NEW SHAKEUP IN SENIOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ADVISORS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TASHKENT 001427 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2017 TAGS: PGOV PINR UZ SUBJECT: NEW SHAKEUP IN SENIOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ADVISORS REF: TASHKENT 1420 Classified By: CDA Brad Hanson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) President Karimov has released his State Advisor for Law Enforcement, Anvar Nabiev, from his duties and appointed him instead as a Deputy General Prosecutor. This appears to be a clear demotion for Nabiev, who gained prominence as the lead prosecutor in the 2005 Andijon show trial. A parliamentary contact claimed that Nabiev's transfer came about as the result of an investigation into his corrupt activities. Meanwhile, the Open Dialogue Project's Country Director (protect) speculates that Nabiev's apparent demotion is part of a plan for him to eventually succeed NSS Chairman Inoyatev. This speculation seems too convoluted to us. Nabiev is notoriously corrupt and it is possible that his activities became too well known for President Karimov to bear. It is also possible that Karimov is setting the stage for the December elections by putting people loyal to him in key positions and that the President believes that Nabiev's prosecutorial skills will be needed in the coming months. As is usual, there are plenty of possibilities, but no certainty, about why the move was made. End summary. -------------- Presidential Advisor Demoted...Maybe -------------- ¶2. (C) State Advisor to the President for Law Enforcement Issues Anvar Nabiev has been relieved of his duties and reassigned as a Deputy Prosecutor General, according to the independent website Uzmetronom.com and Embassy contacts. Nabiev, a career National Security Service (NSS) officer known to be close to NSS Chairman Inoyatov and President Karimov's wife, Tatiana, had served in the position since early 2006. Before moving to the Presidential Apparat, Nabiev served as the First Deputy Prosecutor General, where he gained prominence as the lead prosecutor in the 2005 Andijon show trial. As State Advisor, Nabiev was, in theory, responsible for supervising all of Uzbekistan's law enforcement and internal security forces. Thus, his return to the Prosecutor General's Office appears to be a clear demotion. ¶3. (C) A parliamentary contact claimed that Nabiev's apparent downfall was started by an open letter from criminal court judge Zokir Isaev to President Karimov in late June. Isaev wrote that he recently had been pressured by Nabiev to find an individual charged with fraud guilty despite a lack of evidence and to allow clearly guilty defendants under Inoyatov and Tatiana Karimova's protection to go free. The contact said that Karimov ordered an investigation against Nabiev, which uncovered evidence of corruption. According to the contact, the former State Advisor has lost influence with the President and, in typical Karimov style, will likely be subjected to "dismissal by a thousand demotions." ¶4. (C) Open Dialogue Project Country Director Mjusa Sever (protect) offered Poloff an alternative explanation for Nabiev's transfer back to the General Prosecutor's Office. Sever said that she was told by unidentified NSS contacts that Nabiev is being groomed as Inoyatov's eventual successor. Sever speculated that it would be "unseemly" for Nabiev, who as State Advisor technically was more senior than Inoyatov, to be "demoted" into the job of NSS Chairman. She suggested it was more palatable for Nabiev to return to a less senior position in the General Prosecutor's Office for a time before being promoted into Inoyatov's job. -------------- Comment: Many Possibilities, No Certainty -------------- ¶5. (C) While we cannot rule out Sever's speculation entirely, we are inclined to think that Nabiev's transfer most likely is due to a reason other than a convoluted plan for him to eventually succeed Inoyatov. Nabiev is notoriously corrupt, so much so that he earned the nickname "50 cents" because his standard asking price for favors reportedly is $50,000. He is much too well connected to be caught up in an ordinary corruption investigation, and we seriously doubt that Judge Isaev's letter was the catalyst for his downfall. However, President Karimov has made rooting out public corruption a very public priority, and it is possible that Nabiev reputation for corruption became too well known for even Karimov to bear in the run-up to December's Presidential TASHKENT 00001427 002 OF 002 election. (C) It also occurs to us that Nabiev's transfer may be more about ensuring that Karimov loyalists are in the right positions prior to the election. An MFA contact recently told us that he thought the transfer of former Justice Minister Otakhonov to the Presidential Apparat had something to do with "upcoming events in December" (reftel). The President typically seeks to cloak all he does in an aura of legality. It is possible that he believes that Nabiev's services as a prosecutor, ably demonstrated during the Andijon show trial, might be needed in the near future. As is typical, however, there are many possibilities but no certainty about why Karimov made the move. HANSON