MA YING-JEOU OVER DINNER: HIS COURT CASE,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 000892 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR MASS MCAP PINR CH TW SUBJECT: MA YING-JEOU OVER DINNER: HIS COURT CASE, PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN, CROSS-STRAIT VIEWS Classified By: AIT director Stephen M. Young. Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D) ¶1. (C) Summary. In a private dinner with the Director on April 18, KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou betrayed frustration over his corruption trial, but expressed confidence that he would be found innocent. He predicted that President Chen would continue pushing ethnic and other deep-Green issues right down to the March 2008 presidential election. He also offered little hope of an early resolution to the defense budget stalemate in the Legislative Yuan (LY). With this invitation, the usually formal and distant Ma was apparently trying to reach out and establish a more personal relationship with the U.S. in the run-up to next year's presidential election. End Summary. ¶2. (C) KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou invited the Director to a private dinner on April 18. Two of Ma's closest advisors, KMT legislator Su Chi and former Taiwan Ambassador to Dominican Republic John Feng (Chi-t'ai) accompanied him. The Director was accompanied by Deputy Director and Political Chief. A Quiet Start -------------- ¶3. (C) Sitting down to dinner, Ma appeared somewhat down and preoccupied. Noting that Ma's second court hearing (on charges of misusing his Taipei mayoral budget) the previous day must not have been pleasant for him, the Director asked how the case was proceeding. Ma scowled and said the whole experience had been unpleasant, "a terrible burden." Nevertheless, continued a visibly weary Ma, "I think I will be freed." President Chen to Keep Pushing -------------- ¶4. (C) Ma predicted President Chen Shui-bian would continue pushing the deep-Green (pro-independence) themes he has raised in recent weeks -- name changes, attacking former President Chiang Kai-shek and mainland Chinese, and constitutional reform. These different facets of the ethnic card are intended, Su Chi stated, both to roil the KMT and keep it off balance, and distract attention from the DPP government's failed economic policy. ¶5. (C) The anti-Chiang attacks had been particularly difficult for the KMT to deal with, Ma said, explaining that he had sought to counter by urging Taiwan voters not to play ethnic politics in the upcoming elections. Ma then launched into a long, detailed defense of President Chiang Kai-shek. While Chiang had made his share of mistakes, he was not responsible for the February 28, 1947 incident. Chiang, moreover had made major contributions to Taiwan, including: saving Taiwan from Communist takeover in 1949, import substitution/export oriented model of economic development, local elections and land reform -- the last two unprecedented in Chinese history. No Defense Budget in Sight -------------- ¶6. (C) Even though Su Chi's three-year prohibition on buying PAC-III's expired on March 20, he told the Director that he still has "a problem" with purchasing PAC-III missiles. KMT's pan-Blue coalition partner, People First Party (PFP) continued adamantly opposed to PAC-III purchase, he explained. In any event, Su continued, there was no sign of movement in the Legislative Yuan (LY) on the stalemate between the defense budget and the Central Election Commission issue. ¶7. (C) Ma weighed in, explaining that the PFP was critical to the pan-Blue coalition's legislative majority, so the KMT could not afford to offend the PFP. The Director rejoined that missile defense is crucial for Taiwan in order to demonstrate Taiwan's defense resolve to both the PRC and the Taiwan people. Ma the lawyer, he enjoined, should not depend TAIPEI 00000892 002 OF 002 for legal advice on "my old friend Su, a political scientist." If Ma Becomes President -------------- ¶8. (C) Other points Ma Ying-jeou made to the Director in the course of the dinner discussion included: -- Cross-Party cooperation: If he wins the presidency and the KMT wins the LY, Ma said, he intends to pursue a cooperative policy with the opposition DPP. This is just what he had done in the 1980's when he was KMT Deputy Secretary-General, he explained, and met with Taiwan SIPDIS dissidents on each visit to the U.S. -- Cross-Strait relations: Lien Chan's current visit to China is his own initiative, Ma and Su intimated. Ma noted, however, that the trip could produce important economic benefits for Taiwan and improve relations. It would be good if Wang Jin-pyng could visit China in May, Ma said, since Wang is President of the LY. Ma himself has no plans to visit China before the presidential election because he is "too busy." (Comment: A more fundamental reason might be to avoid the anti-mainlander ethnic attacks such a visit would inevitably engender back here. End Comment.) ¶9. (C) Su Chi told the Director that he has two fears concerning the presidential election. First, President Chen's continued challenges could destabilize cross-Strait relations, raise tensions and even cause an incident. Second, he feared that an attempt could be made to assassinate Ma Ying-jeou, although there isn't much they can do about it. (Coment: The apparent arson-caused destruction of President Chiang's Yangmingshan weekend retreat two weeks ago has upset the KMT and raised its suspicions. In any event, KMT distrust of President Chen and the DPP runs extremely deep, as does the reverse. End Comment.) Comment: Making Bonhomie -------------- ¶10. (C) This dinner was an unusual setting for a meeting with Ma, who tends to hold his meetings in the more traditionally formal Chinese setting of overstuffed chairs arrayed along one wall of a large meeting room conducive to keeping schedules and business-like discussions. A charismatic politician, both telegenic and personable via the media, Ma in person is often distant and ill-at-ease. We view this private and more relaxed setting as an effort by Ma to reach out to the Director and to the U.S., in order to establish a more personal relationship. YOUNG