Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07TAIPEI2592
2007-12-11 10:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  

ELECTION SNAPSHOT: DPP FIGHTS TO DEFINE

Tags:  PGOV TW 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TAIPEI 002592 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2017
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: ELECTION SNAPSHOT: DPP FIGHTS TO DEFINE
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AGENDA

Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young,
Reasons: 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TAIPEI 002592 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2017 TAGS: PGOV TW SUBJECT: ELECTION SNAPSHOT: DPP FIGHTS TO DEFINE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AGENDA Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young, Reasons: 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In the upcoming 2008 presidential election, the DPP hopes to duplicate the come-from behind victory it engineered in 2004 by again campaigning on the national identity issue. Following President Chen's reelection victory in 2004, the DPP stumbled badly in the 2005 local elections when the KMT succeeded in refocusing the campaign agenda on DPP corruption scandals and the fresh image of then KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou. Tired of eight years of Blue-Green gridlock and a series of high-level corruption scandals, the public may be less receptive when asked by the DPP once again to vote for symbolic rather than practical causes. However, national identity is a potent emotional issue in Taiwan and one on which mainlander Ma Ying-jeou is vulnerable. In addition, DPP candidate Frank Hsieh has a relatively strong record as former Mayor of Kaohsiung and Premier, and the ruling party is widely acknowledged to be stronger at campaigning than the KMT, which has its own corruption issues. Therefore, despite Ma's current lead in public opinion polls, the March presidential election is still up for grabs with 100 days to go. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Taiwan will hold two major elections over the next three months: Legislative Yuan (LY) elections on January 12 followed by the presidential election on March 22. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP),which has held the presidency for the past 8 years, has never won control of the LY, and President Chen Shui-bian will be stepping down after eight years in office. Expecting to be bested once again in the upcoming LY elections, the ruling DPP is placing its hopes on retaining the presidency in an election that pits former Premier and Kaohsiung Mayor Frank Hsieh against former KMT Chairman and Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou. ¶3. (C) In 2004 President Chen eked out a razor-thin come-from-behind victory over the pan-Blue team of Lien Chan (KMT) and James Soong (PFP),after he and VP Annette Lu suffered minor gunshot wounds as they were campaigning the day before the election. Data from a tracking poll conducted by respected pollster Tai Li-an, now at Global Views Monthly, suggests that KMT candidate Lien Chan would have won the 2004 election by several percentage points in the absence of the gunshot incident
. Lien's lead heading into the day prior to the election reflected President Chen's reputation for poor performance, corruption allegations, and the edge enjoyed by Blue supporters over Green supporters in the overall electorate. ¶4. (C) While current polling shows Ma leading Hsieh by more than 10 percentage points, our contacts expect this lead to gradually narrow as the election draws closer. KMT supporters, however, continue to outnumber DPP supporters in the electorate, and President Chen and the DPP government are beset by even more questions about corruption and performance. Although Frank Hsieh rather than President Chen is the candidate this time, the situation the party faces is similar to 2004, and the DPP believes it must pursue an aggressive campaign strategy to close the gap. Because of relative POLITICAL weakness as well as longstanding party tradition, the DPP often acts more like an opposition than a ruling party, choosing, for example, to attack the KMT over past historical wrongs rather than run on its own record. Heading into 2008, the DPP wants to maintain control of the election agenda and is also planning efforts aimed at generating a late surge to overtake the KMT on election day. ¶5. (C) The aggressive POLITICAL style of the DPP, especially President Chen, coupled with strong reactions by the KMT and allied parties, has led to increasingly polarized politics in Taiwan over the past several years. This polarization becomes especially clear at election time as POLITICAL parties stake out confrontational positions to distinguish themselves, consolidate their base, and undermine opponents. Other factors contributing to polarization include the divisiveness of the issues of Taiwan identity and independence versus unification, the partisan role played by TAIPEI 00002592 002 OF 004 many media outlets, and the near annual frequency of major elections. The recent battle between the central government and the KMT Taipei city government over renaming the former Chiang Kai-shek Memorial as "Liberty Square" is a good example of how the DPP is seemingly able to keep the campaign agenda focused on identity issues rather than themes favored by the KMT, such as the economy. ¶6. (C) Although the DPP and KMT are locked in confrontation, the two candidates themselves are projecting a more moderate image to appeal to the center of the POLITICAL spectrum. Both Frank Hsieh and Ma Ying-jeou are trying to keep their distance from the more radical wings within their respective camps. As Ma and Hsieh carefully avoid taking overly confrontational positions, the media focuses on those taking stronger stands. As an AIT contact has pointed out, this sometimes makes it appear that the presidential election is between President Chen and the very vocal Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin or even between President Chen and some of the protesters he has criticized. ¶7. (C) One reason for President Chen's current activism is the "cold" election atmosphere, which party officials from the DPP and KMT as well as several LY candidates attribute both to a changed LY electoral system that reduces the effectiveness of media exposure and to voter fatigue. President Chen Shui-bian, who in October resumed his former role as DPP chairman, is working hard to raise the campaign temperature. His strong rhetoric is intended to stir up the enthusiasm of base supporters, which compensates for organizational weaknesses, boosts turnout, and helps unify the DPP's divisive factions. ¶8. (C) The tireless Chen is widely acknowledged to be the DPP's strongest campaigner, and his repeated rhetorical barrages against the KMT help keep the opposition party and its presidential candidate off balance and on the defensive. Chen, who timed the latest in a series of anti-Chiang Kai-shek moves to coincide with International Human Rights Day on December 10, has published an essay, "Goodbye, Chiang Kai-shek," underscoring the significance of "democratizing" the memorial dedicated to the "dictator" Chiang and also drawing a negative comparison between Chiang and Ma Ying-jeou without actually naming Ma. Although Chen generally tries to play themes he thinks will appeal to ethnic Taiwanese, he sometimes gets carried away, and not all of his strong rhetoric goes down well in his own camp. Even some DPP stalwarts were aghast at his attacks on the inscription on the funeral urn of Ma Ying-jeou's father, who died two years ago, and at his willingness to raise the specter of martial law in response to a dispute over technical voting procedures. (Note: Chen uncharacteristically backed down on the martial law theme a day after raising it, presumably due to sharp negative reaction within his own circles.) ¶9. (C) DPP leaders, especially President Chen, want the 2008 presidential election to be about national identity, which includes anti-KMT and independence-related themes as well as cross-Strait relations. Running for reelection in 2004, President Chen promised name changes and a new constitution and he also held Taiwan's first national referenda on political issues. Both the DPP and KMT believe Chen's "defensive referenda" contributed to his victory in 2004. Following a very similar strategy for the 2008 election, the DPP is now promoting a campaign and referendum to join the UN under the name "Taiwan." A DPP official told AIT that, during an island-wide meeting of campaign cadre in October, top party leaders stressed the importance of the UN referendum as the central theme of the DPP presidential campaign. The party leaders predicted that the DPP's UN referendum would be much more effective in mobilizing voters in 2008 than the defensive referenda had been in 2004. ¶10. (C) Campaigning on independence-related themes draws media attention and negative KMT and PRC reactions, which help consolidate the DPP base. The DPP also pushes Taiwan identity themes to drive wedges between Taiwanese and mainlander factions within the pan-Blue. Divisions within the pan-Blue over such issues are demonstrated by the TAIPEI 00002592 003 OF 004 controversies over whether to downplay the party's policies supporting one China and unification, and its emphasis on the role of Chiang Kai-shek. Established KMT policies on these issues are popular with Deep Blue mainlanders but not with many of the party's Taiwanese members and supporters. ¶11. (C) That the DPP chooses to campaign on controversial national identity issues during presidential elections is not surprising, since Taiwan independence is the party's long-term goal. In addition, emotional appeals work well in Taiwan politics, making national identity and related overtones such as past Taiwanese suffering and victimization at the hands of KMT mainlanders highly effective tools for voter mobilization. For this reason, the DPP is playing up the February 28, 1947 incident -- which very conveniently falls less than one month ahead of the presidential election -- and its campaign to discredit Chiang Kai-shek. In 2004, the pan-Green island-wide hand-in-hand rally on February 28 was a great success, and our contacts have told us the DPP will try to duplicate this success with another scenario next February. The DPP believes its advocacy of Taiwan identity enjoys wide and growing support among the Taiwanese public, and it hopes the KMT's dealings with China will make this issue a fatal vulnerability for mainlander Ma Ying-jeou. ¶12. (C) In pushing the envelope on independence-related issues, the DPP tries to avoid going too far because it realizes from previous experiences that the party will be punished at the polls if voters perceive it as radical. The DPP paved the way for Chen's initial election in 2000 by toning down its stance on independence: stating that Taiwan is already an independent state, whose current name is the "ROC," replacing its earlier call for a referendum to establish an independent "Republic of Taiwan." In September, Frank Hsieh and President Chen, looking toward the 2008 presidential election, successfully blocked an effort by then-party Chairman Yu Shyi-kun and the Deep Green to return the DPP to the more radical pro-independence position it held in the past. ¶13. (C) KMT strategists realize that Ma's strong mainlander identity is a liability. With their help, Ma has worked to repackage himself by stumping in local communities, speaking Taiwanese, and even wearing clothing designed to make him look less mainlander and more Taiwanese. Also, the KMT is trying to present itself as a Taiwan-first party, with ads that use the Taiwanese vernacular and delete the word "China" from the name "China Kuomintang." In contrast to previous elections, when the KMT rejected the Taiwan identity themes promoted by the DPP, the KMT has now adjusted its strategy and is focused on blunting the effectiveness of DPP identity campaigning. When the DPP announced a UN referendum, the KMT came up with its own version, and the KMT also mimicked DPP campaign activities related to the referendum, including a rally and a round-the-island torch relay (the KMT countered with a bicycle ride). A KMT official told AIT that his party's UN referendum is intended to minimize its losses to the DPP on an issue that is key to the DPP. ¶14. (C) The KMT is outclassed by the DPP in POLITICAL communication and campaigning, a KMT official readily acknowledged to AIT. Traditionally, the KMT makes up for this weakness with stronger local organizational capabilities, the party official noted. But KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou is taking a new "direct sales" approach that capitalizes on public and media appeal rather than the KMT machine. KMT party work with local organizations continues behind the scenes, however. Ma's go-it-alone approach means that his personal campaign team, party headquarters and the KMT LY caucus are often out of synch, resulting in gaffes such as the temporary removal of the "1992 consensus" and "unification" from a party document and failure to include a key Taiwanese supporter of Ma in the party's at-large legislative candidate list. ¶15. (C) While DPP leaders focus on Taiwan identity, the KMT hopes to train the spotlight on economic issues and DPP corruption. Charging the DPP with corruption and incompetence, the KMT argues that its past record proves it TAIPEI 00002592 004 OF 004 can manage the economy better than the DPP. According to the KMT, South Korea has outdistanced Taiwan in recent years because of poor performance by a DPP administration more interested in ideology than good governance. In addition, Ma is highlighting the KMT promise to speedily open expanded economic links with China, including direct cross-Strait flights. ¶16. (C) Citing its own statistics, lists of projects, and Frank Hsieh's record as Kaohsiung mayor, the DPP defends its performance and blames the KMT for blocking some important projects in the legislature. Frank Hsieh has presented his own cross-Strait and other economic plans, many of which sound similar to those of Ma, though with greater emphasis on social welfare and environmental protection. Differentiating himself from Ma, Hsieh has argued that Ma's plans would compromise Taiwan's longer term interests by acquiescing to PRC positions on cross-Strait issues and opening without adequate regulation. ¶17. (C) Ma's overall goal is to beat the DPP by focusing on the economy, while minimizing his losses on Taiwan identity. Hsieh, however, is trying to make his economic policies sound the same as Ma's, a pro-Green scholar recently suggested to AIT. If there is little difference between the two candidates on the economy, he explained, the election will become a contest over identity as the DPP prefers. The recent move to change Chiang Kai-shek Memorial to Liberty Square well fits the DPP strategy of centering the election battle on the identity issue. KMT resistance to the government's move seems to have played into the hands of the ruling party. It has enabled the DPP to argue that Ma and other KMT leaders are nostalgic for the authoritarian period, because they favor the symbol of a "dictator," Chiang Kai-shek, over freedom and democracy. With more than three months to go to election day, the 2008 Taiwan presidential race promises to be hard-fought down to the wire. YOUNG

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