ESTONIA: AGREEMENT REACHED ON HSPD-6 TEXT

C O N F I D E N T I A L TALLINN 000728 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR CA/VO/F/P AND CA/P DHS HQ FOR DANIEL SULLIVAN AND NATHAN SALES FRANKFURT FOR RSC - RCO RUSSEL BROWN E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2017 TAGS: ASEC CVIS PREL PTER EUN EN SUBJECT: ESTONIA: AGREEMENT REACHED ON HSPD-6 TEXT Classified By: Consul Rodger Deuerlein for reason 1.4(b, d) ¶1. SUMMARY: On October 30, a visiting Washington delegation representing the CA Bureau and the Terrorism Screening Center reached agreement with GOE interlocutors on the text of a Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6) Arrangement to share terrorist-screening information. Substantive changes from the USG model Arrangement were few, though notably, the Estonians stated they would exclude data on non-Estonian EU citizens from any HSPD-6 contributions. END SUMMARY 2 The U.S. delegation was led by Peter Thompson, Deputy Chief International Programs Division, Office of Policy Coordination and Public Affairs, Bureau of Consular Affairs. Accompanying Thompson were attorney Kathleen Hooke of the CA Bureau,s Legal Advisor Office; and Rick Kopel, Principal Deputy Director of the Terrorist Screening Center. From Post, Consul and Regional Affairs Officer participated. The Estonians were led by Mr. Erkki Koort, Deputy Secretary General for Internal Security, Ministry of the Interior; with detailed discussion of the Arrangement text handled by Meelis Ratassepp, Deputy Department Director at the Security Police Board (KAPO). Also participating were MFA lawyer Peter Pedak, KAPO Superintendent Martin Arpo, and Interior Ministry IT Project Manager Kaija Kiirch. ¶3. Deputy Chief Thompson opened the meeting by outlining HSPD-6, explaining in particular its potential benefit to Estonia, namely, access to information about some 42,000 U.S. watch-listed known and suspected terrorists. Thompson noted also that DHS now considers an in)place HSPD-6 Arrangement as satisfying the Visa Waiver Program accession requirement for terrorist information sharing. ¶4. Deputy Secretary Koort described the basic security situation of Estonia, namely that of a tiny country on the edge of Russia. He noted that the Estonians did not have much of a terrorist watch list. He suggested, however, that they did have information on elements here such as the Russian nationalist group &Nashi8 whose activities, he said, had some characteristics of terrorism, and who had already harmed Estonian, Latvian and UK interests (Several days after the meetings Meelis Ratassep told Consul the initial Estonian list for HSPD-6 would be &several hundred8 names long). ¶5. Regarding more typical sources of international terrorists, Koort pointed out that there are approximately 2,000 to 3,000 Muslims in Estonia, most hailing from, or tracing their roots to, Muslim-populated parts of the former Soviet Union, such as Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Tartarstan in Russia. Immigrants from North Africa and the Middle East total only about one hundred, nation-wide. This situation will change, however, Koort suggested, when &migration pressures go up8 with Estonia,s full implementation of Schengen-Area open-border practices beginning in 2008. ¶6. Once past introductions, the delegations made rapid progress. The Estonians were obviously eager to reach an agreement and were well prepared for the discussions. Issues which did require some attention included the meaning of &non-binding8 under Estonian law (there,s no such thing); the classification of the completed and signed Arrangement (to match the Estonian,s classification it will be USG Confidential); and most significantly, the Estonians, SIPDIS planned exclusion of data on non-Estonian EU (or EEA) citizens from any information they provide under HSPD-6. The Estonians proposed this exclusion be added in writing to the Arrangement. It was left out, though with the understanding that the Estonians would still exclude EU/EEA citizen data. ¶7. Following the delegations, agreement on the Arrangement text, the next step, according to Meelis Ratassepp of KAPO, will be for the GOE to complete an interagency review and decide upon their preference regarding who will sign it. He and Kaija Kiirch both indicated that the GOE prefers not to sign an Aide Memoire as part of this process. ¶8. COMMENT: Post welcomes this agreement, which we believe will enhance overall U.S.-Estonian security cooperation * because it will make the U.S. watch list available to the GOE, and because it will systematize terrorist information exchange between our countries. We hope the GOE can be convinced eventually to contribute data on non-Estonian EU/EEA nationals via this channel. END COMMENT. Phillips PHILLIPS