ACCESS PROBLEMS NEARLY DERAIL INL-FUNDED TRAINING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TASHKENT 000583

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN AND INL/AAE
CBP FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING BRANCH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2017
TAGS: SNAR PREL KCRM UZ
SUBJECT: ACCESS PROBLEMS NEARLY DERAIL INL-FUNDED TRAINING
IN TERMEZ

REF: A. TASHKENT 376


B. 06 TASHKENT 1251

Classified By: Amb. Jon R. Purnell for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) An INL-funded U.S. Customs team provided training for
Uzbek Customs personnel at the Termez River Port and Sarosiya
Rail Depot. The team was initially denied access to the
border areas, and the project went forward only after
visiting SCA Deputy Assistant Secretary Evan Feigenbaum
raised the problem with the President's National Security
Adviser. While the program ultimately was successful, its
problems are indicative of our larger border security
relationship with the Uzbeks. Working level counterparts are
eager to cooperate with us, and senior people want to work
with the United States if only because of the equipment that
our programs provide. No one, however, is ready to intervene
to solve bureaucratic problems and other difficulties without
a direct sign from Tashkent. End summary.


2. (U) Post's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
(INL) program sponsored training February 28 - March 6 for
Uzbek Customs officers assigned to the Surkhandaryo
Province's Termez River Port and Sarosiya Rail Depot. In
addition to training on general topics, such as terrorism
awareness and common smuggling techniques, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection trainers provided information on contraband
enforcement techniques specific to rail and maritime
operations. The trainers eventually were permitted to
observe the unloading and inspection of cargo at both
locations as well as passenger inspections at the rail depot.

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Bureaucratic Snafus Abound
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3. (C) The training, which had been approved by the
Government of Uzbekistan two months in advance, almost ended
before it began as the result of what Customs contacts
described as a series of bureaucratic snafus and interagency
rivalry. The problems began immediately upon arrival in
Termez when U.S. personnel were delayed for 30 minutes at the
airport for document checks by Border Guards because they
were not on the list of foreigners approved for travel to
Surkhandaryo Province on the day of arrival. The problems
continued the next morning when the trainers arrived at
Surkhandaryo Regional Customs Headquarters for the first day
of training. They discovered that Customs Headquarters in
Tashkent had ordered all personnel not on duty to attend a
meeting, lasting all day, to discuss President Karimov's
latest anti-corruption speech and its applicability to
Customs personnel. Trying to remain flexible, the U.S. team
suggested they could make use of this time by visiting the
river port. Unfortunately, this would not be possible, our
Customs contact explained, as the Border Guards had yet to
receive orders allowing the Americans access to the port.
Going to the rail depot was out of the question for the same
reason, he said. The American team spent the rest of the day
sightseeing in Termez.


4. (C) Upon learning of the access problems, poloff made
calls to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Border
Guards. MFA blamed the Border Guards, saying that the letter
granting access had been sent weeks beforehand. Border
Guards blamed MFA, saying that such a letter had never been
received. Neither apparently was willing to issue the
necessary orders to break the logjam and grant the U.S.
Customs team access to the border posts. Ultimately, it took
a request for help from visiting SCA Deputy Assistant
Secretary Evan Feigenbaum during a meeting with National

SIPDIS
Security Council Secretary Murod Ataev (ref A) for the
difficulties to be resolved.

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Termez River Port
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5. (C) Once access to the port was granted, U.S. Customs
personnel provided maritime contraband interdiction training
to 11 Uzbek Customs officers assigned to the river port.
These officers are responsible for inspecting cargo going to

TASHKENT 00000583 002 OF 002


and from Afghanistan. Border Guard personnel closely watched
U.S. personnel during their entire visit to the port and
restricted their movements. However, the U.S. visitors were
permitted to observe port employees unload about three rail
cars of raisins from Afghanistan. Uzbek Customs officers
claimed that they inspected 100 percent of the cargo imported
from Afghanistan. It became clear that this claim was
accurate only inasmuch as standing to the side and watching
boxes being carried past can be considered an inspection.
U.S. personnel noted that their Uzbek counterparts lacked
basic equipment such as pliers, probes, and even flashlights.
(Comment: The restrictions encountered during this training
are in marked contrast to the DCM's September visit in which
Embassy personnel were allowed to move freely about the port
(ref B). The DCM's visit was arranged by the regional Border
Guard headquarters, and he was accompanied by the Border
Guard regional deputy commander, which might explain why the
two teams were treated so differently. End comment.)

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Sarosiya Rail Depot
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6. (C) The training provided what is believed to be the first
American access to the Sarosiya Rail Depot, located on the
Uzbek-Tajik border. The depot, which is under construction,
consists of two large two-story buildings occupied by Uzbek
Customs and the state railroad company, several smaller
support buildings, and a rail inspection yard. The rail yard
was equipped with lights. According to Customs officials,
the rail depot receives ten passenger trains each week: six
operating between Moscow and Dushanbe and four that transit
Uzbek territory while traveling between Dushanbe and other
cities in Tajikistan. A similar number of cargo trains also
transit the depot.


7. (C) U.S. personnel observed that Uzbek Customs and Border
Guard personnel line both sides of the tracks as passenger
trains enter the depot to prevent anyone from leaving the
train. Once stopped, officials enter the train and conduct
document and customs checks. The entire procedure takes
approximately two hours, and no passengers are allowed to
leave the train during this period. Cargo trains are
inspected in a similar fashion, with officials conducting an
initial inspection to decide if the train will be allowed to
continue or be held for secondary inspections. If held over,
secondary inspections typically involve unloading entire rail
cars by hand and can take several days. As with the river
port, U.S. personnel noted that their Uzbek counterparts
lacked even basic equipment. As but one example, emboffs
watched Uzbek Customs personnel for over an hour as they
pried open the doors of a rail car using crowbars as they did
not have bolt cutters to break the door's security seals.

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Comment
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8. (C) Emboffs have previously heard the excuse that somebody
forgot to inform the Border Guards, as this was purportedly
the reason that another INL team was denied access to the
river port and rail depot in April 2006 (ref B). Interagency
rivalry may play some role, as access to border areas tends
to go much more smoothly on trips organized by the Border
Guards than those in which Customs is in charge. Regardless
of the bureaucratic reasons for the problems, the visit was
in many respects indicative of our overall border security
relationship with the Uzbeks. At the working level, our
counterparts are engaged and eager to cooperate. Even senior
level officials appear willing to cooperate if only because
they want the equipment our programs provide. No one,
however, is willing to stick his own neck out and resolve
bureaucratic and other difficulties that arise without a
clear signal from Tashkent that it is okay to do so.
PURNELL