UZBEKS "COMBATIVE" IN EU HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TASHKENT 000947 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN AND DRL E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM EUN UZ SUBJECT: UZBEKS "COMBATIVE" IN EU HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE REF: TASHKENT 937 Classified By: CDA BRAD HANSON, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Summary: The British Embassy Political Officer who observed the May 9 EU-Uzbekistan Human Rights Dialogue reported that the Uzbek side approached the talks with a "combative" attitude and treated the forum as a competition in which to score points. He noted that Uzbek officials engaged in frequent grandstanding and attempted to bog the talks down in generalities, blaming Europe and Western institutions for interfering in Uzbekistan's internal affairs. Overall, the British representative said, the talks produced no concrete results other than a non-specific Uzbek commitment to participate in further talks. This assessment contrasts somewhat with the recollection of the German Ambassador (reftel),whose government has staked considerable political clout on restarting a productive relationship with Uzbekistan during its EU Presidency. End summary. ¶2. (C) British Embassy Political Officer Ben Greenwood (protect),who took part in the EU-Uzbekistan Human Rights Dialogue on May 9 in Tashkent, told Poloff that the Government of Uzbekistan approached the eight-hour series of discussions with a "combative" attitude. An internal EU "flash summary" of the talks, which Greenwood shared with Poloff, characterized the atmosphere as "frank and sometimes heated." Throughout, according to Greenwood, Uzbek officials repeated their well-worn message to the West: Uzbekistan desires a "relationship between equals." It "will not be lectured to." It will reject all "politicized attempts to interfere in Uzbekistan's internal affairs." ¶3. (C) The EU delegation found the talks constructive in the sense that Uzbek officials were willing to discuss all issues raised by the EU side. The Uzbeks reportedly gave some indications that they were willing to cooperate with the EU by supporting human rights-related projects of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and judicial reform projects in particular. However, he said, the Uzbeks indulged in frequent grandstanding and stalled the discussion by dwelling on generalities. Q ¶4. (C) According to Greenwood, the internal EU memo on the talks exaggerates the Uzbek side's "readiness to admit deficits regarding freedom of expression/media." He said that the Uzbek interlocutors were unwilling to admit almost any faults at all in their approach to human rights. They reportedly insisted that all investigations and closures of international NGOs by the authorities have been normal law-enforcement actions. In response to EU questions on religious freedom, including questions on harassment of Jehovah's Witnesses, the Uzbeks replied that they were not aware of any harassment of religious groups. When the EU delegation bluntly suggested that the prosecution and imprisonment of many human rights activists seem politically motivated, the Uzbeks angrily replied that all "so-called human rights defenders" who have been imprisoned have been proven guilty of criminal activity in accordance with the law. They vehemently denied press reports that imprisoned Andijon activist Gulbahor Turayeva had undergone a second trial in which her prison sentence had been lengthened. The Uzbeks criticized alleged human rights violations in Europe, including poor treatment of Muslims and ethnic minorities. They also criticized past EU actions toward Uzbekistan as unwarranted interference in internal affairs. ¶5. (C) The Uzbeks affirmed their willingness to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to resume its prison monitoring program. But they accused ICRC of holding up negotiations and implied that ICRC was to blame for the continued suspension of prison visits. ICRC's Head of Regional Delegation told Poloff separately that his Mission is in fact planning a monitoring visit to Tashkent's main pre-trial detention facility (septel). However, he does not hold out great hopes of success, as he sees no genuine willingness on the part of the Uzbeks to cooperate with ICRC. However, the visit is planned for May 21, a week after the EU meets to decide on the future of its sanctions against Uzbekistan. Thus, ICRC avoids being used as a political pawn in the sanctions debate. ¶6. (C) Greenwood said that the May 9 talks produced no tangible results, other than a stated commitment by the TASHKENT 00000947 002 OF 002 Uzbeks to participate in a roundtable discussion at an indeterminate date with EU representatives and registered Uzbek human rights organizations. According to the internal EU summary of the talks, the Uzbeks also agreed to consider a follow-up roundtable in the next six months. ¶7. (C) Comment: The British report on the Human Rights Dialogue contrasted somewhat with the recollection of the German Ambassador, who put a positive spin on the talks and told Charge he was satisfied with the general atmospherics (reftel). This could be explained by the fact that the Germans have staked considerable political clout on including Uzbekistan in the EU's Central Asia strategy during Germany's EU Presidency. HANSON