KMT HONORARY CHAIRMAN LIEN CHAN ON CROSS-STRAIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 002522 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2017 TAGS: PGOV TW SUBJECT: KMT HONORARY CHAIRMAN LIEN CHAN ON CROSS-STRAIT SECURITY, UN REFERENDUM, MA YING-JEOU Classified By: Director Stephen M. Young, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary: The Director met with KMT Honorary Chairman Lien Chan and former TECRO representative Stephen Chen (Hsi-fan) at Lien's office on November 21. Observing that China's military buildup hurts the KMT at the polls, Lien suggested China could earn enormous goodwill in Taiwan (and help the KMT win) by opening a few coastal military bases to inspection by representatives from Taiwan. Lien expressed concern that President Chen will not withdraw the DPP UN referendum, which might then draw the U.S. and China into conflict. He urged the U.S. to do more to dissuade Chen. Otherwise, he argued, a frustrated China could take matters "into its own hands." If KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou is elected president and the DPP UN referendum does pass, Ma will probably simply ignore it, Lien said. Lien said it is too early to predict a Ma victory, adding that he "might have to" campaign for Ma early next year. End Summary. PRC Missiles POLITICAL Burden For KMT -------------- ¶2. (C) The Director observed that China's military buildup appeared to exceed its defensive needs, leading senior U.S. defense analysts to conclude that China desired the capability to challenge U.S. military interests in the Pacific. The PRC conducts its military affairs in secret, Lien responded, and the lack of transparency creates anxiety both in the U.S. and Taiwan. During his first meeting with PRC President Hu Jintao, Lien continued, he and Hu discussed in general terms the possibility of increasing defense-related communications and other confidence-building measures. According to Lien, Hu seemed receptive to the idea, but no tangible steps have been taken. ¶3. (C) Lien noted that China had recently opened some of its missile bases to inspection by the U.S. military. Lien then asked whether it would be feasible for the U.S. or another third party to suggest to Beijing the idea of opening such bases for inspection by legislators, academics, reporters or other non-governmental representatives of Taiwan. China's threatening military posture is a burden to the KMT in every Taiwan election, Lien lamented. By opening some of its coastal military bases to inspection, he continued, China could do much to improve its image in Taiwan, while helping the KMT overcome this electoral handicap. Lien said he had ruled out visiting the Mainland until after the presidential election next March, to avoid exacerbating DPP criticism that the KMT is "too close" to China. Could Referendum Alter Status Quo? -------------- ¶4. (C) Lien told the Director his greatest concern is that President Chen's UN referendum could "force two great powers, the U.S. and China, into conflict." RELATIONS between the U.S. and China are positive and constructive, Lien argued, as evidenced by, in his view, their "co-management" of Taiwan. The UN referendum will increase Green turnout for the presidential election, he continued, so Chen is unlikely to give it up. The U.S. must do more than verbally oppose the measure, Lien urged, otherwise, there is a risk China could "take matters into its own hands" to prevent the referendum's passage. ¶5. (C) The Director explained that the U.S. and China do not "co-manage" Taiwan. The U.S. insists the cross-Strait question must be resolved peacefully in a way that reflects the will of the Taiwan people. But China's military buildup demonstrates it still considers Taiwan an "internal matter" that can be resolved by the use of force. The U.S. will not become a mediator, the Director emphasized, but will continue to work with both China and Taiwan to stave off cross-Strait conflict. ¶6. (C) The question then becomes whether passage of the DPP UN referendum would somehow alter the cross-Strait status quo, Lien said. While passage of the DPP UN referendum could complicate cross-Strait relations, responded the Director, it should not affect the status quo because it does not change TAIPEI 00002522 002 OF 002 the legal status of the ROC. Lien told the Director the KMT leadership believes that as long as Taiwan endorses the ROC name and constitution, Beijing will accept the current reality of Taiwan's de facto independence. President Ma and UN for Taiwan -------------- ¶7. (C) If Ma becomes president and the DPP UN referendum passes, Ma will probably "ignore" the referendum result, or argue that it has already been honored, said Lien. The referendum requires only that the government apply for UN membership as "Taiwan," explained Lien. Because the Chen administration already tried and failed, he reasoned, Ma could convincingly argue it would be fruitless to try again. Lien: Lukewarm About Ma -------------- ¶8. (C) Lien had little to say regarding the strengths or weaknesses of Ma or his presidential campaign, remarking only that it is too early to predict a KMT victory. Lien told the Director that he would not "for the time being" campaign for Ma, but with noticeable disdain said he "might have to" in early February or March of next year. Lien was willing to predict a KMT majority in the Legislative Yuan (LY) of at least 58 seats (of 113). Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) The animosity between Lien and Ma, widely recognized in Taiwan POLITICAL circles, was palpable in Lien's discussion of the KMT candidate. Though he has adopted a low-key approach to Taiwan politics in recent months, Lien's influence among older, more conservative party members makes him an important backroom player as Ma tries to unify the KMT behind his candidacy. In the end, Lien has no choice but to support the Ma campaign, because the alternative of a DPP victory in March's presidential elections would fatally cripple the KMT. But as his remarks to us indicate, he'll do this with no great enthusiasm. YOUNG