KMT HONORARY CHAIRMAN LIEN CHAN ON CROSS-STRAIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 002522

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2017
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: KMT HONORARY CHAIRMAN LIEN CHAN ON CROSS-STRAIT
SECURITY, UN REFERENDUM, MA YING-JEOU

Classified By: Director Stephen M. Young, Reason(s): 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) Summary: The Director met with KMT Honorary Chairman
Lien Chan and former TECRO representative Stephen Chen
(Hsi-fan) at Lien's office on November 21. Observing that
China's military buildup hurts the KMT at the polls, Lien
suggested China could earn enormous goodwill in Taiwan (and
help the KMT win) by opening a few coastal military bases to
inspection by representatives from Taiwan. Lien expressed
concern that President Chen will not withdraw the DPP UN
referendum, which might then draw the U.S. and China into
conflict. He urged the U.S. to do more to dissuade Chen.
Otherwise, he argued, a frustrated China could take matters
"into its own hands." If KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou is
elected president and the DPP UN referendum does pass, Ma
will probably simply ignore it, Lien said. Lien said it is
too early to predict a Ma victory, adding that he "might have
to" campaign for Ma early next year. End Summary.

PRC Missiles Political Burden For KMT
--------------


2. (C) The Director observed that China's military buildup
appeared to exceed its defensive needs, leading senior U.S.
defense analysts to conclude that China desired the
capability to challenge U.S. military interests in the
Pacific. The PRC conducts its military affairs in secret,
Lien responded, and the lack of transparency creates anxiety
both in the U.S. and Taiwan. During his first meeting with
PRC President Hu Jintao, Lien continued, he and Hu discussed
in general terms the possibility of increasing
defense-related communications and other confidence-building
measures. According to Lien, Hu seemed receptive to the
idea, but no tangible steps have been taken.


3. (C) Lien noted that China had recently opened some of its
missile bases to inspection by the U.S. military. Lien then
asked whether it would be feasible for the U.S. or another
third party to suggest to Beijing the idea of opening such
bases for inspection by legislators, academics, reporters or
other non-governmental representatives of Taiwan. China's
threatening military posture is a burden to the KMT in every
Taiwan election, Lien lamented. By opening some of its
coastal military bases to inspection, he continued, China
could do much to improve its image in Taiwan, while helping
the KMT overcome this electoral handicap. Lien said he had
ruled out visiting the Mainland until after the presidential
election next March, to avoid exacerbating DPP criticism that
the KMT is "too close" to China.

Could Referendum Alter Status Quo?
--------------


4. (C) Lien told the Director his greatest concern is that
President Chen's UN referendum could "force two great powers,
the U.S. and China, into conflict." Relations between the
U.S. and China are positive and constructive, Lien argued, as
evidenced by, in his view, their "co-management" of Taiwan.
The UN referendum will increase Green turnout for the
presidential election, he continued, so Chen is unlikely to
give it up. The U.S. must do more than verbally oppose the
measure, Lien urged, otherwise, there is a risk China could
"take matters into its own hands" to prevent the referendum's
passage.


5. (C) The Director explained that the U.S. and China do not
"co-manage" Taiwan. The U.S. insists the cross-Strait
question must be resolved peacefully in a way that reflects
the will of the Taiwan people. But China's military buildup
demonstrates it still considers Taiwan an "internal matter"
that can be resolved by the use of force. The U.S. will not
become a mediator, the Director emphasized, but will continue
to work with both China and Taiwan to stave off cross-Strait
conflict.


6. (C) The question then becomes whether passage of the DPP
UN referendum would somehow alter the cross-Strait status
quo, Lien said. While passage of the DPP UN referendum could
complicate cross-Strait relations, responded the Director, it
should not affect the status quo because it does not change

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the legal status of the ROC. Lien told the Director the KMT
leadership believes that as long as Taiwan endorses the ROC
name and constitution, Beijing will accept the current
reality of Taiwan's de facto independence.

President Ma and UN for Taiwan
--------------


7. (C) If Ma becomes president and the DPP UN referendum
passes, Ma will probably "ignore" the referendum result, or
argue that it has already been honored, said Lien. The
referendum requires only that the government apply for UN
membership as "Taiwan," explained Lien. Because the Chen
administration already tried and failed, he reasoned, Ma
could convincingly argue it would be fruitless to try again.

Lien: Lukewarm About Ma
--------------


8. (C) Lien had little to say regarding the strengths or
weaknesses of Ma or his presidential campaign, remarking only
that it is too early to predict a KMT victory. Lien told the
Director that he would not "for the time being" campaign for
Ma, but with noticeable disdain said he "might have to" in
early February or March of next year. Lien was willing to
predict a KMT majority in the Legislative Yuan (LY) of at
least 58 seats (of 113).

Comment
--------------


9. (C) The animosity between Lien and Ma, widely recognized
in Taiwan political circles, was palpable in Lien's
discussion of the KMT candidate. Though he has adopted a
low-key approach to Taiwan politics in recent months, Lien's
influence among older, more conservative party members makes
him an important backroom player as Ma tries to unify the KMT
behind his candidacy. In the end, Lien has no choice but to
support the Ma campaign, because the alternative of a DPP
victory in March's presidential elections would fatally
cripple the KMT. But as his remarks to us indicate, he'll do
this with no great enthusiasm.
YOUNG