PRACTICAL CONCERNS, DISTRUST PREVENT PAN-BLUE UNITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 000318

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2032
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: PRACTICAL CONCERNS, DISTRUST PREVENT PAN-BLUE UNITY


Classified By: Director Stephen M. Young, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) Summary: On January 22, Kuomintang (KMT) Chairman Ma
Ying-jeou and People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong
signed a four-part agreement formalizing an alliance between
the two parties. While Ma would probably prefer to let Soong
and his party fade into obscurity, he can't do so without
coming across as an ungracious bully. By agreeing with Soong
to jointly nominate candidates for the December 2007
legislative elections, Ma is hoping to convince the public
that he cares about the KMT's smaller pan-blue ally. That
said, KMT legislative candidates don't welcome PFP
competition for legislative nominations, and many KMT leaders
believe Soong's crushing defeat in the Taipei mayoral race
proves that pan-blue voters have already abandoned him. For
their part, Soong and other PFP leaders doubt Ma's ability to
force a reluctant KMT leadership to share nominations with
PFP candidates. KMT interlocutors have suggested that the
KMT could nominate seven to ten PFP candidates in the next LY
election, and offer at-large seats or nominations in other
districts to those KMT candidates displaced by PFP nominees.
End Summary.


2. (C) On January 22, Ma and Soong signed a four-part
agreement to formalize an alliance between the KMT and PFP.
The agreement committed the two parties to cooperate in
selecting the most electable candidates for the Legislative
Yuan (LY) elections scheduled for December 2007. The
agreement did not specify the selection criteria, which will
be decided later. KMT legislator and Ma advisor Wu Yu-sheng,
however, told AIT on February 6 that Ma signed the agreement
not to secure Soong's political support, but to avoid giving
the public the impression that the KMT was willing to ignore
the plight of its smaller pan-blue ally. Soong's humiliating
defeat in the December 2006 Taipei mayoral race revealed that
he and the PFP no longer have a substantial following, and
that pan-blue voters have already decided to unify behind KMT
candidates. Although Ma might have preferred to ignore the
powerless Soong and to let the PFP just fade away, Wu opined,
he could not do so without coming across as a callous bully.


3. (C) Many KMT leaders do not support a KMT-PFP joint
nomination mechanism, Wu told AIT, and some have faulted Ma
for promising to trade something (legislative seats) for
nothing (Soong's negligible political support). Because the
new single-member-district legislative framework will cut the
existing number of legislative seats in half, incumbent KMT
legislators and would-be candidates already face stiff
competition from within the party itself, and don't welcome
additional competition from an influx of PFP candidates, Wu
remarked. But the problem really won't be that significant,
he predicted, since only seven to ten PFP candidates would
have any real chance of displacing a KMT candidate for a
district election. Wu expressed confidence that those KMT
candidates asked to step aside could be placated with an
at-large (bufenqu) nomination, or with a job within a KMT
presidential administration. Regardless of how the
nomination-sharing scheme works out, Wu remarked, Ma will
still have to figure out what to do with Soong. The KMT
vice-chairmen will not accept Soong into their ranks, and
Soong would be unlikely to accept any position subordinate to
Ma, who he perceives as his junior. Ma's best option, Wu
opined, was to name Soong as a "spiritual leader" of the
pan-blue camp, or to offer him a prestigious, but powerless
position within Ma's administration.


4. (C) PFP public affairs director and Soong advisor Liao
Wen-chang told AIT on February 6 that Soong's December 2006
mayoral defeat and subsequent withdrawal from politics
devastated the PFP, which is now "half-dead." The KMT and
PFP are "almost re-unified," he continued, and only two
things are keeping the PFP alive: the desire not to lose the
government subsidy provided to all political parties with
incumbent legislators, and lingering distrust of the KMT.
According to Liao, only four PFP legislators would have any
chance of securing a nomination over a KMT rival. They and
others, including Soong, doubt Ma's ability to force the KMT
to accept any nomination-sharing scheme. Liao added that,
aside from the promise to share nominations, Ma has done
precious little to welcome Soong and his followers back into
the KMT camp. Until Ma extends that kind of welcome, Liao

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predicted, Soong and those loyal to him will be motivated to
keep the shell of the PFP alive, to preserve whatever they
can of their own political futures.
YOUNG