AIT CHAIRMAN BURGHARDT AND FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 002591 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2032 TAGS: PREL PGOV CH TW SUBJECT: AIT CHAIRMAN BURGHARDT AND FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG DISCUSS UN REFERENDUM, U.S.-TAIWAN TIES Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young. Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D) ¶1. (C) Summary. In response to AIT Chairman Burghardt's expression of serious U.S. concern over the ruling DPP's UN referendum in their December 10 meeting, Foreign Minister James Huang insisted the referendum would not actually change anything. Explaining that he was carrying messages from President Bush and Secretary Rice, Chairman Burghardt stressed that the referendum appeared to be a violation of President Chen's "four no's" pledge. Huang countered that President Chen is not trying to block cross-Strait progress or constrain his successor, as his opposition to the ruling DPP's "normal country resolution" in September clearly demonstrated. End Summary. ¶2. (C) AIT Chairman Ray Burghardt met with Foreign Minister James Huang on December 10. Huang was accompanied by MOFA North American Affairs Director-General Leo Lee and Section Chief Douglas Hsu, while AIT Director Young, Deputy Director Wang and EAP/TC Acting Director Douglas Spelman accompanied Burghardt. Chairman Burghardt Conveys U.S. Concerns -------------- ¶3. (C) FM Huang started by asking Burghardt for his assessment of the state of U.S.-Taiwan bilateral ties. Burghardt replied that there continues to be serious concern in Washington over both the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) UN referendum and what Taiwan authorities might say about the referendum if it passes. He noted that during President Chen's August 2007 transit stop in Anchorage, the President had responded to his query on what he (Chen) would say the day after the referendum with "you worry too much." Chen had then spent the next two hours insisting the referendum meant just what it said and had nothing to do with independence. Washington, however, is quite concerned, Burghardt told Huang, particularly in light of Chen's recent assertions that the referendum gives Taiwan voters a choice between unification and independence. Chen, he stressed, has already gone well beyond the text of the referendum, and his statements appear to be a violation of his "four no's" pledge, as well as his pledge not to hold a referendum on independence. ¶4. (C) Burghardt advised FM Huang that he had brought messages from President Bush for President Chen and from 
Secretary Rice for each of the presidential candidates. SIPDIS These messages, he explained, reflect Washington's concerns. At the same time, he continued, the U.S. is urging Beijing not to overreact to developments in Taiwan, stressing that the referendum would not alter Taiwan's international status even if it passes. Noting that the U.S. is sometimes criticized in Taiwan for not standing up to the PRC, Burghardt pointed to DAS Christensen's explanation of U.S. policy in his September speech to the US-Taiwan Business Council and Deputy Secretary Negroponte's admonishment to both Taiwan and the PRC in his October speech to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. FM Huang Insists Referendum Does not Equal Independence -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Huang responded that the U.S. should recognize that campaign rhetoric is different from official policy. His own public statements in support of DPP legislative candidates at night and on weekends, he pointed out, are quite different from those he utters during working hours as Foreign Minister. Most of President Chen's statements about which the U.S. is worried, he continued, were actually made on the campaign trail and should be seen in that light. Huang noted that he is particularly concerned over DAS Christensen's statement that the UN referendum is intended to change the status quo. Burghardt responded that DAS Christensen is very concerned about developments in Taiwan and was expressing concerns that he and other senior leaders in Washington TAIPEI 00002591 002 OF 003 share. ¶6. (C) FM Huang told Burghardt that President Chen has assured Director Young there will be no surprises. Even if the referendum passes, he said, there will be no changes. "The Constitution is still there," he said, "and nothing will change." To Burghardt's query whether the DPP referendum would require the next president to apply for UN membership under the name Taiwan, FM Huang responded "I don't think it is that clear." (AIT Comment: KMT Ma Ying-jeou expressed similar concern to Burghardt in their December 9 meeting (reported septel); however, the wording of the DPP resolution -- "do you agree with the government joining the UN under the name "Taiwan" -- does not specically mandate action. End Comment.) ¶7. (C) If the referendum equals de jure independence, as Beijing claims, then we must ask what definition of "de jure" Beijing is using, Huang argued. De jure independence is a red line that means a formal commitment or declaration, neither of which President Chen has the authority to make. Chairman Burghardt responded that the DPP referendum appears to be a deliberate effort to box in the next president and prevent pursuit of cross-Strait peace. ¶8. (C) Noting that he has been out on the hustings campaigning for DPP legislative candidates, FM Huang said, "I can tell you there is strong support for UN membership." But whatever Taiwan does, he continued, Beijing inevitably equates it with independence, so it is no surprise that Beijing considers the DPP referendum equivalent to independence. In actuality, Huang insisted, these are two separate issues: UN membership, which is a long-term policy goal for Taiwan, and the DPP referendum, which is just a tool of democracy. If the U.S. does not make a big deal of the referendum, he argued, then Beijing could not do so. Conversely, if the U.S. criticizes the referendum, then Beijing will redouble its criticisms. ¶9. (C) Taiwan authorities, Huang told Burghardt, know "where the limits are." If President Chen had intended the DPP referendum to constrain the next president, then he would not have opposed the DPP "normal country resolution" in September. On the contrary, Huang argued, the president had worked hard to kill that resolution, showing that the objective of his referendum "is not independence." Had the president intended to change the status quo, Huang reiterated, he would have supported the normal country resolution. ¶10. (C) The U.S. may want to maintain an ambiguous China-Taiwan policy, FM Huang told Burghardt, but Taiwan must have a clear identity. Otherwise, he mused, Taiwan could end up like Hong Kong and Macao. Unfortunately, the Director weighed in, the DPP UN referendum will probably have the opposite effect and negatively affect Taiwan efforts to get in the UN. This, Too, Shall Pass -------------- ¶11. (C) When the Director asked Huang what else is on the president's mind for his meeting later that same day with Chairman Burghardt, Huang replied, chuckling, "Referenda!" After a moment, he added that the President might raise the issue of PRC efforts to establish a flight route over the mid-line of the Taiwan Strait. ¶11. (C) Burghardt assured FM Huang that the U.S. strongly supports Taiwan's participation in international organizations not requiring statehood and is working hard to achieve this. The incident this fall in which the PRC failed to convey a WHO epidemiological threat warning to Taiwan should not have happened and must not be repeated. The U.S. views PRC efforts to establish a mid-line flight route as a serious matter, he continued, and we are discussing this with the ICAO Secretariat, ICAO members, and the PRC. The TAIPEI 00002591 003 OF 003 Director interjected that AIT is working closely with the Ministry of National Defense (MND) on this issue and DAS Christensen is accompanying Treasury Secretary Paulsen to Beijing for the Senior Economic Dialogue, where he will likely discuss this issue on the side with PRC authorities. Burghardt noted that President Chen's public statement last week on PRC efforts to establish a mid-line flight route might have complicated our efforts to deal with the issue more quietly. ¶12. (C) Chairman Burghardt concluded by assessing that, despite irritants during this election season, the overall U.S.-Taiwan relationship remains strong. Noting that democratic nations, including the U.S., sometimes adopt unwise policies, he stressed the importance of learning "how to live in one's neighborhood." ¶13. (C) Chairman Burghardt did not have the opportunity to review this message. YOUNG