ANTADZE ON PROSPECTS FOR DIALOGUE WITH ABKHAZIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 001213 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR DAS BRYZA AND EUR/CARC E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV GG SUBJECT: ANTADZE ON PROSPECTS FOR DIALOGUE WITH ABKHAZIA REF: A. TBILISI 861 ¶B. TBILISI 459 Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4(b)&(d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Merab Antadze told the Ambassador May 22 that Abkhaz de facto officials appeared to have decided to block contacts with Georgia at virtually every level of society, rebuffing Georgian requests to discuss the security situation in Gali and other issues. He said Georgia strongly opposed inviting the Abkhaz to a meeting in New York, saying this invitation should be made only after the Abkhaz had taken constructive actions. Antadze responded positively to variety of ideas for U.S. initiatives in the separatist regions, including American Corners in Gali and Sukhumi, taking a touring photographic exhibit to Sukhumi, removal of dangerous radioactive sources from Sukhumi, and a concert in South Ossetia. He also responded favorably to the idea of a joint investigation with the Abkhaz of the disappearance of de facto official David Sigua, saying Georgia favored reinvigorating joint investigative mechanisms for a broad range of incidents. On South Ossetia, Antadze said the Kokoity regime appeared to be getting conflicting advice from the Russian officials inside the South Ossetian administration and those in Russia -- suggesting that Russia has no clear policy on the region. End Summary. Don't Call Me, I Won't Call You -------------- ¶2. (C) Meeting on the eve of the Ambassador's trip to Abkhazia, Antadze said that after the Geneva meeting in February, the Abkhaz had turned away all Georgian attempts to arrange meetings. He noted that the Georgians had pushed for a meeting to discuss the security situation in Gali, as was agreed at Geneva, and for a meeting on economic subjects between Prime Minister Noghaideli and de facto prime minister Ankvab, but these attempts produced no results. He noted that the Abkhaz had also blocked joint study tours and other events at the societal level. Antadze said he believed the refusals came on the recommendation of "Russian supporters" inside the Abkhaz administration. He noted that when the Georgians had expressed an interest in a meeting between President Saakashvili and de facto president Bagapsh, Bagapsh had sent a message that such a meeting would be "negatively understood by the Russian side and internal forces." ¶3. (C) Antadze asked for U.S. support for the Georgians' newest initiative to re-start dialogue, a call for a meeting in Geneva to discuss the return of internally displaced persons and security issues. He said the Georgians strongly opposed a meeting with the Abkhaz in New York because they feared that the Russians could use it in their propaganda, preparing the way for a declaration that Abkhazia is an independent state. The Ambassador stressed that Washington had made no decision on a New York invitation, and that the decision would depend in part on the restoring of dialogue between the two sides. ¶4. (C) Antadze said Georgia was attempting to restore dialogue in other ways as well: trying to arrange a meeting of the steering committee for the EC-led economic rehabilitation projects in Abkhazia (which the Abkhaz have continually delayed for "technical" reasons),and seeking to re-start the Quadripartite Meetings (QPMs) in a new format that the CIS peacekeepers do not control. (Note: As noted in reftels, UN officials have previously told us the Georgians have delayed resumption of the QPMs by failing to appoint a representative, as they agreed in Geneva.) Asked by the Ambassador about a possible joint investigation of the Sigua disappearance, Antadze said Georgia supported the reactivation of a joint Georgian-Abkhaz investigative group that had could work on the Sigua case and a variety of others. He added this mechanism, which he said had stopped its activity after Russian opposition made it impossible for the group to work freely, was one issue he wanted to discuss with the Abkhaz in a meeting on the Gali security situation. Supportive of U.S. Program Ideas -------------- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador raised a number of ideas for programs the USG might support in Abkhazia, and Antadze responded favorably to them all. The Ambassador noted that expanding our program of American Corners in Georgian cities to Gali and Sukhumi could expose young people in Abkhazia to the U.S. Antadze agreed, saying he personally believed that having a "direct source of information" could help break the isolation in those areas, and he encouraged the Ambassador to mention the idea to the Abkhaz, stressing that it was an expansion of TBILISI 00001213 002 OF 002 programs in Georgia proper. He added that it might be possible to ask the Abkhaz to take some action in exchange for the facilities, and stressed the importance of all people having free access to them. Antadze said residents of Abkhazia would appreciate being able to see a U.S.-sponsored photographic exhibit that has already toured a number of Georgian cities. He reiterated his support for the removal of four radioactive sources in Sukhumi to a facility in Mtskheta. The Ambassador noted that while we had an agreement in principle from the sides and a source of funding, there had also been talk that the Abkhaz were pursuing removal to Russia. The Ambassador said that Deputy Foreign Minister Chechelashvili had recently told DCM that the most important thing for the Georgians was to get the sources out of Abkhazia, where their security could not be assured. Sanakoyev Slowly on the Rise -------------- ¶6. (C) Turning to South Ossetia, Antadze said he had requested a recent visit by Russian envoy Yuri Popov after it became clear that Russian-led peacekeepers were not reacting to incidents, thereby allowing the situation to escalate. He said that as a result of Georgian demands the peacekeepers had finally acted in a few specific cases, although he noted that such Georgian interventions should not be necessary. He said that it was clear from recent events that Russia does not have a clear position on South Ossetia. Antadze said South Ossetian leader Kokoity was urged by his advisors representing Russian special services to escalate tensions to a point that the Russian peacekeepers would be brought into the equation, perhaps as a justification for increasing the number of peacekeepers. Messages from Russia itself, Antadze added, were long-delayed but in the end contradicted the advice of Russians based in Tskhinvali. ¶7. (C) Antadze said the current dynamic was not favorable for Kokoity: public opinion is slowly moving toward the pro-Georgian Dmitry Sanakoyev, and if the situation remains stable this trend will increase, especially as Georgia starts serious economic and social development projects in Sanakoyev's area and as Sanakoyev gains stature from meeting with foreign officials. The recent "provocations" in South Ossetia, Antadze said, were designed to try to stop this dynamic. Antadze was supportive of the idea of staging a U.S.-sponsored bluegrass concert in a "neutral" location in South Ossetia, where people from both sides could attend. If no appropriate site could be found, Antadze suggested holding the concert in one of the Georgian villages. TEFFT