ARNAULT: ABKHAZ LEADERSHIP IN ANGRY MOOD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 001141 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR DAS BRYZA AND EUR/CARC E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV GG SUBJECT: ARNAULT: ABKHAZ LEADERSHIP IN ANGRY MOOD Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4(b)&(d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Special Representative of the UN Secretary General Jean Arnault told the Group of Friends Ambassadors May 15 that Abkhaz de facto president Bagapsh is angry and politically weakened in the aftermath of his decision to release three Georgian students May 3 without any corresponding Georgian action on the case of missing Abkhaz official David Sigua. Arnault said Bagapsh appears ready to cut off all contacts with Georgia, something Arnault fears will increase the potential for a miscalculation that could lead to a major confrontation during the "hot summer" ahead. Arnault said he would inquire with the Georgians on Sigua, and would undertake initiatives on the ground designed to reduce the risk of a miscalculation. Given the threat of a complete break in communication between the sides, Arnault recommended a visit to Tbilisi and Sukhumi by senior representatives of the Friends from capitals in order to engage at the level of Saakashvili and Bagapsh. End Summary. A "Botched Exchange"? -------------- ¶2. (C) Arnault told Ambassadors and other representatives from the U.S., Russian, German, British, and French embassies that he had gone to Sukhumi late last week with the hope of reactivating dialogue between the two sides, especially on the security situation. Instead, he found Bagapsh in an "angry mood" over what Bagapsh suggested was a botched attempt to exchange the three Georgian students, whom the Abkhaz detained along the cease-fire line in March, for Sigua, who was abducted by unidentified perpetrators in Gali in February. Bagapsh was particularly unhappy that -- his "gesture of goodwill" in releasing the students was taken by the Georgian government as an opportunity to criticize the Abkhaz authorities; -- as of his meeting with Arnault March 10, Bagapsh had heard nothing about Sigua and was concerned he had been "tricked" by the Georgians; -- the Abkhaz political class was increasingly critical of him for giving something to the Georgians while getting nothing in return. ¶3. (C) In response to questions from the Friends about the students' release, Arnault said he understood that Aslan Smyrba, an ethnic Abkhaz who had previously served as mayor of Batumi in the Georgian region of Adjara, had served as an intermediary. The first two Abkhaz de facto officials Smyrba approached -- "foreign minister" Shamba and Gali district chief Kishmaria -- were reportedly skeptical of Smyrba and recommended against dealing with him in the absence of proof he could deliver Sigua. Then Smyrba got a meeting with Bagapsh, who released the students within hours afterward. Arnault noted that the Georgians have consistently said they had nothing to do with Sigua's disappearance. He said it was not clear to what extent Smyrba had been authorized to speak on behalf of the Georgians or what he might have promised to the Abkhaz about Sigua. ¶4. (C) Arnault noted that Shamba -- a formidable figure in Abkhaz politics who has been seen in recent years as an ally of Bagapsh -- had formed a new NGO on March 12 together with two hardline foes of Bagapsh, de facto vice-president Raul Khajimba and general Vladimir Arshba. Arnault added that tough anti-Georgian rhetoric was increasing in Abkhazia, with political figures calling for something to be done in response to alleged Georgian actions. Arnault said Bagapsh had indicated to him that unless Sigua is released soon, he would cut off all dialogue with Georgia, including at the civil society level. Arnault said it was his impression that Bagapsh's disposition on this is "here to stay." Arnault said that a total collapse in the two sides' relationship would be a serious problem; with the likelihood of continued tensions and incidents in Kodori and Gali, the lack of communication would make it harder to prevent a "miscalculation" from escalating into a major confrontation. Next Steps for UN and Friends -------------- ¶5. (C) Arnault said he had requested meetings with Georgian President Saakashvili and Minister of Internal Affairs Merabishvili to get more information on their view of the Sigua case. To help reduce the risk of miscalculation, he said the UN would reactivate its post in Azhara, in the Upper Kodori Gorge, as soon as the weather permitted. He said the UN would also undertake two initiatives in Gali: a review of the security presence of each side, to determine if they are TBILISI 00001141 002 OF 002 exceeding the agreed limit of 600 personnel, and a permanent base in conjunction with the CIS peacekeepers near a youth camp that the Georgian government is building at the mouth of the Enguri River near the cease-fire line. ¶6. (C) Arnault said that while the idea of a Geneva-style meeting involving representatives of the two sides was a good idea in principle, he thought the more pressing need now was communication with the leaders on the two sides. In the absence of direct contact, he thought a visit by senior representatives of the Friends as soon as possible, to meet with Saakashvili and Bagapsh, would be the next best thing. The Friends reacted positively to the idea, while noting that it would require consultation with their capitals. Russian Embassy Counselor Vasily Korchmar claimed that he believed the key to dialogue was on the Georgian side; if given a signal from Tbilisi, he believed the Abkhaz would be ready to meet. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Everyone in the meeting noted that we do not know if the Georgians have Sigua or not, or if he is alive or dead. All also agreed that it is probably better for the Friends not to get involved in that question; Arnault said he thought the likelihood of Sigua's release was small, especially given the Georgians' declarations that they do not have him. In any case, Arnault's description of Bagapsh's internal political crisis raises the troubling prospect that the situation along the cease-fire line is even more tense and dangerous than we thought it was. During his visit to Abkhazia May 23, the Ambassador will encourage Bagapsh and other de facto officials to maintain lines of communication with the Georgians, as well as to undertake demilitarization and other steps to build confidence. We agree with Arnault that a visit by representatives of the Friends from capitals could help restore communication between the two sides' top decision-makers, something that may be essential to managing the fallout of provocative incidents. TEFFT