Bucharest is the mutual goal of the USG and
GOG. Bokeria, supported by all the others, expressed
skepticism about the idea of an American Corner in
Abkhazia, fearing it would be seen as USG support for
independence aspirations of the de facto authorities.
Turning to South Ossetia, Bryza praised the Georgian
approach, but cautioned against the GOG embracing Sanakoyev
too closely. Bryza advised the GOG to work closely with
the OSCE to improve conditions in South Ossetia. On
elections, Bokeria and the others said that the government
would likely lower the threshold from seven to five percent
to enter Parliament, but argued that the majoritarian
system is the only way to ensure opposition voices in
Parliament and that a professional Central Election
Commission (CEC) keeps politics out of the technical
running of the elections (reftel). End Summary.
--------------
Abkhazia - Pointing Fingers
--------------
2. (C) On July 27, DAS Matt Bryza and Charge met with
influential United National Movement (UNM) Members of
Parliament, Giga Bokeria (Deputy Chair of the Legal Issues
Committee),Nick Rurua (Deputy Chair of the Defense and
Security Committee),Nino Nakashidze (Deputy Chair of the
Foreign Relations Committee),and Irina Kurtadze (Chairman
of the Speaker's Cabinet). Saakashvili insider Bokeria
dominated the conversation. He stressed that the
Government of Georgia (GOG) believes the recent UN interim
report on the situation in Abkhazia is prejudiced against
Georgia. He claimed there is no mention of ethnic
cleansing by the de facto Abkhaz authorities, forced
conscription of ethnic Georgians into the Abkhaz army, or
of the dire human rights situation in Gali. The MPs
complained that instead the GOG was singled out for
provoking the situation with a youth camp, something that
was in fact positive and needed. Bryza countered that the
recent United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)
Joint Fact Finding Group (JFFG) report was a victory for
Georgia, clearly suggesting that only Russia could have
been responsible for the March 11 attack.
3. (C) Bryza stressed that Georgia has played a smart hand
regarding Abkhazia, and must continue to drive a wedge
between the Abkhaz authorities and Russia. He said Georgia
must continue to work in the UN and OSCE to improve
Georgia's standing in Europe. Citing concerns of the
potential for an unintended accident or provocation caused
by young Georgians at the new youth camp established by the
GOG on the north side of the Enguri River, he said the camp's
provocative location undercut Georgia's diplomatic position
in NATO and the UN. Rurua and Bokeria complained
that they "don't have much time" to counter Russian
propaganda against Georgia. Bryza countered that Georgia
needed to slow down, perhaps focusing first on resolving the
South Ossetia conflict, which was moving in the right
direction. Next, Georgia should advance its NATO-MAP
aspirations. With South Ossetia out of the way and MAP on
the way, Tbilisi would find the Abkhazia conflict more
manageable. Bryza reaffirmed the USG's enduring support for
Georgia's territorial integrity, and would try to deter
Russian recognition of Abkhazia (in the context of Kosovo) by
arguing: (1) recognition of Abkhazia would open a Pandora's
Box in the North as well as South Caucasus; and (2) neither
Abkhazia nor any political entity can garner legitimacy on
the foundation of ethnic cleansing. Until the IDP issue is
resolved, any Abkhaz claims of independence on the basis of a
referendum held while hundreds of thousands of ethnic
Georgians were disenfranchised will remain illegitimate.
Finally, Bryza reassured the group that a Membership Action
Plan (MAP) for NATO before the 2008 meeting in Bucharest is
the mutual goal of the GOG and USG. He told the group that
MAP will greatly increase Georgian ability to withstand
Russian pressure. In cautioning against further
provocation by the GOG, Bryza advised that the Olympics in
TBILISI 00001976 002 OF 003
Sochi may also moderate Russian action in the region.
--------------
Possible USG Assistance?
--------------
4. (C) Charge suggested the idea of establishing two
American Corners in Abkhazia, one in Sokhumi and one in
Gali, which could improve the standing of the USG in the
region and serve as a conduit for information and political
reporting. Bokeria said he personally opposed the idea,
fearing it would be seen as USG support for the de facto
Abkhaz authorities. Rurua and Nakashidze agreed. Charge
advised that five American Corners are already operating
throughout Georgia, and this could be a natural extension
of the program in Georgia's internationally-recognized
territory. Bokeria said the GOG is in the process of
considering a similar EU proposal. The condition on that
proposal would likely be that any information center in
Abkhazia follow the opening of other centers in Georgia.
Although clearly not a supporter of the idea, he indicated
that, if agreed, this could be one way to consider the
opening of an American Corner as well.
--------------
South Ossetia - Close, But Not Too Close
--------------
5. (C) Bryza said he agree with Georgian thinking that the
conflict in South Ossetia could be resolved first, enabling
Abkhazia to follow. Bryza encouraged the GOG to resolve
the water issue in South Ossetia, and to work closely with
the OSCE to improve living conditions there. Bokeria said
Kokoity
is blocking any resolution of the matter. Bryza advised
the USG will push the issue at the OSCE. In the meantime,
he suggested, the GOG should let Sanakoyev gather ethnic
Ossetian support and not embrace him too tightly as a puppet.
Only through an organic process of gaining the support of
local Ossetians can Sanakoyev develop political legitimacy in
South Ossetia as well as Europe.
-------------- --------------
Elections and Representation - No Deal For The Opposition
-------------- --------------
6. (C) Bryza said that NATO Allies would look closely at
the upcoming 2008 elections in gauging how quickly to proceed
with Georgia's NATO aspirations. He asked Bokeria about
the opposition's request for electoral reforms (reftel),
and mentioned the recent Parliamentary elections in Turkey
as a positive development. Now the Turkish
Parliament is much more representative of that country's
diverse population, with the AK Party's number of seats in
parliament more closely reflecting the percentage of the vote
it received in the election. Could not such a development
also
benefit Georgia, and allow for a viable opposition to emerge?
7. (C) Bokeria expressed frustration (as Speaker Burjanadze
did later - septel) that now that the majority is willing
to agree to opposition complaints about the 7 percent
threshold, they say that this issue is no longer important
and have raised two others instead. On the opposition
criticism of the majoritarian system, he said we will "not
give away our majority, and a strong party could still
compete" under the proposed system. Bokeria claimed that
the majoritarian system was in fact put in place to ensure
that the opposition would receive representation in
Parliament. Without it, he said, the ruling party would
take every single seat. PolChief mentioned OSCE concern
that the electoral system could be more representative, and
asked if it could be, which in turn would build Georgia's
diplomatic support in Europe. Bokeria said lowering the
threshold
would address that concern. Bryza asked why the UNM would
not want to adapt electoral procedures to reflect a less
managed - albeit European-standard - system, and thereby
garner more political support in Europe. He claimed that the
most recent polls of at
least 70% support for the UNM reflect the composition of
Parliament, and that it represents the electorate.
(Comment: Opposition MPs gave Bryza a figure of 30% support
for the UNM, but approximately 60% support for President
Saakashvili. In the October 2006 local elections, UNM
received 66.5 percent of the vote in Tbilisi and 77 percent
in the regions. End Comment.)
8. (U) Bryza thanked the group and congratulated them on
the enactment of the bill to ban ex-parte communication in
court proceedings, and encouraged the implementation of
TBILISI 00001976 003 OF 003
this and other legislation on judicial reform.
9. (U) DAS Bryza cleared this cable.
PERRY