MERABISHVILI ON WHAT'S NEXT IN SOUTH OSSETIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 001605 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR DAS BRYZA & EUR/CARC E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL GG SUBJECT: MERABISHVILI ON WHAT'S NEXT IN SOUTH OSSETIA REF: TBILISI 1562 Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4(b)&(d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Georgian Minister of Internal Affairs Vano Merabishvili told the Ambassador July 5 that while he thought tensions would continue in South Ossetia, he did not expect a major escalation. He said the Georgians hoped to be able to recruit a number of prominent de facto officials at the "deputy minister" level to jump ship and join the temporary administrative unit of Dmitry Sanakoyev. He said de facto leader Eduard Kokoity was aware that his position was eroding, but Merabishvili expressed doubt that Kokoity had the ability to carry out a major provocation, both because of the controlling presence of Russian FSB officers in his administration, and because South Ossetian militia would be reluctant to get into an overly bloody fight with the Georgians. The Ambassador stressed the importance of giving Sanakoyev real autonomy and sufficient time to build his local base of support. Merabishvili expressed disappointment that Sochi had won the 2014 Winter Olympics, predicting this would lead to a greater Russian financial stake in Abkhazia. End Summary. South Ossetia Simmering, Not Boiling Over -------------- ¶2. (C) Merabishvili told the Ambassador in a lunch meeting that tensions were likely to continue in South Ossetia, stoked by such things as a recent Russian shipment to the de facto authorities of mobile artillery and other equipment, including one additional GRAD missile. Merabishvili said he was highly skeptical of efforts to cut a Russian-Georgian deal to resolve the conflict, because he did not believe the Russians wanted to change the status quo. While acknowledging that a number of points of tension had arisen recently in South Ossetia, Merabishvili said he did not believe the situation would escalate out of control, in part because the Russian FSB ran things in South Ossetia through its officers in high positions in Tskhinvali. He added that Kokoity's first preference might be an all-out war, even one that the Georgians won, because that would assure him a comfortable future in Russia. But Merabishvili did not think Kokoity was strong enough to carry out a major escalation, such as the killing of a large number of Georgians. He said South Ossetian forces were averse to fatalities, and it would be hard to convince them to carry out extreme orders. ¶3. (C) Merabishvili said Sanakoyev's position was strengthening daily, and he pointed to Sanakoyev's recent speech in Brussels (reftel) as an important step -- something the de facto authorities implicitly acknowledged when they shut off power in Tskhinvali in a laughable attempt to suppress news of the speech. He said Sanakoyev and the Georgians were appealing to influential figures in the de facto administration -- mostly deputy ministers since the ministers are Russians -- to join Sanakoyev's team. He said that many were interested, despite intense pressure from the FSB to prevent them from switching. Merabishvili said that there was a good chance -- although he could "not say a 50-50 chance" -- that a sizable number of officials would switch sides soon. He said that if given a free choice, the majority of South Ossetians would go with Sanakoyev. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador asked how plans were going for consultations between the Georgians and Sanakoyev on the details of autonomy, and Merabishvili said the plans remained unchanged but there was currently some dispute within the Georgian government about which ministry -- Merabishvili's and/or others -- should have the lead on consultations. Merabishvili said that unfortunately the Ministry of Internal Affairs was still serving as the intermediary between Sanakoyev and others both in and out of the government, but he hoped to encourage the development of direct relationships between Sanakoyev and other ministries. Merabishvili added that Jemal Karkusov, Minister of Internal Affairs of Sanakoyev's administrative unit, had gone along on Merabishvili's recent trip to Lithuania. He said Karkusov had been overwhelmed by the welcome he had received from the Lithuanian government, far better than the humiliating treatment Karkusov had received in Moscow during his time as de facto minister of internal affairs in Tskhinvali. The Ambassador stressed that Sanakoyev would benefit politically from a specific identification of the powers held by his administrative unit, and from sufficient time to build his support with the population. From Russia with Cash -------------- ¶5. (C) Turning to Abkhazia, Merabishvili said he personally TBILISI 00001605 002 OF 002 did not believe Russia would recognize the independence of Abkhazia, explaining that Russia's interests are best served by the status quo. He said that the awarding of the 2014 Winter Olympics to Sochi -- announced less than a day before -- was unwelcome news to the Georgians. Merabishvili said he understood Russia had spent into the billions of dollars in various countries to win support for Sochi's bid. He predicted that the Olympics would drive up property values around Sochi, leading more Russians to buy land and to invest in neighboring Abkhazia. He said this would have negative consequences for Georgia over time, because such financial interests often played a key role in determining Russian policies. (Note: Merabishvili's private comments contrast with public statements by Saakashvili, made both before and after the Olympic decision, expressing Georgian support for Sochi's bid. End Note.) Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) As in previous conversations, Merabishvili gave an upbeat assessment of the growth of Sanakoyev's popularity in South Ossetia. We have heard markedly different assessments on this subject from others with connections in South Ossetia, and it is difficult to determine the truth in the rigidly controlled environment in Tskhinvali. Some (but not all) OSCE Mission members are convinced that most South Ossetians see Sanakoyev as a traitor, and that this perception has been reinforced by the recent tensions over water, roads, and sniper fire between the two sides. Former Georgian Defense Minister Okruashvili, an old rival of Merabishvili's with little use for the Sanakoyev project, recently told the Ambassador that the Georgians had "failed" in their efforts to bring prominent members of the de facto government over to Sanakoyev's side. Merabishvili clearly remains hopeful that key de facto officials will defect, and the outcome of this recruitment process may be a useful measure of which way the tide is turning. TEFFT