SPELMAN VISIT: KMT LEGISLATOR SU CHI ON DEFENSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 002607 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2032 TAGS: PGOV TW SUBJECT: SPELMAN VISIT: KMT LEGISLATOR SU CHI ON DEFENSE BUDGET, CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS, ELECTIONS REF: TAIPEI 2588 Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary: KMT legislator and defense policy advisor Su Chi told Acting EAP/TC Director Douglas Spelman on December 11 that the Legislative Yuan (LY) Defense Committee would authorize significant spending for F-16's, PAC-III's, helicopters, and a submarine exploratory committee. Su expressed concern that if the DPP UN referendum passed, the political fallout might limit the next president's ability to conduct successful negotiations with the PRC. He argued that the KMT experience during the late 80's and early 90's suggests the PRC will tolerate Taiwan's efforts to enlarge its diplomatic and international circles and to improve its defensive capability, as long as the cross-Strait dialogue continues and Taiwan independence remains off the table. Ma could win the presidency, predicted Su, if he can sidestep the "dirty tricks" expected from the DPP. Su clarified that in his recent, controversial statement regarding a Taiwan nuclear weapons program, he said only that President Chen had given the order authorizing such a program, and not that Taiwan already had such weapons, or that work had already begun. End summary. ¶2. (C) Acting EAP/TC Director Douglas Spelman met with KMT legislator Su Chi on December 10. Su is one of three KMT chairmen on the Legislative Yuan (LY) Defense Committee, and is a senior foreign policy advisor to KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou. DEFENSE INFORMATION HARD TO COME BY -------------- ¶3. (C) Su complained that he is unable to give Ma good foreign policy advice because the current DPP government tightly controls information related to Taiwan's foreign affairs and defense matters. For example, even as a senior member of the LY Defense Committee, Su said he had not been informed of a live-fire naval exercise conducted last week on Taiwan's eastern coast. Because the Defense Ministry does not share information with the LY unless required by law to do so, it is "impossible" for those outside the Chen administration to obtain reliable information regarding Taiwan's possible development of offensive weapons, a matter of special concern to the KMT. This leads to a vicious circle, Su described, where legislators, deprived of information, resort to spectacle and showmanship, which in turn makes the Defense Ministry less willing to share sensitive information. Su told Spelman he gets some of his best information by comparing U.S. defense estimates with those issued by the Taiwan government, and investigating the inconsistencies. BUDGET PREDICTIONS LARGELY COME TRUE -------------- ¶4. (C) Su told Spelman on December 10 that the LY Defense Committee was reviewing the classified portion of the defense budget, which contemplated funding for F-16's, PAC-III's, helicopters, and submarines. According to Su, the KMT caucus, at Ma's instruction, would approve funding for six PAC-III batteries, 30 attack and 60 utility helicopters, and NT$1.5 billion for a submarine exploratory committee. The KMT also backed a total of NT$28 billion of funding for the eventual purchase of F-16's (12 billion from this year's budget, and another 16 billion "frozen" from last year's budget). ¶5. (C) Concerns about the helicopter purchase had been raised by two Blue legislators, but Su expected those concerns to be voted down in committee. Many legislators continue to balk at purchasing submarines, Su added, because of cost and utility concerns. (Note: On December 11, Su informed AIT that four PAC-III batteries had been approved, and two "frozen" for approval next LY session. The committee also approved NT$20 billion for F-16's, after learning the NT$16 billion "frozen" from last year's budget had inadvertently lapsed. Although the helicopter purchase had not yet been finalized, NT$2 billion had been approved for the submarine exploratory review. End note.) TAIPEI 00002607 002 OF 003 CONFIDENT CHINA WILL GIVE KMT PRESIDENT BREATHING ROOM? -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Spelman asked Su whether he agreed with KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou's assertion from an earlier meeting that Beijing would be more tolerant of Taiwan's arms purchases with a KMT administration in place. Su said he did, based on the KMT's experience from the late-80's to early-90's. During that period, Su explained, Taiwan purchased some 150 F-16's and several Knox-class frigates from the U.S., as well as Mirage fighters and Lafayette frigates from France. At the same time, Taiwan and PRC counterparts held 16 public and 27 secret rounds of talks, some of which culminated in what is now known as the "1992 Consensus." Taiwan also managed to enhance its participation in international organizations, and to increase the number of its diplomatic allies. While Beijing and Taipei were talking to each other, and Taiwan did not push for independence, Su concluded, Beijing was willing to tolerate Taiwan's efforts to enlarge its diplomatic and international circles, and to improve its defensive capability. ¶7. (C) China, however, is much stronger now than it was 15 years ago, noted Spelman. Would Beijing still be willing to tolerate Taiwan's efforts to expand its international presence and to build up its defense? Yes, answered Su, because today's China is also much more confident. China's seat at the UN is secure, he continued. Moreover, Beijing is preoccupied with increasing internal unrest over growing economic disparities. The PRC leadership would welcome a chance to put aside the "Taiwan problem" for the time being, Su asserted. A KMT government would drop the push for independence, he continued, to seek a "modus vivendi" with China. The KMT's price would be increased international living space for Taiwan. Su argued the KMT's past experience suggests China would accept such a deal. REFERENDUM A POLITICAL, NOT LEGAL DANGER -------------- ¶8. (C) Su confided that he was more concerned about the DPP UN referendum passing than Ma, who stated earlier that the KMT might be able to avoid petitioning the UN as "Taiwan" on grounds that doing so would be unconstitutional (see reftel). Although the legal impact of the referendum might be blunted by constitutional arguments, Su worried, the POLITICAL impact of its passage would not be so easy to contain. If the referendum passes, Su argued, President Chen will have considerable POLITICAL leverage to limit the next president from moving forward on cross-Strait dialogue. (Comment: Su seemed to mean that Chen could undermine the "92 Consensus" by arguing that the Taiwan people had rejected the "Republic of China" in favor of "Taiwan." End Comment.) MA'S ELECTORAL CHANCES -------------- ¶9. (C) Ma Ying-jeou still has a good chance of winning the presidential election, Su predicted, but the KMT is deeply concerned about the prospect for DPP "dirty tricks." Ma is widely perceived as Taiwan's cleanest politician, claimed Su, and he is resolutely opposed to offering positions to or making other deals with KMT bigwigs. While the elites may grumble, Su continued, Ma's resistance to trading favors makes him very popular with the KMT rank-and-file. The KMT "political machine" is still dirty, Su added, but Ma will do his best to maintain a clean, transparent administration. SU: DIDN'T SAY NUKES UNDERWAY -------------- ¶10. (C) Spelman asked Su to elaborate on his recent public claim that President Chen had authorized the Taiwan military to develop nuclear weapons. Su claimed a friend within the DPP camp had told him, after overhearing remarks from a senior DPP legislator that Chen had "given the order." Su clarified that in his statement, he said only that Chen had given the order, and not that Taiwan already had such weapons, or that the work had already begun. Su insinuated TAIPEI 00002607 003 OF 003 that his claim must have some merit, because after the story broke, Chen convened his first international press conference in two years to rebut it. Chen also publicly criticized Su, but did not file any legal action against him, as might be expected. (Note: Taiwan politicians frequently slap their opponents with slander and libel suits as part of the normal rough-and-tumble of debate. End note.) ¶11. (U) EAP/TC Director Spelman cleared this message. YOUNG