AIT CHAIRMAN BURGHARDT AND DPP PRESIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 002590 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2032 TAGS: PGOV TW SUBJECT: AIT CHAIRMAN BURGHARDT AND DPP PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE HSIEH DISCUSS UN REFERENDUM, CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS, AND ELECTION POLITICS Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young, Reason 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary: DPP presidential candidate Frank Hsieh on December 10 told AIT Chairman Burghardt that he is optimistic the DPP-proposed UN referendum will pass on March 22, because a majority of the people on Taiwan support greater participation in international organizations. Hsieh said he understands the U.S. position on the referendum and takes those concerns seriously. If elected president, he said he would affirm the referendum as an expression of the people's desire for international space and the belief that Taiwan is not part of the PRC, but he would not characterize the referendum as a vote on independence. Hsieh emphasized that he plans to take a cautious, deliberate approach to handling the relationship with Beijing, focusing on economic issues before tackling more difficult political questions. Hsieh said his campaign was making good progress and is narrowing the lead enjoyed by KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou. End Summary. Hsieh Pledges Moderate Tone on Referendum -------------- ¶2. (C) AIT Chairman Burghardt and DPP presidential candidate Frank Hsieh (Chang-ting) met on December 10 to discuss the DPP's UN referendum, cross-Strait relations, and Taiwan election politics. Hsieh said he is optimistic that the DPP-proposed UN referendum will pass on March 22 because a majority of the people on Taiwan supports greater participation in international organizations. He acknowledged, however, that according to bi-monthly polls conducted by the DPP, U.S. opposition to the measure has reduced overall support among the voting public. ¶3. (C) Chairman Burghardt conveyed to Hsieh an oral message from Secretary Rice (text in paragraphs 11-13). The Chairman emphasized that the U.S. has the highest regard for Taiwan's democracy, but deeply regrets the DPP decision to pursue a referendum on UN membership under the name Taiwan, which unnecessarily threatens stability in the Strait and Taiwan's security. The U.S. urges Hsieh to distance himself from any inflammatory claims President Chen may make regarding the significance of the referendum and to avoid provocative or independence-oriented steps in the course of the upcoming elections. The U.S. also urges Hsieh to consider the effect his possible inaugural speech could have on cross-Strait stability and U.S-Taiwan relations. ¶4. (C) Hsieh said he understood the U.S. position on the referendum and takes those concerns seriously. He pointed to his consistent stance on the need to preserve peace and stability across the Strait as evidence he would seek to pursue a moderate course as president. Hsieh said as a DPP member he supports the referendum initiative, but noted that it was passed by his party before he became its presidential candidate. If elected president, he would affirm the referendum as an expression of the people's desire for expanded participation in international organizations and the belief that Taiwan is not part of the PRC. Hsieh emphasized that he would resist pressure from the deep Green to go further and would not characterize the referendum as a vote on de jure independence. This was a position he already made clear during his trip to Washington, when he rejected the need for Taiwan to hold a referendum on independence. Hsieh emphasized that as president-elect he would affirm this interpretation of the UN referendum in public statements, irrespective of any remarks President Chen may make or pressure from deep Green fundamentalists. Outlines Approach to Cross-Strait Relations -------------- ¶5. (C) Hsieh emphasized that as president he would take a cautious, deliberate approach to handling the relationship with Beijing. He said both sides need to have confidence in order to pursue peaceful dialogue without rushing into immediate reconciliation that could over the long-term harm Taiwan's interests. Hsieh said he would work toward making TAIPEI 00002590 002 OF 003 progress on economic issues first, noting that he supports the expansion of charter flights, further opening of PRC tourism, and more flexibility in managing Taiwan high-tech investment in the mainland. He said as president his administration would look to the more relaxed U.S. standards and regulations on high-tech transfer and investment in China as a guide. ¶6. (C) On the political front, Hsieh said he would first urge Beijing to give Taiwan some international breathing space. The PRC's unrelenting effort to shrink Taiwan's presence in international organizations and woo diplomatic partners only generates more anti-China resentment on the island. Relaxing the pressure, Hsieh asserted, would help improve China's image, a necessary step before both sides can begin to make progress on substantive political issues. Hsieh emphasized that he would stick by these "core beliefs," despite the intense criticism they have engendered from the deep Green and pro-independence media such as the Liberty Times. Satisfied with Progress of Presidential Campaign... -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Hsieh told the Chairman his presidential campaign was progressing "so far so good." Although internal campaign polls still show he lags behind KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou, the gap has been closing since September and Hsieh's polling numbers continue to trend up. Hsieh said on the campaign trail he has not demurred from going head-to-head against Ma on economic issues, an area the KMT views as a DPP weakness but which Hsieh said his performance in Kaohsiung and as Premier demonstrate his own abilities and vision. Hsieh noted he has a good working relationship with his running mate, former Premier Su Tseng-chang, and expects to get a boost with an endorsement from former President Lee Teng-hui after the legislative elections when the TSU will no longer be in direct competition with the DPP for votes. ...Though Chen is Both Boon and Bane -------------- ¶8. (C) Asked about his relationship with President Chen, Hsieh said it presented him with a "management challenge." He could neither afford to break fully with the President nor fully embrace him. Hsieh would lose the election without Chen's support, which helps energize the deep Green base. If the election becomes a vote of confidence on Present Chen, however, Hsieh would not be able to gain enough votes from independents to win. Hsieh said Chen was "heartfelt" in his advice and support for the legislative and presidential races, noting that the President routinely attends 12 or more election-related events or activities a day. This contrasts with Hsieh's average of 6 activities a day, which he said resulted more from limited resources; he joked he does not enjoying the convenience of an "Air Force One." Nevertheless, Hsieh suggested that the president's often controversial statements and public criticism of his cross-Strait policy plans were not helping the campaign. Hsieh's campaign manager, Y.Y. Lee, interjected saying the reality is Hsieh and Chen have a lot of baggage, over 20 years worth of a relationship, to handle. Clarifies Position on Constitutional Reform -------------- ¶9. (C) Prior to the meeting, Hsieh's international affairs director Bikkim Hsiao told the Chairman she was aware that U.S. officials had expressed some concern over Hsieh's comments on constitutional reform during his Washington visit. Hsiao explained that Hsieh had not pledged to revise the constitution within five years if elected president. Rather, he had said such work could begin at the earliest in five years, and only if two conditions had been met. The DPP would have to win three-quarters of the legislature in 2012 and Taiwan identity would have to reach over 75 percent of the population. Both those conditions would not be met during his first term in office, so in the interim Hsieh TAIPEI 00002590 003 OF 003 would seek legal interpretations of claims implicit in the constitution that cannot be enforced in practice, for example the inclusion of Chinese provinces such as Sichuan as part of ROC territory. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Hsieh, upbeat and confident throughout the meeting, is walking a fine line in balancing his relationship with President Chen. Hsieh clearly sees and presents himself as his own man, having taken public positions that at times place him at odds with the president. Y.Y. Lee's telling comment on their past history suggests the two will continue their political tango up until election day, and probably beyond. Appendix: Oral Message from Secretary Rice to Hsieh -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) Continued stability in the Taiwan Strait serves the interests of the United States, the PRC, and Taiwan. The U.S. has the highest regard for Taiwan's democracy, and believes that our approach to cross-Strait issues and to Taiwan's security has allowed your democracy to flourish. That said, we deeply regret the DPP's decision to pursue a referendum on UN membership under the name Taiwan, which we believe unnecessarily threatens stability in the Strait and thus your security. This referendum should not take place. ¶12. (C) Your own stance vis-a-vis the DPP referendum before the election will be critical to ensuring more productive cross-Strait relations after the election. Should President Chen make inflammatory claims about the significance of the DPP referendum, and should he continue to characterize it as a vote on sovereignty versus unification, we would urge you to distance yourself from his remarks. We urge you to avoid provocative or independence-oriented steps in the course of the presidential and legislative campaigns and to use your influence to urge the same caution on President Chen and his administration. We also urge you to consider carefully the effect that your possible inaugural speech will have on both cross-Strait stability and the atmosphere of trust that has long characterized Taiwan's relationship with the U.S. ¶13. (C) The U.S. has the highest regard for Taiwan's democracy. It is therefore very important that the upcoming elections be a model of democracy in every way, throughout the electoral season and in the period before the inauguration, regardless of electoral outcomes. We will continue to oppose PRC threats and to urge Beijing to engage in direct dialogue with Taiwan's elected leadership. We will also work to protect Taiwan's international space. ¶14. (SBU) Chairman Burghardt did not have the opportunity to review this cable. YOUNG