MORE MAC PESSIMISM ON CROSS-STRAIT INITIATIVES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 000985 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE PASS USTR STATE FOR EAP/TC COMMERCE FOR 3132/USFCS/OIO/EAP/WZARIT COMMERCE FOR 4431/ITA/MAC/AP/OPB/TAIWAN/MCHOI TREASURY FOR OASIA/LMOGHTADER USTR FOR STRATFORD, ALTBACH E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2017 TAGS: ECON PREL PGOV PINR EAIR CH TW SUBJECT: MORE MAC PESSIMISM ON CROSS-STRAIT INITIATIVES REF: TAIPEI 930 Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young, Reason 1.4 b/d ¶1. (C) Summary: In a May 1, 2007 meeting with AIT, Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Chief Secretary Jan Jyh- horng expressed pessimism about the likelihood of cross- Strait agreements on charter flights and tourism during the remaining thirteen months of the Chen administration. He further told AIT that the appointment of Chen Ming- tong as the new MAC Chairman has had a negative impact on prospects for the two initiatives. He also explained that Taiwan's principal objection to the Olympic torch route announcement by Beijing on April 26 was the nomenclature used for Taiwan rather than the path the torch would take. Jan's comments suggest that either the Chen Shui-bian administration has given up hope on reaching agreement with China on charter flights and tourism, or that the appointment of Chen Ming-tong as MAC Chairman reflects a decision to signal a less cooperative approach to cross-Strait relations, or both. End summary. Charter Flights and Tourism Agreements Unlikely -------------- -- ¶2. (C) MAC Chief Secretary Jan Jyh-horng told AIT on May 1, 2007, that he sees little possibility in the short term for progress in cross-Strait discussions on weekend passenger and cargo charter flights and further opening of Taiwan to PRC tourists. In AIT Director Young's meeting with MAC Chairman Chen Ming-tong a week earlier, Chen speculated that the two sides would need to reach agreement on these initiatives before late July. Otherwise, intensified campaigning in advance of legislative and presidential elections would likely preclude any cross-Strait agreement for the rest of President Chen Shui-bian's final term (reftel). When asked about Chairman Chen's hypothetical late-July deadline, Jan said he was pessimistic that an agreement would be concluded before then. ¶3. (C) Jan attributed his pessimism in part to the highly partisan political atmosphere in Taiwan in the run up to legislative and presidential elections in late 2007 and early 2008. He noted that Taiwan President Chen Shui- bian and Premier Su Tseng-chang's harsh criticisms of the Kuomintang (KMT)-Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Economic Forum that concluded in Beijing on April 29 should be understood in the context of election politics. The Chen administration's reaction to the previous two KMT-CCP forums, Jan pointed out, had been more restrained. He explained that the administration's response had also been exacerbated by the perception that Beijing is using the new national association of Taiwan investors in China to generate political support for the KMT. ¶4. (C) Jan also cast blame on Beijing for the failure to reach agreement on the charter and tourism initiatives. The statement at the KMT-CCP forum by Jia Qinglin, Chairman of the PRC Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, that cross-Strait tourism is not an issue that should be handled "state to state," Jan explained, had deeply offended the Chen administration. Beijing, he continued, had earlier set similarly unrealistic preconditions that blocked conclusion of a tourism agreement. During the fourth round of tourism consultations in Macao on January 27, 2007, he said, Beijing had surprised the Taiwan negotiators by presenting a draft text. The document was to be signed by the civilian organizations assigned to lead the negotiations but omitted any mention of government authorization to enter into an agreement. In addition, that text referred to Taiwan as "China Taiwan" (Zhongguo Taiwan),a name unacceptable to the Taiwan authorities. Jan explained that Taiwan insists the tourism agreement should be similar to the Taiwan-Hong Kong aviation agreement. That document was signed by aviation industry organizations but specifically noted that they had been TAIPEI 00000985 002 OF 003 authorized by their respective governments to enter into the agreement. The January 27 meeting, he assessed, had marked a turning point in cross-Strait negotiations that has resulted in the current stalemate. New MAC Chairman a Setback -------------- ¶5. (C) Jan Jyh-horng told AIT that he believes the appointment of Chen Ming-tong as the new MAC Chairman may have exacerbated the stalemate. He noted that the "name rectification" campaign to remove "China" references from the names of official and state-owned entities and proposals for a new "second Republic of China" constitution had surprised Beijing and made it less willing to deal with the Chen administration. The appointment of Chen Ming-tong, one of the drafters and a vocal proponent of the second republic constitution, as MAC Chairman had worsened the situation. The PRC was unlikely to allow Chen Ming-tong to take credit for a cross-Strait agreement. Jan noted that China had been unwilling to deal with the previous MAC Chairman, Joseph Wu, for the first two years of his tenure, 2004-2005. It was only after the PRC authorities had time to see Wu in action and decided they could deal with him that they began to work more cooperatively with MAC, Jan observed. Olympic Torch - Nomenclature More Problematic Than Route -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) When asked about Taiwan's rejection of the PRC's proposed route for the 2008 Olympic torch to pass through Taiwan, Jan explained that the Beijing Olympic Games Organizing Committee's use of the nomenclature "China Taipei" (Zhongguo Taibei) in all of its publications and website was more problematic for Taiwan authorities than the route of the torch. Beijing, he explained, had consciously violated a 1989 agreement signed by the Chinese Olympic Committee and Taiwan's Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee by consistently referring to Taiwan as "China Taipei" instead of the agreed "Chinese Taipei" (Zhonghua Taibei). Taiwan, he said, had repeatedly complained about this usage but to no avail. On Friday, April 27, however, the night Taiwan rejected the PRC's Olympic torch proposal, the Beijing Olympic Committee's website replaced some (but not all) of the references to "China Taipei" with "Chinese Taipei," Jan noted. He surmised this might indicate some flexibility on the part of Beijing regarding the torch and nomenclature issues. He believes China is eager to include Taiwan in the relay as a goodwill gesture to the people of Taiwan. Although reluctant to speculate, Jan also said he believed the Taiwan authorities might accept Beijing's proposed route if it agrees to consistently use the "Chinese Taipei" nomenclature. He stressed that Beijing would not go so far as to consider Taiwan's preferred route in which the torch would both enter and exit Taiwan from a third territory. No Cross-Strait Honeymoon After Election -------------- ¶7. (C) Jan predicted a cool period in cross-Strait relations after next year's presidential elections regardless of which party wins. Beijing, he said, has a fairly favorable opinion of Frank Hsieh, one of the DPP front-runners, but it will want to wait to see how he governs before moving forward with closer cross-Strait cooperation if Hsieh wins. Noting Ma Ying-jeou's reputation as a strong opponent to communism, Jan similarly argued that China would want to see how Ma acts as President if he wins. However, Jan believed that this period of observation imposed by Beijing would be shorter for a KMT President than a DPP one. KMT-CCP Forum Offers Little to Work With -------------- ¶8. (C) Jan dismissed the possibility that Taiwan could TAIPEI 00000985 003 OF 003 act on any of the announced proposals from the KMT-CCP Economic Forum in Beijing. On China's offer to permit Taiwan firms to invest in wholly-owned shipping companies and to operate highways and ports in China, Jan argued that these measures would face stiff opposition from Chinese firms that see Taiwan investors as unwelcome competition. Jan acknowledged that some in Taiwan believe China's offer to permit Chinese students to enroll in Taiwan universities might be the answer to excess capacity in Taiwan's higher education system. But he argued that Chinese students would be reluctant to pay Taiwan university fees to enroll in some of Taiwan's less competitive schools, which suffer most from the shortfall of students. Comment - A New Course? -------------- ¶9. (C) Jan's pessimism on charter flight and tourism discussions suggests the Chen administration may have given up hope that an agreement with China is within reach. In this light, the somewhat controversial appointment of Chen Ming-tong as MAC Chairman could be seen as a signal of Taiwan's unwillingness to compromise any further on these issues. Jan's observations on Chen's appointment suggest that senior Taiwan officials must have known it would likely have a negative impact on cross-Strait relations and may even have made a decision to follow such a course. ¶10. (C) As we entered Jan's office for the meeting, his walls were bare and his shelves emptied of his stacks of books and files. The new Chairman, he explained, had decided to select his own Chief Secretary and Jan would move to a new as yet undetermined position. Jan is a knowledgeable and politically objective MAC insider, who has been with the agency since it was established in ¶1991. While dissatisfaction with his sudden replacement may have colored Jan's characterization of Chen Ming- tong's appointment, his dismissal as Chief Secretary probably does not bode well for the Chairman's cross- Strait intentions. Jan's replacement may, in fact, corroborate the above early indications that the Chen administration has chosen to take cross-Strait relations in a different direction during its final thirteen months. YOUNG