Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TASHKENT980
2007-05-18 10:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tashkent
Cable title:
UZBEKS ACKNOWLEDGE BALL IN THEIR COURT ON
VZCZCXRO9559 PP RUEHDBU DE RUEHNT #0980/01 1381035 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 181035Z MAY 07 FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7872 INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 3041 RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 9171 RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 3647 RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 3511
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TASHKENT 000980
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN AND S/CT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2017
TAGS: PTER PREL UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKS ACKNOWLEDGE BALL IN THEIR COURT ON
COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION
Classified By: CDA Brad Hanson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
-------
Summary
--------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TASHKENT 000980
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN AND S/CT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2017
TAGS: PTER PREL UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKS ACKNOWLEDGE BALL IN THEIR COURT ON
COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION
Classified By: CDA Brad Hanson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
--------------
Summary
--------------
1. (C) Working-level government contacts told a visiting S/CT
Regional Affairs Officer that Uzbekistan is ready to
cooperate with the United States on terrorism issues. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs' (MFA) U.S. Division Chief said
that he understands that the ball is in the Uzbeks' court for
responding to suggestions on how we can work together and
said that a response should be forthcoming "soon." Ministry
of Internal Affairs (MVD) representatives said that
Uzbekistan has the situation with religious extremists and
terrorists in hand, and is not in need of any major
assistance from the United States, emphasizing that the
government has chosen to deal with the issue primarily
through preventative measures. both MFA and MVD officials
said it would be helpful if the United States would provide
more information on terrorist groups operating in the region,
but had little to say when reminded that this is the same
type of information that Post needs from the Government of
Uzbekistan in order to calibrate its security posture. The
meetings broke no new ground; not surprising since only
President Karimov can authorize increased cooperation with
the United States, something Post believes he is unwilling to
do at this time. End summary.
--------------
MFA : Uzbekistan Interested in Cooperation
--------------
2. (C) Visiting S/CT Regional Affairs Officer and poloff met
with MFA U.S. Division Chief Ismat Fayzullaev May 4 to
discuss the status of U.S.-Uzbek cooperation on
counterterrorism. Fayzullaev used the meeting to assure
Emboffs that Uzbekistan remains engaged against terrorism and
is eager to resume cooperation with the United States.
Fayzullaev said that his government remains concerned about
the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, both of which show
that terrorism remains a threat to Uzbekistan. Despite this
threat, he complained, Uzbekistan is constantly criticized
over its counterterrorism efforts with the latest bad press
coming over the Government of Uzbekistan's decision to
extradite a Uygur "terrorist" with Canadian citizenship to
China.
3. (C) Fayzullaev acknowledged that the ball is in the
Government of Uzbekistan's court to respond to specific
suggestions made by SCA DAS Evan Feigenbaum on specific ways
that cooperation could be resumed, and said that a response
should be forthcoming "soon." (Comment: Fayzullaev
subsequently told poloff that he is not sure when the
response will be forwarded, as it has been sent "to the top"
for approval. End comment.) He said that cooperation would
of necessity start slowly since we were starting almost from
the beginning again. When asked what the Uzbeks hoped to
gain from counterterrorism cooperation, Fayzullaev responded
that the government would welcome increased information from
the U.S. on terrorists and terrorist groups in Central Asia.
Emboffs noted that as a step towards restarting cooperation
it would be useful for the GOU to agree to provide additional
security assets to the Embassy, as requested on multiple
occasions. Fayzullaev said he would convey the request to
appropriate authorities.
--------------
MVD: Situation Under Control
--------------
4. (C) Rothschild and poloff met with Abdumutal Zakurlaev,
Deputy Chief of the Ministry of Internal Affair's (MVD)
Counterterrorism Department, and Sergei Petrochenko, Head of
the CT Department's Religious Extremism branch, later on May
4. According to the MVD officers, the extremism situation in
Uzbekistan is "stable" since the Ministry has successfully
dealt with most Islamic Jihad Union and Hizb-ut-Tahrir
members in the country. Petrochenko said that his branch
keeps suspected extremists and their families under constant
observation, and that lists of people of concern are
distributed regularly to the leaders of mahallas
(neighborhoods),schools, and other social organizations.
(Comment: Petrochenko portrayed these institutions in the
most benevolent light possible, claiming that their main
functions include helping to guide extremists back to the
path of righteousness. This may be true in some cases, but
TASHKENT 00000980 002 OF 002
they also serve as an integral part of Uzbekistan's police
state by observing and reporting on individuals of concern to
the government and enforcing sanctions upon those who step
out of line through a combination of social pressure and
harassment. End comment.)
5. (C) Zakurlaev claimed that Uzbekistan has little problem
with Islamic radicalization in its prison population. He
attributed this to the government's efforts to "re-educate"
individuals sentenced on extremism charges. Every such
prisoner receives regular counseling, he claimed, and
Tashkent's Islamic University also conducts regular lectures
on Islam as a religion of peace. Zakurlaev said that MVD has
determined that it is best to "fight ideology with ideology"
as the result of information suggesting that the government's
re-education campaign is successful in over 90 percent of the
cases. (Comment: Zakurlaev appears to have left out major
parts of the government's "re-education" campaign, such as
isolating prisoners jailed on extremism charges away from
other prisoners and subjecting them to even harsher prison
regimes than faced by run-of-the-mill inmates. End comment.)
6. (C) Zakurlaev said that Uzbekistan is not in need of major
counterterrorism assistance. However, he said that the MVD
had found previous exchanges of information with the United
States to be useful and said that it would welcome an
exchange of operational information on terror groups in the
region. He said that the government would evaluate offers of
other assistance, such as training, on a case-by-case basis.
When Rothschild remarked that operational information sharing
from the government would be useful in calibrating our
security posture at Post, Zakurlaev said that a decision to
share such information would be made at a level above his;
Fayzullaev, who also attended the meeting, chimed in and said
such information sharing would be possible, but only after we
had rebuilt a relationship of trust between the countries.
--------------
Comment
--------------
7. (C) In Post's opinion these discussions broke no new
ground and brought no new opportunities to engage the Uzbeks
on counterterrorism cooperation. This is not surprising
because, empty working level professions of willingness to
work together aside, only President Islam Karimov can
authorize improved cooperation. Also, neither the MFA or MVD
is a major player in counterterrorism, which remains the
purview of the National Security Service. We have no doubt
that the Uzbeks will happily take all of the information,
equipment, and at least some types of training that we are
willing to provide them. However, we believe that Karimov is
not interested in, and will not permit a true cooperative
counterterrorism relationship with the United States at this
time.
HANSON
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN AND S/CT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2017
TAGS: PTER PREL UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKS ACKNOWLEDGE BALL IN THEIR COURT ON
COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION
Classified By: CDA Brad Hanson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
--------------
Summary
--------------
1. (C) Working-level government contacts told a visiting S/CT
Regional Affairs Officer that Uzbekistan is ready to
cooperate with the United States on terrorism issues. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs' (MFA) U.S. Division Chief said
that he understands that the ball is in the Uzbeks' court for
responding to suggestions on how we can work together and
said that a response should be forthcoming "soon." Ministry
of Internal Affairs (MVD) representatives said that
Uzbekistan has the situation with religious extremists and
terrorists in hand, and is not in need of any major
assistance from the United States, emphasizing that the
government has chosen to deal with the issue primarily
through preventative measures. both MFA and MVD officials
said it would be helpful if the United States would provide
more information on terrorist groups operating in the region,
but had little to say when reminded that this is the same
type of information that Post needs from the Government of
Uzbekistan in order to calibrate its security posture. The
meetings broke no new ground; not surprising since only
President Karimov can authorize increased cooperation with
the United States, something Post believes he is unwilling to
do at this time. End summary.
--------------
MFA : Uzbekistan Interested in Cooperation
--------------
2. (C) Visiting S/CT Regional Affairs Officer and poloff met
with MFA U.S. Division Chief Ismat Fayzullaev May 4 to
discuss the status of U.S.-Uzbek cooperation on
counterterrorism. Fayzullaev used the meeting to assure
Emboffs that Uzbekistan remains engaged against terrorism and
is eager to resume cooperation with the United States.
Fayzullaev said that his government remains concerned about
the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, both of which show
that terrorism remains a threat to Uzbekistan. Despite this
threat, he complained, Uzbekistan is constantly criticized
over its counterterrorism efforts with the latest bad press
coming over the Government of Uzbekistan's decision to
extradite a Uygur "terrorist" with Canadian citizenship to
China.
3. (C) Fayzullaev acknowledged that the ball is in the
Government of Uzbekistan's court to respond to specific
suggestions made by SCA DAS Evan Feigenbaum on specific ways
that cooperation could be resumed, and said that a response
should be forthcoming "soon." (Comment: Fayzullaev
subsequently told poloff that he is not sure when the
response will be forwarded, as it has been sent "to the top"
for approval. End comment.) He said that cooperation would
of necessity start slowly since we were starting almost from
the beginning again. When asked what the Uzbeks hoped to
gain from counterterrorism cooperation, Fayzullaev responded
that the government would welcome increased information from
the U.S. on terrorists and terrorist groups in Central Asia.
Emboffs noted that as a step towards restarting cooperation
it would be useful for the GOU to agree to provide additional
security assets to the Embassy, as requested on multiple
occasions. Fayzullaev said he would convey the request to
appropriate authorities.
--------------
MVD: Situation Under Control
--------------
4. (C) Rothschild and poloff met with Abdumutal Zakurlaev,
Deputy Chief of the Ministry of Internal Affair's (MVD)
Counterterrorism Department, and Sergei Petrochenko, Head of
the CT Department's Religious Extremism branch, later on May
4. According to the MVD officers, the extremism situation in
Uzbekistan is "stable" since the Ministry has successfully
dealt with most Islamic Jihad Union and Hizb-ut-Tahrir
members in the country. Petrochenko said that his branch
keeps suspected extremists and their families under constant
observation, and that lists of people of concern are
distributed regularly to the leaders of mahallas
(neighborhoods),schools, and other social organizations.
(Comment: Petrochenko portrayed these institutions in the
most benevolent light possible, claiming that their main
functions include helping to guide extremists back to the
path of righteousness. This may be true in some cases, but
TASHKENT 00000980 002 OF 002
they also serve as an integral part of Uzbekistan's police
state by observing and reporting on individuals of concern to
the government and enforcing sanctions upon those who step
out of line through a combination of social pressure and
harassment. End comment.)
5. (C) Zakurlaev claimed that Uzbekistan has little problem
with Islamic radicalization in its prison population. He
attributed this to the government's efforts to "re-educate"
individuals sentenced on extremism charges. Every such
prisoner receives regular counseling, he claimed, and
Tashkent's Islamic University also conducts regular lectures
on Islam as a religion of peace. Zakurlaev said that MVD has
determined that it is best to "fight ideology with ideology"
as the result of information suggesting that the government's
re-education campaign is successful in over 90 percent of the
cases. (Comment: Zakurlaev appears to have left out major
parts of the government's "re-education" campaign, such as
isolating prisoners jailed on extremism charges away from
other prisoners and subjecting them to even harsher prison
regimes than faced by run-of-the-mill inmates. End comment.)
6. (C) Zakurlaev said that Uzbekistan is not in need of major
counterterrorism assistance. However, he said that the MVD
had found previous exchanges of information with the United
States to be useful and said that it would welcome an
exchange of operational information on terror groups in the
region. He said that the government would evaluate offers of
other assistance, such as training, on a case-by-case basis.
When Rothschild remarked that operational information sharing
from the government would be useful in calibrating our
security posture at Post, Zakurlaev said that a decision to
share such information would be made at a level above his;
Fayzullaev, who also attended the meeting, chimed in and said
such information sharing would be possible, but only after we
had rebuilt a relationship of trust between the countries.
--------------
Comment
--------------
7. (C) In Post's opinion these discussions broke no new
ground and brought no new opportunities to engage the Uzbeks
on counterterrorism cooperation. This is not surprising
because, empty working level professions of willingness to
work together aside, only President Islam Karimov can
authorize improved cooperation. Also, neither the MFA or MVD
is a major player in counterterrorism, which remains the
purview of the National Security Service. We have no doubt
that the Uzbeks will happily take all of the information,
equipment, and at least some types of training that we are
willing to provide them. However, we believe that Karimov is
not interested in, and will not permit a true cooperative
counterterrorism relationship with the United States at this
time.
HANSON