TAOYUAN COUNTY MAGISTRATE ERIC CHU ON TAIWAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TAIPEI 000468 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/15/2032 TAGS: PGOV TW SUBJECT: TAOYUAN COUNTY MAGISTRATE ERIC CHU ON TAIWAN POLITICS REF: TAIPEI 00020 Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young, Reason 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Director met with Taoyuan County Magistrate Eric Chu on February 27 to discuss party politics and the upcoming presidential and legislative elections. Chu is confident Ma will be cleared of the corruption charges that led to his indictment on February 14, despite Ma's "negligence" in his initial response to the investigation. Although doubts about Ma's leadership abilities remain, most KMT members do not believe the corruption charges against Ma. Chu characterized Ma's resignation as a chance for the KMT to continue its evolution toward a more democratic institution resembling political parties in the U.S. Chu said that during a meeting on February 25 he pushed Ma to accept the idea of forming a presidential ticket with Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, despite the two men's personal animosity. Chu downplayed the likelihood of a KMT split should Ma and Wang not reach an accommodation. Though the 2008 presidential contest will be a tight race, Chu was optimistic that the KMT could secure a strong majority in the 2007 legislative election. In response to the Director underscoring the need for Taiwan to pass a robust defense budget this spring, Chu said he was personally disappointed with KMT legislators for blocking the budget. Chu suggested that the KMT leadership needs to be realistic and realize that Beijing will continue to squeeze Taiwan in the international arena and play hardball on fundamental cross-Strait issues even if the KMT comes to power in 2008. End Summary. Ma Indictment, Leadership Challenge -------------- ¶2. (C) The Director met with Taoyuan County Magistrate Eric Chu (Li-lun),a rising star within the Kuomintang (KMT),on February 27 to discuss party politics and the upcoming presidential and legislative elections. Chu, a close associate and adviser to former KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou, said he was on an official trip to Australia when he heard the news of Ma's indictment on February 14. Chu immediately telephoned Ma, who was incensed by the prosecutor's accusation that he had "intentionally and willfully" embezzled public funds for private use. Chu said he met with Ma on February 25 and told him he had been too "negligent" in his initial response to the prosecutor's investigation. Ma made the mistake of telling the prosecutor he knew the mayoral special funds were intended for public expenses and later claiming he thought they were part of his salary that could be used for personal expenses. Despite Ma's backtracking, Chu told the Director that after examining the accounting records and prosecutor's report he is confident that Ma will be cleared of all charges and found innocent. (Note: Chu earned a Ph.D. in Accounting from New York University, a fact he did not fail to mention to the Director.) ¶3. (C) Chu told the Director that how Ma handles the fallout from the indictment and his subsequent resignation will be a test of his leadership skills. In particular, Ma must face the threat the indictment poses to his presidential candidacy and leadership of the KMT. Party members continue to doubt Ma's leadership ability and critics charge that Ma has a poor record of handling crises and is prone to "overreacting." Despite these doubts, most people are fairly certain that Ma is not corrupt. Chu pointed to the ten percent boost in Ma's support rating immediately after his indictment as evidence that most people believe the charges against Ma are unfounded. Resignation an Opportunity for Party Reform -------------- ¶4. (C) Chu characterized Ma's resignation positively as a chance for the KMT to continue evolving from a centrist Leninist-style party to a more democratic institution resembling political parties in the U.S. Part of that transition, Chu said, means the KMT chairman must become the TAIPEI 00000468 002 OF 004 head of an "election machine" rather than the center of the party's power structure. Chu suggested that such a development is already underway as now none of the KMT's three powerbrokers -- KMT Honorary Chairman Lien Chan, Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, or Ma -- head the party. He surmised that acting KMT Chairman Wu Po-hsiung, rather than Lien or Wang, is likely to be elected KMT Chairman in April. Chu explained that Wu is held in good regard by a large number of party members, is old enough that the chairmanship would be the pinnacle of his career, and has the experience to clean up KMT "messes," such as resolving the party assets issue, coordinating legislative nominations, and pushing through party structural reform and downsizing. ¶5. (C) In response to the Director's request to identify the KMT's next generation of talent, the 45 year old Chu said the party has done a poor job of cultivating new leaders. He contrasted this with the DPP and President Chen, who has successfully groomed several leaders by rotating them through the Premiership. The four DPP contenders for the presidential nomination now have impressive resumes and extensive administrative experience. Chu said that if Ma wins in 2008 against one of these opponents, he should make cultivating the KMT's next generation of leaders a top priority. ¶6. (C) Chu conceded that a KMT victory in 2008 may lessen the urgency of inner party reform. Such a development, Chu underscored, would be "unacceptable" to his "Young Turk" generation. Chu told the Director that, as an example, the KMT needs to dispose of party assets acquired during the period of authoritarian one-party rule by returning them to the state or donating the proceeds from their sale to social causes rather placing the proceeds in party-controlled trusts. Chu also said the KMT should not continue to "cover up" for former President Chiang Kai-shek. The KMT needs to acknowledge that Chiang was a "dictator just like Mao Zedong" while giving Chiang some credit for spurring Taiwan's modern economic development. Addressing such issues, Chu continued, is the only way for the KMT to break free of its historical burden, but doing so would require strong leadership from Ma. In moving the party toward the mainstream of public opinion instead of catering to the KMT's "radical" fringes, argued Chu, Ma can enhance his chances of winning in 2008. A Ma-Wang Ticket for 2008? -------------- ¶7. (C) Chu told the Director that on February 25 he urged Ma to form a presidential ticket with Wang Jin-pyng to boost KMT chances of defeating the DPP. Chu said Ma appeared open to the idea and left the meeting willing to further consider the possibility. Nevertheless, Chu suggested that Ma advisors, such as King Pu-tsung, may be able to convince Ma otherwise even though Wang is the next best candidate and should be the vice presidential running mate. Chu, who has close family ties to Wang, said he believed Wang would be willing to take the vice presidential slot even though publicly he has been hinting that he may mount a direct challenge to Ma. According to Chu, Wang has had to make such rumblings to avoid being sidelined by Ma. Chu opined that Wang may be calculating that as the vice presidential candidate he has a chance of stepping into the presidential slot should Ma run into further legal troubles. ¶8. (C) Chu told the Director that the KMT would not likely split if Ma and Wang fail to reach an accommodation. Chu explained that any breakaway candidate would not be able to gain much support from pan-Blue voters who have learned from President Chen's victory in 2000 that a lack of unity will only benefit the DPP. Chu added that for the same reason, People First Party Chairman James Soong is unlikely to again play the spoiler role he did in 2000 given his poor performance in the Taipei mayoral race last December. Chu nevertheless conceded that if Soong runs and gets as little as 4 per cent of the vote he could affect the final outcome in what is sure to be a close and tough election. Expects Strong KMT Performance in Legislative Race TAIPEI 00000468 003 OF 004 -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Chu told the Director that the shift to a single-member district system for the 2007 legislative election gives the KMT a structural advantage over the DPP. Chu expects his party will secure a strong majority of 45-50 seats out of the 79 district seats. Five districts with small populations (Penghu, Matsu, Kinmen, Taitung, and Hualien) and five of the six aborigine seats are in the KMT's pocket, giving it an automatic 10-1 lead over the DPP. With a large percentage of Taiwan's urban population located in the North, the KMT's traditional stronghold, the party will be able to put in a strong showing in the LY election. Crunching the numbers, Chu projected the KMT would take 8-9 of the 13 seats in Taipei County, 5-6 of the 6 seats in Taoyuan, the single seats of Hsinchu City and County, and the two seats in Miaoli. ¶10. (C) The PFP, along with the pan-Green Taiwan Solidarity Union, will be increasingly marginalized under the new system, Chu argued. The PFP will have a difficult time fielding viable candidates as most of the strong contenders have already returned to the KMT fold. With PFP Chairman Soong's waning popularity, the PFP is unlikely to even meet the 5 percent threshold needed to secure party representational seats. At best, Chu predicted, the PFP could get a total of 7-8 seats compared to 34 in 2004. Taiwan Defense and Cross-Strait Relations -------------- ¶11. (C) The Director emphasized to Chu the need to pass a robust defense budget that strengthens Taiwan's capabilities vis-a-vis the PRC. Agreeing, Chu said he was personally disappointed with KMT legislators, especially PFP and KMT "radicals," for blocking the budget. He said he has urged Ma and other KMT leaders to think through their stance and tactics on the defense budget. If the KMT returns to power, Chu said he asked Ma, how will the party reverse its previous opposition and pass the budget without losing credibility with the public? Chu said the best strategy for his party is to pass the budget as soon as possible to begin strengthening Taiwan's defense and prevent the DPP from using KMT blocking the defense budget as a weapon in the upcoming elections. ¶12. (C) Chu added that the KMT leadership must be realistic and realize the PRC will continue to squeeze Taiwan's international space and play hardball on fundamental cross-Strait issues even if the KMT comes to power in 2008. The ultimate aim of Beijing's pressure is not to target President Chen or the DPP, but to undermine the sovereignty and independence of Taiwan. Chu said he has cautioned KMT colleagues that if the KMT becomes the ruling party it will not be able to move easily on the path laid out by Lien Chan during his visits to the mainland. Although the KMT is not now Beijing's "immediate" enemy, it is an enemy "in waiting," noted Chu. Taoyuan: Focused on Economic Development -------------- ¶13. (C) Chu told the Director that his top priority in Taoyuan remains the economy. Taoyuan generates 20 percent of Taiwan's GDP and 20 percent of all central government revenue but with 2 million residents has less than 10 percent of Taiwan's total population. Chu said his main challenge is encouraging top technology firms, such as ASUS and other computer notebook manufacturers, to continue investing in R&D in Taoyuan as they move their production to the PRC. Progress on cross-Strait opening would help, rather than harm, the county's long-term competitiveness, said Chu. With 16 cargo flights of high-tech goods a day between Taoyuan and Dallas, TX, Taoyuan has the potential to become the main regional transshipment center for laptops and other high-tech goods between China and the U.S. Comment -------------- TAIPEI 00000468 004 OF 004 ¶14. (C) The tone and substance of Chu's discussion regarding Ma's legal difficulties and future challenges as a leader suggest he may have cleared at least part of his message with Ma before talking to us. Chu, along with (KMT) Taichung City Mayor Jason Hu and others, is one of the "New KMT" leaders that has been working to bring erstwhile rivals Ma and Wang together on a joint presidential ticket for 2008 to prevent a split within the party (See reftel). While the enmity between the two men may still be too great to overcome, Ma's legal troubles and concerns about attracting the southern, rural vote could compel him to accept Wang as running mate, though it remains unclear how much a real boost Wang would add to a Ma-led ticket. YOUNG